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DUKOR ON RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM IN NATION-BUILDING

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Abstract

Professor Maduabuchi Dukor did some critical reflections on the nature and character of the phenomena of 'religious fundamentalism', and 'nation-building' in a multi-cultural and multi-religious society like Nigeria., wherein he depicts religion as a neutral concept with a malleable nature that makes it susceptible to both positive and negative deployment. He identifies religious fundamentalism as one of the negative consequential effects of the malleable nature of religion. This paper is an appraisal of Dukor's postulations and submissions on the twin notions of religious fundamentalism and nation-building. Although its findings corroborate Dukor's positions in virtually all fronts regarding religious fundamentalism and nation-building, the corroboration is only to the extent that religious fundamentalism is construed as an inherently evil phenomenon without any good latent in it. However, relying on the twin theories of utilitarianism and dualism, the paper argues that contrary to Dukor's position, there are ways in which religious fundamentalism could be a catalyst to nation-building and sustainable development. This observed imbalance in Dukor's position constitutes the gap in his discourse which this paper fills.

Keywords: nation-building, religion, fundamentalism, fanaticism; crisis; bigotry.

Introduction

Religion occupies a central place in the affairs of man. Whereas there is no known community without a religion, virtually all known religions have belief in the existence of a supernatural deity as their foundation. Even in a nation with

religious pluralism, members of such a nation and by implication, varying religions, are expected to be united by the notion of belief in a supernatural deity as the architect of all that exists. This is why religion is said to be an integrating force. However, the inability of humans to comprehend the true nature of the supposed Supreme Being as manifested in numerous claims and counter-claims of revelations and miracles has produced fanatics/fundamentalists in these religions. While noting that fundamentalism has such negative connotations as bigotry, zealotry, militancy, extremism, and fanaticism which make it unsuitable as a category of scholarly analysis, Henry Munson conceptualized fundamentalism as a type of conservative religious movement characterized by the advocacy of strict conformity to sacred texts (<https://www.britannica.com/topic/fundamentalism>. Accessed 3 May 2022). Religious fundamentalism is prominent in virtually all faith traditions across the globe.

Dukor conceives religion as both an integrating as well as a disintegrating force. According to Dukor (2003), religious fundamentalism breeds religious violence, and the combined effects of these two factors constitute a major obstacle to Nigeria's efforts at nation-building. He adds that, when considered economically and politically, it is the absence of defined, articulated and practicable ideology or a philosophy of economic and political stability that is at the heart of the problem (p. 173). Religious fundamentalists/extremists (when construed from the angle Dukor did) are responsible for the various religious mayhems besetting different countries today, including Nigeria. To what extent are Dukor's observations and submissions correct, out of tune, or over-bloated? What follows is an appraisal of Dukor's views on religion as a potent force for unification and disintegration in nation-building. Although I agreed with Dukor in most of his observations and position vis-à-vis religion and nation-building, my agreement with him is only to the extent that religious fundamentalism is perceived purely through the lens of an inherently negative phenomenon. But there are many ways in which religious fundamentalism could become a formidable catalyst for nation-building and sustainable development. Dukor's failure to recognize and incorporate this aspect of religious fundamentalism constitutes the gap in his discourse which this paper fills. Utilitarianism and dualism form the theoretical frameworks upon which the paper is based. While utilitarianism as a theory judges the moral worth of actions

on the basis of the utility/consequences it produces, dualism is a theory which holds that reality is made up two supposedly independent stuffs or opposites. Applied to the concept of religious fundamentalism, utilitarianism makes strict/extreme adherence to religious precepts a better option to follow, if doing so will result in more peace, social cohesion, and sustainable development. As for dualism, its application helps us to appreciate the fact that there are two sides to reality. Thus, we have life and death, tall and short, male and female, the spiritual and the material, etc. It is, therefore, not surprising that religious pluralism is open to both positive and negative construction and deployment.

Conceptual Clarifications.

Religion

As a concept, religion is no doubt a controversial one. This accounts for the lack of consensus among scholars vis-à-vis its definition. It also accounts for the nuances in religious practices among various religious groups found all over the world. Be that as it may, virtually all known religions have one thing in common, and that is the notion of God, or invisible super-human power as the case may be. The notion of God equally underpins the various definitions of religion that are so far in existence.

The root meaning of the term 'religion' derives from the Latin word "religio" which means to link up. Because the idea of God can hardly be divorced from religion, one can posit that etymologically, religion means "to link up with God". By the idea of God is meant that God is the supreme power in the universe and that his worship is necessary for welfare and happiness (Visudeva, 1988: 95). Regarding religion, Mbiti (1999) notes that religion has permeated human life in all ramifications such that it is not easy to separate man from it. In fact, for him, Africans do not know how to live without religion. The idea of God is central to every religion, but then no one religion is in agreement with the other as it concerns the identify of God and the best way of worshipping him.

Since the idea of religion is to bring man to the recognition of, or an awakened sense of a higher unseen controlling power or powers, with emotion and morality connected therewith (Visudeva, 89), and since different religions do not have a common knowledge of the true identity and nature of God, with each claiming to have exclusive knowledge of him and his ways, there is bound to be one religious

crisis or the other besetting humanity. It is in this sense that Dukor (1988) rightly conceived religion as both an integrating and disintegrating force.

Fundamentalism

According to the Webster's Dictionary, Fundamentalism means, among other things, (1) the belief that all statements made in the Bible are literally true. (2). In the United States, a movement among Protestants holding that such belief is essential to Christian faith: opposed to modernism (The New International Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary of the English Language, Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition, 2004: 512). What this definition implies is that a fundamentalist is one who is prone to literal interpretation of the traditional beliefs of Christian religion, especially as contained in the Bible. For the purposes of this discourse, the usage of the term fundamentalism would not be restricted to the Christian religion alone, but would instead apply to all religions. Thus, coming from a broader perspective, Benedict conceives fundamentalism as "a concept usually applied to biblical religions, cults, sects and their literature, identifying a belief in the absolute and infallible truth of whatever authority they rest on (cf. Benedict, 2008: 192). To this end, the fundamentalism of the Bible, the Koran, the Vedas, etc, is derived from the belief that every word as contained in them is the given and inviolable word of God or Allah as the case may be. Underpinning the whole idea of fundamentalism is a supposedly unquestionable truth which, in the estimation of the fundamentalists, is only opposed by forces of evil that must be fought to a standstill. Altemeyer (1996), Kirkpatrick (1993), and Watson et al., (2003), all betray the impression that, Fundamentalism is positively related with prejudice. For Beckford (2015), fundamentalism centers on unswerving faith in the authority of fixed principles, usually embedded in sacred texts, to dictate categorical rules for the conduct of personal and public life. He adds that it is also associated with assertive leadership and deep distrust of life outside its groups of committed believers. Also in this regard, Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) conceive fundamentalism in terms of attitude. In their words which are implicative of the purport of fundamentalism, "there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity" (p. 118).

Dukor does not condemn religion per se. For him, there is nothing inherently wrong with religion as a concept. What he condemns with respect to religion is

religious fundamentalism, a phrase he uses interchangeably with “religious fanaticism.” He sees religious fanaticism as a hallmark of anti-intellectualism (Dukor, 2010: 207).

Nation and Nation-Building

In its simplest form, the term nation refers to a group of people with common history, language, customs, descent, traditions as well as culture. The French philosopher, Renan (1882: 32) states that a nation is large scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of sacrifices that one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future. In his 1991 work entitled: *Imagined Communities*, Benedict posits that a nation comprises a group of people so large that its members cannot know each other personally but nonetheless have come to imagine that they share important characteristics that unify them as a nation and even national self-determination (p. 46). According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a nation is an extensive aggregate of persons, so closely associated with each other by common descent, language or history as to form a distinct race or people usually organized as a separate political state and occupying a definite territory (*Oxford English Dictionary*, vol vii., 1970: 30). This second conception of a nation is broader than the first for it embodies the idea that a nation can be used interchangeably with a state. In this sense, a country like Nigeria can be referred to as a nation. It is also in this sense that Dukor conceived a nation, for he categorized Nigeria as a nation even though with regret that Nigeria has neither a common culture nor a common religion (1988: 60). For him, what makes for a consistent nationhood is the interaction of such cultural elements as politics, economics, science, arts and law, etc.

Dukor’s conception of a nation as being synonymous with a state is in line with J.S Mill’s notion of a nation. Concerning a nation which he used synonymously with nationality, Mill remarked thus:

A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality (nation) if they are united among themselves by common sympathies, which do not exist between them and any others- which make them cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves, or a portion of themselves, exclusively (cf. Olayiwola, 1988: 228).

There is a link between the concept of nation and nation-building, such that the degree to which one is construed (in this case, 'nation') determines the successful implementation of the other (nation-building). Scholars of different persuasions have construed the notion of 'nation-building' from their respective points of view. In this regard, Nwabughugu (2004: 54) submits that nation-building is "a process of developing national consciousness among individuals and groups to cultivate a sense of love for a given nation and to accept this as a commitment to a nation-state". Beyond this conception, he adds that nation-building involves the creation of a conducive environment that will sustain the sense of love developed by the individual and group for the nation-state. As Olayiwola (1988: 230) puts it, nation-building is a key concept that is derived from the term nation and it is seen as a dynamic process of generation among a collectivity, a community of culture, economics and politics with ability for most members to actualize their potentialities.

Still on nation-building, Ilo (2011) posits that nation-building is a project involving the "the psycho-social reconstruction of individuals, as also a process of infusing people who differ widely in language and shared identity. Whether we construe it from the economic front or political front, the concept of nation-building involves change, and the goal of the envisaged change is the emergence or birth of a modern society from the hitherto traditional society. The goal of nation-building in Nigeria pursued from the political front is to evolve nationhood, a conscious sense of patriotism, a transfer of individualistic sentiments and loyalties to a national level. On the other hand when pursued from the economic front, the goal of Nigeria's nation-building is to effect a rapid and massive increase in both individual and national productivity vis-à-vis the material and physical well-being of the nation.

Religious Fundamentalism

In the opinion of Komonchak, et al (1987: 68), Religious fundamentalism is manifestations of religious intolerance. This being the case, religious fundamentalism is a religious movement that promotes the literal interpretation of, and strict adherence to religious doctrine, especially as a return to orthodox scriptural prescriptions and doctrinal originality. It seeks strict adherence to the orthodox principles of particular faiths, just as it frowns at modernism with its propensity to adulterating or diminishing original doctrinal principles. Religious

fundamentalism, which is a derivation of the two terms; 'religious' and 'fundamentalism', may be construed as any sect of movement within a religion that emphasizes a rigid adherence to what it conceives of as the fundamental principles of it (sic) faith, usually resulting in a denouncement of alternative practices and interpretations" (cf. Mgbachu & Onwuliri 2014: 108). Religious fundamentalism occurs when one religion holds the belief that no other religion is real or instituted by God other than itself. In Nigeria, for instance, where we have Islam and Christianity as the two dominant religions, one sees religious fundamentalism in action in a supremacy battle of authenticity between actors from both sides. Fundamentalism is found even within a given religions, courtesy of the existence of different sects within that religion claiming to be espousing the real tenets and principles of the religion in question.

For the reason that religious fundamentalists tend to disparage members of other faiths or those within their faith circle, but outside their sect or group and to convince them that they are not experiencing the authentic version of their professed religion, their activities and antics are bound to bring about conflict, distrust, and violence in society. Little wonder, then, why Casanova (1994) averred that, processes of modernization are commonly identified with the separation of religions from states as a prerequisite for the development of civil society. Beckford and Cairns (2015) did not agree less. They observe (and rightly I think) that the separation between religion and the state is widely regarded as a central feature of modernization processes, albeit they regrettably contend that sociological research has tended to neglect the extent to which even 'secular states' continue to manage religion in such institutions as prisons, hospitals as well as military establishments.

Dukor on Religion as an Integrating and Disintegrating Force

The National Association for Religious Tolerance (NARETO) made a very strategic declaration which she adopts as her motto. It goes thus:

I Believe In The Supreme Being And I Subscribe To The Doctrines of My own Religion. I Declare That Adherents Of Other Religions Have Similar Natural Rights. It Is The Supreme Being Alone Who knows and Who Will Have The Last Say on Who is The Genuine Practitioner. I Pray to Him To Judge me

As Such And I Appeal To My Fellow Human Beings To Leave
That Judgement To Him And To Him Alone (cf. C.S. Momoh et
al eds., 1988: iii).

Dukor has no doubt whatsoever that religion is a potent unifying force. But he is also aware that religion is at the same time a veritable disintegrating force. In fact, he **is** aware that religion is a neutral concept like many other concepts and is, as such, subject to either positive or negative manipulations and deployment depending on whose hand it enters. Hence, bearing this in mind, and in tandem with the spirit behind the above NARETO declaration (which is to guard against religious abuse and fundamentalism), Dukor observes that,

... Religion is not a concept which is intrinsically bad. It is rather an integrating force. Religion as a disintegrating force is attributable to the organizers, the organization, the preachers, the preaching, the propagators and the propagation of religions (1988: 61).

From Dukor's utterances, it is understandable that he links religious fundamentalism/fanaticism to failure to imbibe the spirit behind the NARETO declaration in the face of religious pluralism. This lack of spirit of open-mindedness ultimately results in a quest and effort to defend the particularistic claims of one religion. Religious extremists are usually of the position that ones others do not follow their ways, they will be damned. Besides condemning the preaching and articles of faith of other religions, they more often than not resort to violence to stop these other people from the other side of the religious divide. What is more, given that religious fundamentalists do not subscribe to imaginary or perceived compromise with social change, especially social change that contradicts their religious orthodoxy, they do everything within their reach to ensure that their religious doctrines are given universal acknowledgement, just as the prevailing political, social and economic systems must conform to their religious tenets and standards. Religious extremism does not admit of any.

Dukor is of the conviction that the disintegrating force of religion manifests itself in fundamentalism, which in turn results in terrorist activities. Like most scholars, including this writer, Dukor holds the opinion that religion as a disintegrating force is man-made, and therefore superficial. Every religion tries to project itself as the only genuine religion sanctioned by God. And in a bid to project and defend

itself in that light, it goes into the business of blackmailing other religions. The corollary of such false indoctrination is the emergence of some dogmatically-oriented groups within each religion with the goal of countering the force of perceived opposing religion (s). Dukor suspects that those who fan the embers of religious fundamentalism and vandalism are only using them as a means to further their politico-religious interests. While expressing regrets that Nigeria no longer has African values and practices as the bedrock of her unity, Dukor blames the spate of religious crisis in Nigeria largely on the importation of Islam and Christianity into Africa (1988: 62).

The formation of religious associations and the organization of symposia and seminars by religious sects as a means of disseminating their dogmas was identified by Dukor as another motive force behind religions as a disintegrating force. He attributes the purpose behind these sects to mere show of superiority to opposing religions. This, he said, is coupled with the proliferation of both primary and secondary schools formed along the line of different religions and religious denominations and wherein education in the form of dogmatism, pride of one's religion and fanaticism, etc., is received. Elsewhere, and in apparent reference to the intrusion of religious fundamentalism/bigotry, ignorance, and greed into state affairs in Africa as well as the debilitating effects they have on efforts at nation-building, Dukor has these to say: "There is an ill-wind that is blowing across African continent and which disintegrate nations in Africa. This ill-wind renders multi-national democracy and federalism which are the cornerstone of modern development otiose (2003: 172, fn. 12).

In a related development, Dukor observed that religion as a disintegrating force is nothing short of religious intolerance. In other words, religion as a disintegrating force finds expression in religious intolerance. And for him, as for this writer, religious intolerance is the end product of exclusive religiosity – the propensity to believe and project the idea that one's religion, God, and religious practices are the only authentic ones, and that salvation is only possible through identification with them. Save the Nigerian Indigenous religion which Dukor accused the other two major religions (Islam and Christianity) of treating as though it has no knowledge of God, he accused different religions in the country of being avenues for breeding intolerance and disunity. Much as Dukor finds in religion a disintegrating force if wrongly embraced and manipulated, he equally opined that religion is a veritable instrument for social integration. For him, religion as an integrative force

manifests itself by way of preaching social, political and economic morality (1988: 62). Every religion, he observes, teaches virtues and moral values that are strategic to the promotion of peace, unity, progress and peaceful co-existence. It is worthy to note that all these virtues are potent weapons of integration. Dukor has no doubt that the dogmas of Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Godianism, etc, have the in-built mechanism for remolding the moral, social and political temperament of mankind. This is even as religion is generally antithetical to terrorism and rascalism (1988: 64). He, therefore, submits that religious conflicts, riots, fundamentalism as well as terrorism would become a thing of the past in Nigeria, if Christians and Moslems tailor their religious preaching and practices in line with the life and teachings of Jesus and Muhammed.

Dukor on Nigerian Nationhood.

We had stated earlier that for Dukor, nationhood is a consistent whole made possible by the interaction of such cultural elements as politics, economic, science, arts, and law, etc. Bearing this in mind, he emphasizes the need for all religions including Islam, Christianity and traditional religions to interact theologically and socially, and for their respective adherents to see people from outside their fold as children of the same God. While admitting that Nigeria is a federation of multi-ethnic nationalities and that federalism has the propensity to deepen imbalances among the federating states, Dukor identifies and distinguishes between two kinds of federalism – a federation of sponsoring states, and a federation sponsored states. In the case of a federation of sponsored into which he categorizes Nigeria, there is usually the presence of an over-arching central government which supersedes the states sponsored by it (2003: 172, fn. 11). This sort of federalism, Dukor believes, has the propensity of promoting the thirst to hijack central authority by national group due to the often weak nature of such sponsored states. In his estimation, this conception of federalism should not be used to subvert the multi-national democracy and nation-building (Ibid.). Conversely, a federation of sponsoring states assumes the presence of socially, culturally and economically vibrant states empowered to minister at the grassroots to the objectively varied needs of the people. Unlike the federation of sponsored states, the idea of a federation of sponsoring states weakens the urge to hijack central authority by national groups because there is simply nothing to loot centrally (Ibid.).

Dukor is of the view that for a smooth and effective nation-building to materialize in a multi-plural and multicultural society, nothing short of a plural structure is needed. Putting any other structure other than this in place is an invitation to disintegration. As a way forward to nation-building, Dukor proposes what he calls Acculturation, Democracy, Ideology, Secularism, and Patriotism (ADISP). ADISP, for him, is an integrated process which, if adopted, will work overtime in the consciousness of the people. In proposing ADISP, Dukor notes that a theory of nation-building is an imperative in this historical period of anomy stemming from ethnic diversity, religious plurality, and bigotry, greed and ignorance.

According to Dukor, the process of integration is the process of building a new society and a new social order based on justice and fair play (2003: 173). This integration requires that socio-economic progress be made within the democratic framework and sharing of power with minorities. For him, therefore, invoking and relying on the notion of religion in a multi-cultural, multi-linguistic, and multi-religious entity like Nigeria vis-à-vis nation-building requires that we embrace the notions of universal brotherhood of all men and the universal fatherhood of God as the basis upon which Nigeria's quest for nationhood will be attained. In the absence of this, he recommends the recognition of Nigerian indigenous religions as the official religions for both domestic and foreign policies and as the possible basis for Nigeria nationhood.

How Appropriate are Dukor's Views on Religious Fundamentalism: *Towards a Discussion*

Dukor's views on religion generally and religious fundamentalism in particular as they affect nation-building are, no doubt, far-reaching. They are far-reaching because most of them are in the right direction and have the backing of many scholars, both from the old and new generation blocs, including this writer. One can say, without any fear of contradiction that Dukor's entire discourse on religion was a repudiation of fundamentalism. Dukor examined religious fundamentalism vis-à-vis nation-building from the dimension of a blind acceptance of one's religious group and teachings/precepts as the only divinely and authentically ordained religion and teachings to the point of excluding all alternative religious groups, members and their teachings. Dukor's straight-jacketed perception of religious fundamentalism as being an inherently negative phenomenon with little or no positive impact on development marks my point of departure from him. His

failure to understand religious fundamentalism both in terms of strict adherence to the known universal spiritual values believed to be recognized and present in almost all known religions and the recognition of one's own religion and teachings as the only truly ordained ones by God makes his discourse one-sided. Dukor who, from all indications, appeared to have favoured secularism seems to agree that even secularism taken to an extreme could be both anti-human and social development. In other words, he condemns fundamentalism for its exclusionist character to the point that he also moved for a rejection of a full-scale adoption of secularism. Regarding secularism, Dukor opines that its confusion and misunderstanding in the hands of many political leaders and interlocutors has portrayed it as a stumbling block to nation-building. This is notwithstanding the fact that secularism is a significant term as far as modern democratic systems and politics of developing nation-states are concerned (cf. Dukor, 2003: 173). He conceives secularism as the belief that state, moral, education, etc, should be independent of religion, the implication of which, for him, is that society where it is applied should be wholly mundane, materialistic, and scientific in her undertaking (Ibid.). Worthy of note here is that much as Dukor (at least from my estimation) condemns religious fundamentalism/extremism for being a cog on the wheels of nation-building in favour of secularism, he is also averse to an undiluted secularism. Unknowingly to him, this singular disposition to moderate religiosity and moderate secularism puts on him the toga of eclectic philosopher. Dukor's conception and discourse on religious fundamentalism in the context of nation-building is diametrically to those of some other scholars as we shall come to see later. Dukor's aversion for religious fundamentalism is not without some strong reasons.

First, he equates religious fundamentalism with fanaticism, rascalism and intolerance. Among other things, Dukor cautions against religious fundamentalism for the reason that fundamentalism is generally opposed to change, and for him, change is the only phenomena that remains constant. He alludes to the fact that religious fundamentalism surfaced as a result of the realization by religions that empires built on religious myth and miracles are now under the threat of the increasing power of scientific knowledge. The only condition upon which Dukor would have accepted religious fundamentalism is when it is adopted for the purpose of nationalistic agitation in a mono-religious and mono-cultural entity. Anything short of that smacks of intolerance and

exclusionism. For him, religious revolution in a multi-cultural and multi-religious entity can never be a replacement for nationalism. Thus, in commenting on the Islamic fundamentalism in Africa, he writes that:

Nationalistic agitation was based on African cultural unity which Islamic religion and values cannot substitute in any context without a theory of conflict and cataclysm. This is the rot and lot of Islamic revolution or agitation in a multicultural world (2010: 199).

What is more, Dukor condemns out rightly religious fundamentalism in Nigeria and in African because of its exclusionist tendency. Exclusive religiosity is a situation whereby the fundamentalist drive of one religion makes it lay claim to being the only authentic religion, thereby implying a monopoly vis-à-vis the knowledge of God and his ways. This is what Dukor says is obtainable in Africa today, where Islam and Christianity have relegated African traditional religions to the level of religiousless bodies that lack any knowledge of God.

It is worthy to note that Dukor is not alone in condemning fundamentalist-oriented religious exclusionism. This writer and some others share his views completely. For instance, the whole essence of an allegedly controversial book written by a certain author and entitled: *God Has No Religion* (Ezeora, 2010) is to demonstrate that no religion has a monopoly of the knowledge of God, and that no religion has any justifiable basis to claim superiority to others. In the said book, the author takes several stands that are similar to those of Dukor. In an attempt to back up his position that God has no singular personality, no gender, and no name, and that he dwells impartiality in all men, the author quotes, among other Biblical verses, 1 Cor. 12:4-14. Specifically, Verses 4-7 states that:

There are different kinds of spiritual gifts, but the same spirit gives them. There are different ways of serving, but the same Lord is served. ... The spirit's presence is shown in some way in each person for the good of all.

According to the author under reference, the exclusionist character of Islam and Christianity is responsible for the current woes of Africa and the Middle East as well as the inglorious label of these countries as third world countries. He writes:

...Most professed Christians and Muslims find it very difficult to appreciate this truth (i.e of their ungodly behavior). These two religious constitute the only reasons for the third world syndrome stamped in Africa and the Middle East (Ezeora, 2010).

In the above passage, the author is actually reacting in support of Prof. Covey's observations to the effect that attending church does not necessarily mean living the principles taught in those meetings, and that one can be active in a church but inactive in its gospel (Stephen. R. Covey as cited by Ezeora, 2010). As I had mentioned earlier, Dukor's views on religion and religious Fundamentalism/extremism are also in consonance with mine. However, it has to be noted that being in consonance with my own understanding is to the extent that religious fundamentalism is understood in a purely negative sense as Dukor did. But then beyond Dukor's understanding, I am of the affirmation that some positive values are latent in religious fundamentalism. I also share the views of Ezeora and covey as expressed above. Both Koran and the Bible are replete with passages that clearly give vent to the oneness of God. Asogwa (2011: 156) corroborates this when he writes that, "God is one and that the different religious are only manifestations of different ways of getting to one destination". The Koran (Qur'an) in its chapter 3 verses 84 declares thus:

We (believers) believe in God and that which was revealed to Abraham and Ishmael and Isaac and Jacob and the Israelites and that which was given to Jesus and to all the prophets from their Lord. We do not make distinction between any of them and to God we submit.

Elsewhere, in chapter 29 Vs 46, the Koran says:

And do not argue with the people of the book, except in best terms, and not at all with those of them who are unjust. And say we believe in what has been revealed to you. Our God is one and to Him we submit.

It is obvious that the combined effect of Qur'an 3:84, 29:46, the book of Matthew 18:14, and 1 Cor. 12:4-14 are strong enough to convince any right thinking man that God is one and that different religious cleavages are only different ways of his manifestation. These verses are also enough evidences that those who fan the

embers of religious exclusionism and the attendant crisis are only action from ignorance.

Unlike Dukor and those who share his line of thought by way of conceiving religious fundamentalism as nothing other than a tool that undermines rather than develop a nation, there are scholars who are of the affirmation that religious fundamentalism and nation-building/sustainable development are inextricably connected such that the former influences the latter (Cf. Aminu, 2003; Ekeopara and Ekpenyong 2016; Mbon 1991; Okpa et al, 2018; Sunday and Mordi 2017). Since fundamentalism, according to Okpa et al, 2018 has come to mean a term applied by many “to a tendency to among certain groups, mainly, though not exclusively, in religion, which is characterized by a markedly strict literalism as it is applied to certain specific scriptures, dogmas, or ideologies”, all the aforementioned authors are of the conviction that religious values if courageously adhered to, translate to high moral and ethical values that all faiths aspire to achieve. In this regard, they are of the affirmation that religions can serve as a catalyst for the teaching and advancement of ethical principles, which are essential in the development of strong character particularly as it affect sustainable development and nation development (Okpa et al 2018: 14).

There is hardly any known religion in the world that does not preach fairness, equality, equity, tolerance, sincerity, dedication to duty, truthfulness, moral rectitude, respect for life, sacrifice for others, patriotism, among others, among its core values in line with what are widely believed to be universal spiritual principles. If strictly, faithfully, religiously or literally adhering to all these values is what amounts to one being a religious fundamentalist, it follows then that religious fundamentalists are the best materials for development-driven governance. All the aforementioned values are the core values known to be emphasized by religious fundamentalism. In fact, there is wild belief among the scholars earlier mentioned as entertaining the belief that religious fundamentalism has the propensity to enthrone sustainable development that these universal spiritual principles espoused by most religions as their core values regulate the behaviour, conduct, and actions of individuals, who are, or incidentally may become religious and socio-political leaders of their society. These spiritual virtues, if strictly obeyed, can make for social order, peace, harmony, stability, and discipline in the society, just as genuine and firm commitment to them could determine the political and socio-economic behaviour of a people as well as the

stability and development of such society. Specifically, Ekeopara and Ekpenyong (2016) contend that strict adherence to the values and morals (sic) belief system of various religious organisations is a catalyst that could bring about change in human characters and attitudes and consequently result to sustainable development anywhere in the world. And in the words of Okpa et al, "All through human history, religious fundamentalism has proven to be the principal force behind human development. Adheres are motivated by religious teachings, ethics and beliefs to develop spiritual qualities, that empowers them to sacrifice for others and to contribute to the development of their community" (2018:12).

Going forward, Okpa et al (2018) affirm the strong bond between religious fundamentalism and sustainable development when, in the paper under reference, they write thus: "religious fundamentalism inculcates spirit of hard work and industrialization, which is the foundation that brings about sustainable development. People who adhered to religious precepts, beliefs, participations, practices, rituals, behaviours, etc, often drive development activities" (p. 14). In a bid to further add weight to their claims, they cite Ogbonnaya (2012) to the effect that, "strong commitment to religious principles has the propensity to facilitate global development. Religious teachings promote common belief in the dignity of the human person under God, and emphasises committed (sic) to the promotion of the human good so as to provide basic human needs, guarantee protection of human rights and promote integral development globally" (cf. p. 14. Emphasis is mine). Okpa et al (2018) rightly observe that religion has an effect on many people's attitudes to everything, including such matters as savings, investment and a host of economic decisions. It influences area we had come to see as vital for successful development, like schooling, gender quality, and approaches to health care. For them, religion could be an important driver of change, even as it could be a break to progress. It is clear from the foregoing that Okpa et al (2018) and some scholars they cite in support of their position conceive religious fundamentalism purely from the ideal/positive perspective, whereby it purports strict adherence to the moral injunctions/positive values which, as experience has shown, are common to all known religions. There is no doubt that religious fundamentalism understood in this way is a strong driver of both human and social development.

Reflections

My examination of Dukor's views on the notions of religion and religious fundamentalism reveals that the idea that there are different religious prophets with conflicting testimonies of revelations and miracles from God does not mean that the prophets involved are lying or that the revelations are not true. It only points to the fact that God is, in the final analysis, beyond human comprehension; a being that is both immanent and transcendent; a "unity in diversity. Armed with this knowledge, humans have to be tolerant and open-minded in their dealings with people of distinct faith, religion and/or culture. I am of the affirmation that the degree to which a country succeeds in her efforts at nation-building is dependent on the degree at which her people coming from diverse backgrounds are willing to accommodate others through the principles of give and take. This expectation, however, is being constantly undermined by the disintegrative antics and propensities of those who have constituted themselves into unfortunate religious bigots. The avalanche of religious crises and killings going on in the country and around the world bears testimony to this.

I solicit for secularism in a state with a heterogeneous culture and religion. To this end, I share Dukor's view, wherein he notes that the idea of secularism in a multi-religious society like Nigeria is neither irreligious nor indifference to religion but equal respect. My reason for this is that secularism taking in its naked form (extreme) will surely result in exclusionism. The religion, the secularism, the politics, the cultural practices as well as the philosophy I envisage will be devoid of fundamentalist and exclusionist tendencies. That is the sure way of ensuring peace and stability in a multi-linguistic, multi-cultural, and multi-religious society like ours. Dukor speaks my mind (and that of numerous others, I guess) by positing that:

World peace centers on philosophical rapprochement of conceptions of secularism, fundamentalism and freedom as it affects the world and secondly, as it promotes freedom of all races... In the philosophical prognosis of this contemporary socio-political problems (sic), the philosophy of pluralism with a variation in monism, communicative rationality, democratic existentialism and globalism seems to be a pragmatic approach to

harmonizing the conflicting goals of races and religions in a circular world (2010: 207).

That is to say that, what I join Dukor in affirming here is that virtue lies in the middle and that recognizing and harmonizing the best in varying religions, cultures and the related concepts is the best way of ensuring peace and stability, not only in Africa, but the world in general. In a related development, Dukor's views on religion and religious fundamentalism finds support in a recent message from Pope Benedict xvi to the people of Lebanon as well as their Christian and Muslim faithful. (cf. Greenwell, 2012). In the said message, the Pope enjoined his audience to take note of the fact that the basis of our unity and our advocacy for peace should be sought not in revelation, but in human nature wherein the natural moral law can be found.

Among other things, the Pope noted that the desire to build peace, the innate yearning for beauty, goodness and truth, religious freedom, etc., are aspects of the natural moral law which should serve as the basis of our unity. He explains further that the family is the first school of the desire to build peace and that implied in it is respect for life which in turn makes the rejection of violence an imperative. As for the yearning for beauty, goodness and truth, the Pope says that it reflects the fact that we are made in the image of God and that each of us is in a way a reflection of the divine. This, he says, is the basis for a sound and correct notion of morality which is always centered on the person. Implied in this area of unity based on human nature is the rejection of any sort of religious fundamentalism in the negative sense Dukor viewed it. To this end, the Pope declares that, "Thoughts of peace, words of peace, and acts of peace are required if any sort of reconciliation and common life is to be expected" (Greenwell, 2012: 3). With regard to religious freedom, the Pope was in agreement with Dukor and he indeed spoke the mind of many, including this writer, when he notes that "The freedom to profess and practice one's religion without danger to life and liberty must be possible to everyone.

There are three major religions in Nigeria namely, Christianity, Muslim, and African Traditional Religion. Although these religions have their respective core values that serve as guide to their adherents in their daily private and public life, these values are in the final analysis the same as they revolve or are drawn from the acclaimed universal spiritual principles. These universal spiritual principles

are, however, given different interpretations, with some religious groups laying claim to possessing the appropriate knowledge of the requirement of each principle, courtesy of direct revelation to them by God. If the adherents of the major religions in Nigeria properly understood religion and its place in human and social development and stability, then there is no way it can be turned into a tool of intolerance and instability. It is the claim to exclusive authenticity of establishment and revelation of truth by the respective religion that brings about religious fundamentalism in the way or negative sense in which Dukor construed, thereby posing a threat to all efforts and policies geared towards sustainable development in Nigeria. The present upsurge in the killing of Christians coupled with the overall religious mayhem in the country is one of the untoward outcomes misinterpretation and misapplication of universal spiritual principles.

One cannot but join (Greenwell 2012) in agreeing with Pope Benedict that religious fundamentalism in form of religious compulsion is to be rejected. Greenwell adds that flowing from the pope's observations is the idea that the 'Qur'anic verse of the sword' which advocates the expansion of religion by the sword is contrary to the natural moral law (p. 3). From the foregoing, it follows that religious fundamentalism in the form Dukor construed it amounts to religious compulsion which, as Pope Benedict observes, is immoral. While Pope Benedict is not against religious dialogue as a way out of religious compulsion, he, however, is of the opinion that any proposed dialogue in which the participants ignore the existence of those core values that are common to all great cultures as a result of their being rooted in the nature of the human person is bound to hit the rocks. Pope Benedict ended his message with a clarion call on both the civil and political society to embrace secular tolerance and openness of mind to transcendence as a way of ensuring world peace and security. This admonition is, for me, a vindication of Dukor's position in the dimension of religious fundamentalism he is pursuing.

Conclusion

From what we have seen and said so far about Dukor's and other scholar's views concerning religion and religious fundamentalism, it is obvious enough that religion occupies a prominent and strategic space in every society's quest for nationhood. Though a unifying instrument, it (religion) is no doubt a volatile one. No society or individual can consistently and justifiably lay claim to possessing monopolistic knowledge of God and His ways. It is observable from our foregoing

observations that religious fundamentalism, which is a fall-out of humans approach to the notion of religion could take either positive or negative dimension. Since all religions are known to preach commitment to such universal spiritual precepts such as justice, truth, honesty, forgiveness, love of neighbor and of ones country, uprightness, avoidance of evils such as stealing, corruption, murder, lie, amongst others, it is only prudent to submit that religious fundamentalism in the sense of strict adherence to these religious precepts can only result in both human and social development, given that all the enunciated core values are nothing short of the basic ingredients of good governance and sustainable development. Conversely, the approach to religion by way of laying claim to exclusive authenticity of ones own religious group and teachings (which was the focus of Dukor's discourse on religious fundamentalism) will, no doubt, constitute a stumbling block on a country's way to nation-building as it has the propensity to enthrone discrimination, fanaticism, rascalism, terrorism, social tension, among other negativities. It is this negative and straight-jacketed conception of religious fundamentalism that constitutes the gap in Professor Dukor's discourse on religious fundamentalism which this paper has filled. This position is without prejudice to the fact that the paper endorses Dukor's position on virtually all fronts with reference to religious fundamentalism construed as an inherently negative phenomenon.

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DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN NIGERIA: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS

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Abstract

Democratic government has been with us for over two decades, several mechanisms to ensure national integration has been put in place. Such as establishment of federal character commission, National Youth Service Corps, adoption of multi-party system, creation of states and local governments, adoption of several fiscal allocation formulae among others; yet, national integration remains a mirage. Inter and intra communal conflicts, inter and intra state clashes, religious and tribal conflicts, regional and sectional disharmony, majority and minority agitation has clouded the Nigerian polity and threaten national unity and integration of Nigeria. It is against this back drop that this paper seeks to examine democracy and National Integration in Nigeria: Issues and Prospects. The paper adopted documentary method by way of employing only secondary data in the course of conducting the study in question. The paper is pinned on the sociological theory of federalism as adopted by Living Stone, (1954) and Sharada, (1984). The results reveal among others the adoption of the federal system of government that is meant to accommodate the multi-ethnic setting of Nigeria had failed to promoted national integration among Nigerians. The paper recommends that: True federalism should be incorporated and adopted in the Nigerian polity, so that all the segments of the country will have sense of belonging and fairness.

Keywords: Democracy, federalism, national integration, diversity.

Introduction

The evolution of Nigerian state can be traced to the 1914 amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates by the erstwhile colonial masters in their attempt to perpetuate the exploitation of Nigeria's human and economic resources. Upon the regain of national political independence in October 1st 1960 the country's first political leaders opted for federal system of government which allowed each and every region to be autonomous with the government at the centre Dawood, (2014) The idea for the adoption of federalism as a system of government was majorly for national unity and integration of Nigerian nationalities. The founding fathers of Nigeria like Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe, Alh. Sir Ahmadu Bello, Chief Obafemi Awolowo and so on, subscribed to the notion of federalism as a form of government that best suits Nigeria. The choice of federal system of governance was born out of the desire of the founding fathers to nurture and preserve "unity in diversity" Kurfi, (2014), Gambari, (2016). This however did not provided the smooth terrain needed for national unity and nationhood to thrive, instead, it provided a highest regional tension, ethnicity, and sub-regional agitation in the country Hassan, (2006). The plural nature of the Nigerian society and the apparent 'cold war' among the different competing ethnic nationalities has tended to aggravate the situation. This has been more compounded with the emergence of a new politico-educated elite on whom the mantle of leadership has fallen and who, in order to further their individual personal and selfish ambitions, have largely sown, and continue to nurture, the seed of discord among Nigerians Ajayi, (2006). It has been observed by Ahmed and Dantata (2016) that democracy as a system of government has a universal acceptability. They noted that Nigeria as a nation has had several democratic regimes which were somehow truncated by several military coups. However, Nigeria was fully integrated into a democratic dispensation on the 29th of May 1999. Nigeria has accepted democracy as a symbol of development, modern civilization, unity and stability.

Democracy by its tenets served as a driving force for national unity, integration and development of any country. Democracy in Nigeria has no doubt increased very significantly the freedom of association, religion and participation. Ahmed and Dantata, 2016; Idowu and Satuyi, 2016, contend that, Nigeria attain fastest growth in democracy compared with the United State of America, the mother of liberal democracy, the growth is observed to be mostly in the people's participation in electioneering processes.

However, the prevailing realities in Nigeria's democratic practice jeopardize national integration and national development. Despite passing the post-transition election trial test, Nigeria's democracy is still considered as 'nascent democracy'. This trial started for more than twenty years now, by now the attention should have been on the quest for a better democratic practice that will guarantee sustainable national integration. The concern now should have been on the quality of democratic practices rather than the type of democracy in operation (Dawood, 2015).

Democracy in Nigeria by implication has instead of promoting national integration ended up promoting disunity, regional tension, secession and national question. The quest for self-determination by the so-called marginalized group in the Southeast of the country and the subsequent ultimatum given to the Igbo people living in the Northern part of Nigeria, the rise of farmers/herders conflicts in the North central part of Nigeria, raised a fundamental question as to what is happening to the quest for Nigerian national integration? What went wrong with the mechanism for national integration? How has democratic governments guaranteed or undermined national integration among Nigerians?

Conceptualizing Democracy

The evolution of democracy is associated with the politics of Athens city state of Greece, where all male adult citizens were allowed to participate actively in the policy making and implementation Dawood, (2014). Political scientists associated this type of democracy with classical liberal democracy that fights against dictatorship, monarchy, oligarchy, aristocracy and feudalism (Ibodje and Dode, 2007). However, with the growing population and increased complexity of modern states, the Athens style of democracy becomes practically impossible to operate. Thus, modern day democracy in turn refers to elected representative government, who comes to power as a result of the popular will of the electorates (i.e. the political community).

Lincoln defined democracy as the government to the people, for the people and by the people Ake, (1992). In spite of the fact that this definition has many deficiencies, it has however sends a strong message on what democracy should be, because it take into cognizance of people in all its processes. Oyovbaire (1987) defines democracy as a system of government which seeks to recognized and

respect popular will of the people and ensure that policies are made to address common and collective needs and aspirations of the people. Democracy within the context of this study refers to a system of government that comes to power through political party activities and an electoral process. The elected representatives that emerged from the electoral process are the political actors and actresses that steer the affairs of government.

It is understood that the concept of democracy has universal appeal. In fact, as a principle or style governance, democracy is considered as the best way of ruling in contemporary global community and therefore should serve a mechanism of national unity and integration.

Conceptualizing National Unity and Integration

Paul (2015) refers to national unity and integration as the attempt at uniting or bringing together the hitherto multi-ethnic groups of people with diverse cultural, historical, language, religions and beliefs systems into one which would remove primordial and subordinate loyalties and sentiments to ethnic nationalities. Onifade and David (2013), define national integration in a rather comprehensive way:

As a process that produces an omnibus of initiatives put in place by a state, its representatives or institutions guided by respect for the unique traditions and cultural backgrounds of ethnicities sharing the same polity with the goal of harmonising all interests through a form of dialogue and representation and addressing differences that may be divisive and conflictual using the instruments of fairness, justice and equity in the sharing of resources, benefits, opportunities and responsibilities in order to guarantee stability, longevity and prosperity of the polity as long as the inhabitants decide to remain within the polity.

Accordingly, Earnest, (1991) as cited in Dawood (2014) opined that national integration is a process whereby political actors in distinct national setting are persuaded to shift their loyalty specification and political activities to a new centre,

whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing nation state. In the context of this study national unity and integration refers to the notion of one Nigeria despite its ethnic, religious and regional diversities. It is also, about possessing national consciousness and the feeling of national identity, in the spirit of one nation, one people and one destiny. From the foregoing development we can deduce that democracy as a principle of governance ought to promote national unity and integration.

Empirical Review

Dawood (2015b) in his paper “the fragility of the Nigerian federal system and the quest for national integration: some contending issues and way forward” notes that in spite of the fact that Nigeria operates federal system of government however, the inadequacies of the federalism have continue to endanger the cooperate existence of the polity not only because of the artificiality and haphazard nature of its arrangement but also due to the failure and collapse of the state apparatus in ensuring democracy and good governance. He notes that Nigerian govern have put forward different policies, programmes and institution capable of promoting national unity and integration. The study recommend that minority-majority, indigene-settler issues must be addressed to give all and sundry sense of belonging in the national affairs. In another study conducted by the same Dawood (2015a) “Fifteen years of democracy, 1999-2014: Reflections on Nigeria’s quest for national integration” the researcher reveals that democracy in Nigeria fails to promote national unity and integration. He observes that the ruling elites were unable to comprehend and understand the political system they are managing or operating. The author recommends the adoption of welfarist policies that will provide economic and social relief to common Nigerians. He posits that a popular democracy that is people oriented will ensure national unity and integration, he furthers by advocating for institutionalizing democratic tenets that will inculcate the idea of national integration.

Paul (2015) in his study on “National integration: A panacea to insecurity in Nigeria” notes that several internal forces has militated against national unity and integration in Nigeria. Despite the fact that the struggle toward national unity and integration has been an unrelenting task in Nigerian state, it achievement however, has remind illusive. Thus, Paul (2015) identified insecurity, conflict and crime, and insurgency as bane to national integration in Nigeria. He then

recommends the establishment of what he called the “New Crusade on National Integration (NCNI)”. The focus of the crusade is preaching the doctrine of unity in diversity based on the principle of collective responsibility in tackling all issues of national unity and integration. This propaganda machinery should use the existing institutions and structure of government to actualize their goals. In study by Asaju and Egberi (2015) on “Federal character and national integration in Nigeria: The need for discretion and interface” show that federal character principle has fail to achieve the aims and objectives of promoting national unity due to the elitist interest. They recommend however, that for federal character to achieve its objective of national unity, it is important for Nigerians to appreciate the beauty of unity in diversity and see themselves as one nation, one people and one destiny. Democracy should ensure the reign of justice, equity and fairness in the distribution of resources, guarantee freedom and respect for the rule of law so that all and sundry will have a sense of belonging and feeling that he/she matters irrespective of their tribe, religion, sex, section etc.

All these literatures focused on issues surrounding Nigerian national unity and integration but failed to touch on the nexus between democracy and Nigerian national unity, more specifically the effect of the fourth republic democratic regimes on Nigerian national unity and integration. This paper therefore intends to fill that gap.

Theoretical Framework

This study is guided by the theoretical expositions of the theories of federalism, from the modern category of it, as different from classical expositions of federalism which sees federalism as purely jurisdictional matter.

The modern era is an age of cooperation and a joint venture in all walks of life. These theorists believe in cooperative federalism between the center and the federating units in a very positive way. The essential features of “cooperative federalism” are cooperation and interdependence upon one another. Cooperative federalism is also called marble-cake federalism whereby both the center and the units through cooperation and collective efforts strive to solve problems rather than make policies disjointedly. The meaning of federalism today lies in a process of joint action, not in a matter of legal status. It lies not in what governments are but

in what but they do. It is a matter of action rather than structure. Modern federalism is very clear in describing the actions of the state. It refers to joint action in almost all spheres of life. It does not stress upon what the government is but refers to what the governments do. Tariq, M. (et.al) (2021)

Modern federalism is characterized by cooperativeness and interdependence, it does not believe in what the government is but rather believes in what the governments do under the umbrella of joint action (Satyanarayana, 2011). Several theories were formulated by the modernists; prominent among these is the sociological theory.

Sociological Theory of Federalism

Livingston (1954) and Sharada (1984), are some of the key contributors to the formulation of this theory. The theory that takes into account the sociological aspect of the nature of society, a society that is federal by nature results in the creation of a federal system or a federation. In such a society, the elements of a diversification play a key role in bringing the people together. Livingston is the driving force of this theory (Verma, 1986), who extricated federalism from the clutches of the legal orthodoxy of K.C. Wheare and A.V. Dicey. According to Livingston, the diversity may be due to the gap in the economy, interest in the field of economy, religious affiliation, racism, and affiliation to a particular nation, social distances, chronological milieu and previous nature of existence of the state such as colonial position Livingston, (1952), reprinted in 1967. Another important point of this theory is the federal political system in which the division of powers between governments is made based on territory. According to Livingston, federal society is one in which diversity is made based on territory. Livingston opines that the federal form of government is the direct result of society being federal. He defines the federal form as a political contrivance in which the various diverse groups, ethnic groups, and groups claiming different languages, religions, races, and cultures unite into a single whole to make a federation Sharada, (1984). Another important issue in this theory is that in a typical federal system the distribution of powers is made on the basis of territory. So, diversity and territory are the two important ingredients of federalism according to Livingston. They

neither alter the existing ethnicity nor change the territorial position of a country but make room for the smooth functioning of the federal society. Here, a distinction must be made between 'structural federalism' and 'social federalism'.

Sociological theory of federalism has also been subject to criticisms. Firstly, this theory describes diversity only but does not describe to explain the factors, which can help in creating harmony among the various ethnic groups for the establishment of the wide-ranging government within the federation. Secondly, it is noteworthy to point out that a society based on ethnic diversification may not result in the creation of a federal political system. The Welsh, the Scots, the Ulster Irish are some of the examples of ethnic diversification connected by the specific geographically demarcated area but still, they co-existence under the umbrella of Unitary form of government of the U.K. The same is also true of France, Ghana, South Africa Ceylon and Indonesia. Thirdly, social attitudes and diversities do not always lead to federalism; and may result in the creation of any type of government-specific to a particular region having its respective constitution or system of politics from a confederation to a system based on the centralization of power with a good bargain of de facto insurrection Sharada, (1984).

In this respect, sociological theory comes in handy in line with the thrusts of this study; as we can see, one of the mechanisms for ensuring national integration in a federal state like Nigeria, is ensuring fair distribution of power and resources among the diverse components of a federal setting; items such as the principle of federal character, rotational presidency and so on, are been put in place to further integration among the components of the Nigerian federation. Sociological theory also, sees diversities among federating components as merely territorial and not in ethnic, regional, religious among other elements; in a typical federal setting the assumption is that all these elements are watered down to give room for efficient and functional federal system.

Methodology

The research design adopted for this study is documentary and exploratory where existing works on the subject matter were consulted and analyzed. Specifically the paper relies on secondary information which is generated from journals, periodic, articles in Newspapers and magazines as well as online material. These data were presented and critically analyzed via content analysis technique.

Findings and Discussions

This section present discussion along a number of themes in an attempt to provide answers to the research questions rose in the background of the paper, i.e. what is happening to the country's quest for National unity? What went wrong with the mechanism for national integration? How has the Nigerian democracy guaranteed or undermined national integration

Nigeria's Quest for National Integration

The evolution of Nigerian state can be traced to the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Protectorates in the 1st January 1914 by the then British colonial administration. The practice of Federal system of government started 1954. The federal system of government was bequeathed to Nigeria as a viable option to govern multi-ethnic setting like ours. Over the years, there was convergence of opinions as to the desirability of political union in Nigeria. In 1948 for instance, Sir Arthur Richards acknowledged that ".... It is only the accident of British suzerainty which has made Nigeria one country. It is still far from being one country or one nation socially or even economically..." Dawood, (2015b), Idowu & Satuyi, (2016). Again Sir Abaubakar Tafawa Balewa argued during the Legislative Council debate in 1948 that: "many Nigerians deceived themselves by thinking that Nigeria is one. This is wrong. I am sorry to say this presence of unity is artificial and it ends outside this chamber"(Nigeria 1948 in Ojo, (2009). These assertions are akin to what Obafemi Awolowo said in 1947 that:

Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression.

There are no 'Nigerians', in the same sense as there are 'English', 'Welsh', or 'French'. The word 'Nigerian' is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not. There are various national or ethnical groups in the country It is a mistake to designate them 'tribes'. Each of them is a nation by itself with many tribes and clans. There is much difference between them as there is between Germans, English, Russian and Turks for instance. The fact that they have a common overlord does not destroy this fundamental difference (cited in Dawood, 2015b).

The above brief look into Nigeria's political records offers rich historical narrative in comprehending the intricacies of national integration in Nigeria. The problem does not just happen today. Even the founding fathers seemed to have contentions with the unity of Nigerian state.

However, several policies and programmes were put in place by successive Nigerian governments as effort to ensure national integration. For instance, immediately after the civil war, the regional governments were resolved and 12 states were created to break the hegemony of the three dominant tribes that control the regional administration and give the minority tribes some sense of belonging. Kurfi, (2014) noted that the creation of states has reduced the domineering tendencies of the dominant ethnic groups and secured some measure of autonomy for the minority groups. Often, members of the dominant ethnic groups now find themselves as minorities in some new states, while those who were minorities in the old states are now majorities in some of the new states. This explains why the agitation for the creation of more states is still ongoing despite increases by successive regimes.

Also, the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) was another measure established to ensure national integration. It was conceived in 1973 to permit university graduates to serve for a one (1) year period in a state other than his/her own in order to appreciate the unity in diversity of the Nigerian state. Later the federal character principle was enshrined in the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria aimed at accommodating the diverse linguistic, ethnic, religious and geographic groups in the decision-making, political and economic affairs of the state. The movement of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) from Lagos to Abuja was seen as an integrative policy of government to further unite Nigerians. Some scholars opined that the new FCT in spite been at the center of the country it is still claimed by a section of the federation as belonging to them which was one of the main reason for the movement in the first place.

Another measure is the unifying National Policy on Tertiary Education that talks about quota system of admission and recruitment aimed at fostering national integration. The JAMB, (2020) report revealed that most federal universities have exceeded the 30% quota for the catchment area criterion enshrine by the national policy, favouring individual states where the universities are located. The same scenario applied to staff recruitment. The proportions range from 44% for the

University of Calabar to 65% for Bayero University, Kano. Although there are some exceptions such as University of Ilorin that draws 2% of its students from the North and university of Benin drawing 51% of its students from the South west. Generally, the percentages of Northern students enrolled in Southern universities are extremely low. In the East, it rarely exceeds one percent, and in the West, it varies from two to seven percent. On the contrary, the percentage of Southern students enrolled in Northern universities is quite substantial, ranging from three percent at Bayero University, Kano, to fifty-seven at the University of Ilorin (JAMB, 2020). Other measures include the Establishment of unity Schools run by the federal government, introduction of a uniform Local Government system in Nigeria, federal character principle among others.

However, there are a lot of challenges affecting the implementation of most of these policy programmes. Onifade et-el, (2013) are of the opinion that the major hurdle in the path of national integration in Nigeria has been a regenerative breed of selfish and greedy political actors who either seize power through the barrel of the gun or through stolen electoral mandates. These breed of political gladiators in a bid to secure the support of members of their own ethnic groups install ethnic and religious differences and demonize members of other groups. Ahmed et-el, (2016) argue that federalism as it is presently practiced in Nigeria suffers because of lack of fiscal federalism, over-centralisation of power at the centre, laidback or non-viable states, absence of state police, among others. Some other challenges include corruption, nepotism and fear of leaders losing political control among others. Further discussion on the mechanism for national integration and the challenges associated with them are presented in later part of this paper.

Mechanisms Adopted by Nigerian Government for National Integration

The Nigeria's federation has been played by instability of war, cases of insurgency and other numerous outbreaks of ethno-religious conflicts across the country. In spite of the setback, Nigeria has remained one country. Successive regime in Nigeria have put in several efforts, established institutions, formulate policies and implemented programmes and schemes that will promote national unity and integration among Nigerians. Ahmed and Dantata, (2016). Some of these mechanisms are discussed below:

Adoption of federal system of government: As noted by Dicey, federalism is political machinery that tends guarantee national unity and balanced power to accommodate the right of all citizens (Dicey cited in Aderonmu, 2010). As opined by Obafemi Awolowo, “if a country is bilingual or multilingual, the constitution must be federal and the constituent states must be organized on linguistic basis”. He further stressed that it is only true federalism that will ensure unity, integration and harmony among the diverse racial and linguistic groups of Nigeria. Fagbamigbe, (1981), cited in Dawood, (2015b). Historically, it is the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorate in 1914 that form the basis of federalism in Nigeria. The position to adopt federalism as the best system of government in Nigeria was further strengthen and affirmed by successive national dialogue and reports of constitutional conferences organized by several regimes. This assertion is further confirmed by Gambari (2016) where they noted that federal system of government was adopted by the founding fathers with main aim of ensuring integration in Nigeria. Although federalism was adopted as the system of government which recognizes the needs and aspiration of every Nigerians including the minorities, cries for marginalization, suppression etc does not come to an end.

Establishment of federal constitution: The adoption of federal constitution was considered by many scholars as a measure to promote national unity and integration of Nigerian state. According to Dawood, (2015b) the establishment of federal constitution and the abolition of regional constitutions was a measure to ensure national unity as against regional loyalty. Every region within Nigeria is expected to adopt and use the single document. Thus, it served as a unifying factor that integrate the people of Nigeria as one nation, united under one constitution. Equally, several provisions for national unity and integration were enshrined in all the constitutions adopted thereafter including the current 1999 constitution, such as articles that are expected to promote national integration (Dawood, 2015b). For instance, section 2 (1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended 2011 says “Nigeria is one indivisible and indissoluble sovereign state...” Oyadiran and Adeshola (2017), shed more light along this conviction thus:

Since the inception of fourth republic in 1999, the national assembly has not been able to amend the constitution... Until the opinions of Nigerian people are sought before we can have legitimate constitution drafted. Issues that

required urgent attention by the constitution include: the kind of federalism to operate, local government autonomy... rotational presidency, federal character, legislative list, revenue generation and sharing formula

Establishment of National Youth Service Corps: This scheme was established by General Yakubu Gowon's administration in 1973 after the longest Nigerian civil war. The scheme provides for one year compulsory national service for all graduates in states other than theirs. The main focus of the scheme was promotion of peace, national unity, national integration and national development. Specifically, the objectives are to promote unity and understanding, develop togetherness and spirit of co-operation, inculcate entrepreneur skills to make them self-reliant, expose them to different cultures for them to appreciate the beauty of unity in diversity and also learn to accommodate others from different cultural background (Ahmed and Dantata, 2016). NYSC scheme has resulted in the encouragement of inter-ethnic marriages and domiciliation in ethno-regional areas other than one's own. However, Odunnuga (1999) in Ahmed and Dantata (2016) observed that there are some negative aspects of this scheme which hinder national integration. For instance, many of the graduates are either not employed or are themselves unwilling to take up appointments in the area they served because of the uncertainty of future prospects in those states, for reason of statism arising from the vexed issues of Indigene and settler struggle (Odunnuga, 1999 in Ahmed and Dantata, 2016). Another disturbing problem of contemporary NYSC scheme is corruption, which makes a number of the corps members to pay off their ways away from their areas of primary assignment, poor social infrastructure made corps members to prepare urban area to rural communities, even when posted to one. Also, insecurity in particular pose more threat to the scheme in the sense that a number of locations are practically not safe for the corps members; due banditry and kidnappings in some parts of the north west region, ISWAP and Boko Haram threats in the north east, IPOB and unknown gunmen in the south east and may more across the country, and laziness among the youths thus members prepare to serve in their state's of origin. These problems have successfully defeated the objectives NYSC scheme.

Establishment of Federal Character Commission: The commission was established to entrenched Federal Character Principle in the area of appointment

of Federal Civil and Public Service, political appointment, infrastructure services and anything that has national appeal. Ojo (2009) noted that the Federal Character Principle is another measure adopted to promote national unity and integration. This principle means that political and administrative appointments at federal level should and must reflect the six geo-political zones that make up Nigeria and where need be the respective States that make up the zone. By extension, the States and Local Governments should ensure that the distribution of appointments follows the same principle, by taking into cognizance the number of Local Governments, wards and of course the ethnic groups there in. The central focus is to ensure that every community and ethnic group is carried along in the process of governance.

Table 1: Stating the number and percentage of political appointees excluding Ministers and Ambassadors of Buhari's administration per region from 2017-2021.

S/N	Region	Number of Appointees	Percentage
	North Central	21	13.2
	North East	24	15.1
	North West	30	18.9
	South South	20	12.6
	South East	22	13.8
	South west	42	26.4
	Total	159	100%

Source: Premium Times Newspaper, Monday, 4/11/2017

The above is the table stating the number and percentage of political appointees of Buhari's administration per region as at 2021, these appointees comprise of Services Chiefs, Directors General and Chief Executives of Federal Parastatals and Agencies of the government including Special Assistants/Advisers. The table shows that the South West has the highest number of political appointees 42 (26.4%) followed by the North West with 18.9% of the total number of political appointees whereas, South South and North Central have the least number of political appointees 20 and 21 political appointees representing 12.6% and 13.2% respectively. From this table one might think that there were no major

discrepancies in the distribution of the political appointees per regions looking at the region's population.

However, the state by state distribution is skewed such that one state takes larger share of the appointees. For instance, Ogun state has the highest number of the appointments with 21 out of the 42 appointees from the region. Also, Imo state has 15 political appointees, meaning that it takes 68.2% of the total political appointees assigned to that region. The same thing with Kano State with 15 numbers of political appointees representing 50% of the total appointment made to the region. The worst case scenario is that The Federal Capital Territory, which has no appointee. Ebonyi and Abia states got the least with each having only two appointees.

The foregoing shows that the principle of federal character was not adhered to, thus cries of marginalization and clamor for creation of more political structures such as state creation and local government. Ayoade (1998) noted that: "as long as the application of the principle of federal character discriminated against one group and favours another, no unity can result from such an exercise".

Establishment of Unity Schools and FGCs: The establishment Unity Schools and Federal Government Colleges across the country was born out the desire to inculcate national unity among the youths in the country. This assertion was noted by Ahmad and Dantata (2016) where they posit that these schools and colleges were established to ensure unity in diversity at early age by bring youths from different states within Nigeria under one umbrella, to learn, to trust and to love one another. This will go a long way to reduce prejudices and mistrust among Nigerian at early age. However, Gambari (2016) and Dawood (2015b) opined that unity schools as strategy of integration has instead of promoting national unity and integration, has ended of creating discrimination of children of the so-called educationally advantaged states and promoting elitism. The so called national unity schools and colleges are mostly populated by the sons and daughters of the bureaucrat, politician and their associates. Thus, rather than promoting unity it end up promoting and re-enforcing the existing power structure.

State and Local Government Creation: The creation of states from 1967 to 1996 was born out of the contention that when states are created there would be reduced marginalization, national unity and speedy economic growth and

development. Accordingly, Gen. Yakubu Gowon on May 27, 1967, by the Decree No.14 of 1967 created twelve states, six in the north and six in the southern part of Nigeria. The essence, is to do away with the regional orientations and install the sense of national unity as well as to move away from the colonial creations of regional loyalty that engulf the country into a bloody civil war. Since the creation of the 12 states in 1967, the quest for more states continued, from 19 states in 1976, 21 states in 1987, to 30 states in 1991 and now 36 states in 1996. This same scenario applied to creation of local Governments in Nigeria. From 301 to 449 in 1989 and 589 in 1991 and later increased to 774 in 1995. Despite, all these developments there is still serious agitation for the creation of state and local government across the country. For example, the Cable on line newspaper (August 11, 2021) reported that:

While some Nigerians are calling for the return to regionalism, currently there is a proposal before the senate for the creation of new states. Some of the requests are: Itai state from Akwalbom, the status of state for the FCT, Katagum state from Bauchi, Okura state from Kogi East, Adada state from Enugu; Gurara state from Kaduna and Ijebu from Ogun state...

Movement of Federal Capital from Lagos to Abuja: As part of integrative mechanism the Federal Capital Territory was moved from Lagos to Abuja. This largely was aimed at achieving administrative convenience looking at the terrain of Lagos. Ojo (2009) noted that, the movement of the federal capital to Abuja was symbolic and intended to be an integrative policy. He however, lamented that the whole idea of the movement is to make Abuja, being the center of the nation geographically to serve as a symbol of unity and nationhood. However, Ajayi (2006) holds the notion that the creation of Abuja is nothing more than what he called 'a revenge project' to change the site of power from the west to the Northern part of the country by the Northern elites.

Formation of National Political Parties: This is another integrative mechanism adopted by the federal government to ensure the unity and integration of Nigerian state. It was hitherto known that political parties were the creation of respective regional governments during the first republic. Each region has its political parties with regional appeal, for instance in the First Republic northern Nigeria was

dominated by Northern Peoples' Congress and Northern Element Peoples' Union, while in the west and East there were Action Group and National Council for Nigeria and Cameroon respectively. However, section 223 (2b) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides room for the formation political parties that have national appeal. Thus, executive committees must reflect the geo-political setting of Nigeria for it to be registered as a political party. The essence is to ensure wide spread and representation of the geo-political setting of the country and its people. However, many if not all the political parties today seem to have regional or geo-political connotation and thus enjoy favour and sympathy from those regions and zones. The two leading political parties in Nigeria; APC and PDP for example have more or less regional colouration. APC comprises mostly the northern States and the south western States while the PDP housed the south east and south southern States with very few selected northern States. In fact, APGA is even a south eastern political party in outreach. Even then, it was only able to secure Anambra state, at the 2022 general election of the state. Many other political parties have not win even one seat at the State's Assemblies. Most of these other political parties don't have structure at even state levels not to talk of owning local structure to register and mobilize people. This defeats the essence of the formation of political parties.

Another major challenge of political parties today is lack of distinct political ideology that will categorically differentiate it from another. For instance, during the second republic one can differentiate NPN housing programme from UPN free education policy and the PRP is for removal of head and cattle tax. But today's PDP and APC political ideology are not different even in theory not to talk on practice. These explain why some time the electorate does not look at the party but the individual candidate contesting. This negates the whole essence of party formation

Zoning of presidency and rotation of power: Although it is not enshrined in any section or subsection of the constitution of FRN or any extant law, the zoning of presidency was aimed at tackling cries for marginalization and promoting national integration among geo-political zones of the country. No wonder, section 229(4) of the 1995 Constitution made provision for zoning and rotation of the presidency between the geo-political zones in the country. The six geo-political zones are presented thus:

1. North-Central: Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau and FCT.
2. North-East: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe.
3. North-West: Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara.
4. South-East: Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo.
5. South-South: Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River Delta, Edo and Rivers.
6. South-West: Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo.

The above shows the breakdown and the compositions of States under the zoning arrangement. However, there are some intricacies with zoning over time. According to the World Bank Group, (2011) report shows that the southern zones still feel marginalised politically despite their economic (resources) potentials and contributions whereas, the north continue to debate against the zoning and rotation of political office, saying it is against the tenant of democracy. Going by our history of disunity in Nigeria, zoning seems like a great idea to ensure 'principle of inclusion and equity.' Unfortunately, it was jettisoned by the political elite. For instance, Shagari went for second term despite poor performance, Obasanjo wanted third term while Jonathan run for second term in 2015 despite the initial agreement of one term. This implies that zoning has gone against practical politics due to naked ambition and excessive greed of the politicians. Zoning has also proven to be a limitation to merit and quality leadership.

The 2023 general elections is another litmus test for the zoning and rotation formula. The south is waiting for the presidency to be zoned to them since they were extremely instrumental in the ascendancy of Buhari administration and the fact that it is their turn going by the zoning formula. Are they likely to win at the general election?

Importantly, looking beyond 2023 elections is what matters. Nigerian elites must begin to realise that the zoning formula or policy is not a one for all size solution to the disunity of the Nigerian state. They must abstain from widening the existing divisions, emphasised on our similarities, be sincere with the people on our differences and truly preach unity in diversity so that we all can look beyond the limitations of state, geo-political zones, ethnicity and religion. It is only then we can progress as one country. Other countries like America and Singapore that have more population, with multiracial and multi religious have achieved that thus it is certain not impossible for Nigeria.

Revenue Allocation: Resources or revenue allocation is another integrative mechanism adopted to check the excesses of national unity and integration in Nigeria. The Federation Account was created to further strengthen national unity and integration. It is an account where all revenues accruing to the federal government are generated and pooled into one single account known as Federation Account to be shared monthly to the three tiers of governments based on agreed formula. As an affirmation, section 162(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the FRN as amended 2011 says: "The federation shall maintain a special account to be known as 'the Federation Account' into which shall be paid all revenues collected by the Government of the Federation..."

The current revenue sharing formula gives the federal government 48.50 per cent while states get 26.72 per cent and Local governments receive 20.6 per cent. However, there is a proposal that seeks to review the current revenue allocation formula. If the proposal is approved, federal government will receive 45.17 per cent of the money from the consolidated revenue fund of the federation, made of oil and gas sales proceeds as well as tax and revenue from Customs. The 36 states will receive 29.79 per cent while the 774 local governments will receive 21.04 per cent of the funds. This is the vertical formula; the more controversial formula that excites ethnic tension is the horizontal sharing of 26.72% by the states. The formula is currently pinned on five principles: (1) equality of states, 40% (2) population, 30% (3) landmass/terrain, 10% (4) internal revenue effort, 10% (5) social development effort, 10%. Again the constitution has give 15% to oil producing states via the derivation principle. This is put in place to address the agitation for states control of national resources and promote national integration.

Inekwe, (2014) urged that revenue allocation in Nigeria has led to lack of solid diversified revenue generating base, and dependence on mono-economy dominated by crude oil production and exportation. Also, revenue allocation encourages multiplication of states and local governments that are revenue allocation dependent, rather than being revenue generating fiscally and self-reliant. Many states are simply contended with what they collect as allocation from the federal government and thus, not making any effort at revenue generation.

How democracy guarantees or undermines national integration in Nigeria

Empirically, national unity and integration has been for years the concern of many multi-ethnic and multi-religious countries of the world. The experience in Sudan, India, Rwanda, Kenya and Yugoslavia posed a serious concern for national integration. As multi-ethnic country, Nigeria has been grappling with the issues of national integration for decades. In line with this fact, Gambari (2016) notes that quite a number of multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies constantly have to contend with tension and conflicts arising from the ramifications of their diversity. He furthered by saying it usually requires “the highest level of statesmanship, patriotism and astute brinkmanship to maintain the requisite delicate balancing that keeps the whole together”. At the time of independence in 1960 one of the greatest challenges which the founding fathers had to deal with is the problem of national integration. In affirming to the above Paul (2015) posited that the issue of ethnic conflicts is the major challenge to Nigerian democracy. Nigeria being a country of over 250 different ethnic groups is likely to pose a threat to national unity if not carefully managed. Whereas Idowu and Satuyi (2016) contend that factors such as political crisis, corruption, tribalism, and insecurity among others hinder true democracy and national integration in Nigeria. In their view, ethnicity, tribalism and corruption are the major impediment to national unity and integration. Nigeria is a country of over two hundred and fifty ethnic groups with different backgrounds.

It true that during democratic administrations Nigeria as a country seems to register increased violence, tension and conflict of different nature and form; ranging from communal, tribal, religious, sectional conflicts etc. Most of these conflicts seem to be identity driven, where one community feel superior while other are inferior, some people are regarded as indigenes while others are settlers, some feel that they are the majority while others are the minority. These identity conflict breed enmity, hatred and mistrust among people. Dawood (2015b) noted that it this identity driven notion of lack of tolerance, respect for one another and accommodation that are responsible for many of the conflicts Nigeria has witness. Gambari (2016) opined that this identity driven conflicts further aggravate intolerance, and exclusion and as well ethnicity and religious jingoism, constantly perpetrated by selfish ‘politicians’ and ‘leaders’ whether religious or secular in order to meets their ulterior motive.

Furthermore, Lanre (2007) argued that successive ethnic rivalries are what challenge government efforts of national unity and integration. He emphasizes that it is this identity divide that give birth to the creation and of course sustenance the so called ethno-regional groups in Nigeria. He identified groups such as; Arewa Peoples' Congress (APC), O'odua Peoples' Congress (OPC), Ohaneze Ndigbo, Ijaw Youth Movement, Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and Egbesu. He posited that these groups will continue to find popular support from the people of their respective ethnic group in as long as our elites are using the identity divide as a political weapon to remain in power. This singular support in my opinion is a symptom of an unstable democracy, and thus, the point of departure is that democracy in spite of its enduring legacy in promoting good governance, popular participation, due process and discipline, does not in Nigerian case promote national unity and integration which is one of the symbols of democracy in the country.

The political experience of Nigerian Fourth Republic as relate to democracy and national unity and integration has been characterized by corruption, embezzlement of funds, ethno-religious conflicts, master/servant relationship, tribalism, insecurity and misplacement of national priority occasioned by absence of patriotism by political leaders. In fact, leadership in Nigerian state, at all level appeared to be the cause of Nigerian national disunity, regional tension, agitation for self-determination by the secessionist in the Southeast and preponderance of insecurity across the regions of the country. Gambari (2016) noted that General Murtala Ramat Mohammed had captured the characterization of Nigerian political experience more succinctly thus:

Despite our great human and material resources, we have not been able to fulfil the legitimate expectations of our people. Ethnicity, religiosity, tribal and divisive considerations have denied us of the focus that was the promise at independence to build a respectable democratic and economically vibrant nation deserving the respect of all

Unfortunately, this observation remains very relevant even after the 20 years of return to civil democratic rule; our political leaders at all level are yet to imbibe

the spirit of nationalism and patriotism driven by the principle of democracy and good governance devoid of ethno-religious sentiments. Specifically, Hassan (2006) identify weak democratic institutions, corruption, power shift and ethno-regional tension, clash of political interest or differences and ethnic and religious differences are the major challenges of democracy on Nigerian national unity and integration.

The activities of the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) a hitherto armed group based in Niger Delta region which emerged from 2005 to 2009 had threatened the unity and integration of corporate existence of Nigerian state. Although the main motive of the group was rather economic, it had caused a lot tensions and suspicions within Nigerian state. (www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mend.html). The rise of Boko Haram insurgency which transform into terrorism has created a negative impression on the unity and integration of Nigerian state. Looking at the early attacks of the sect, majority of the Nigerian Christians have been accusing the group of deliberate attempt to decimate if not eliminate completely the Christians population and Christianity in the Northern part of Nigeria. For instance, Nweke (2015) argued that;

The truth remains that Boko Haram poses greater challenge to the problem of integration in consideration of the dichotomy between the reality and the perception. Whereas could mean that Boko Haram is an international terrorist group, it is perception by the citizenry could assume various dimension. For perceiver, the fact that Boko Haram is an Islamist sect already couches it in an ethnic garb. The spate of attacks of Christian dominated areas in Northern Nigeria and burning of churches presents an ethnic undertone to the situation" (Nweke, 2015).

The position taken by Nweke has been with myriad of Non-Muslim Nigerians. To further buttress this Akpogena (2012 cited in Nweke, 2015) advised that all Christians be sensible of people around them especially 'your guard', 'your driver', 'your domestic staff'...get necessary information on security and "activities of terrorist especially Boko Haram and Islamic Jihadist". The abduction

of over 270 Chibok secondary schools girls in 2014 by the sect adds intense pressure to the already dichotomized country. There is no denying the fact, activities of Boko Haram created distrust and disunity among already divided lines, thereby threatened the country's national unity and integration.

The resurgence of agitation for Indigenous People of Biafra led by Nnamdi Kanu has further threatened the corporate existence and independence democratic state. It should be noted that, in an attempt to secede Kanu came up of with Biafra Independent Radio Station, Biafra national anthem and Biafran currency and even declared Nigeria as "Zoo". This no doubt prompted the Nigerian state to launch a military operation to be known as "Operation Python Dance" in Abia state the home Nnamdi Kanu which had received condemnation by the leadership of Igbo and some so-called human rights lawyers. For instance, Dr. John Nwodo and Femi Falana faulted the decision and described it as illegal (<https://punchng.com/ipob-and-the-national-question/>).

The intensity of farmers/herders conflicts in the North central states and its subsequent movement to the Southwest of the country has degenerated to yet another issue of national concern. The accusations put forward by many non-Hausa/Fulani and Christian community of Islamization and Fulanization agenda of President Muhammadu Buhari administration caused serious concern on national integration. For instance, former President Olusegun Obasanjo while given a keynote address at the 2019 Synod of the Church of Nigeria, Anglican Communion held in Oleh, Isoko South Local Council of Delta State said "It is no longer an issue of lack of education and lack of employment for our youths in Nigeria, which it began as, it is now a West African Fulanisation, African Islamisation and global organized crimes of human trafficking, money laundering, drug trafficking, illegal mining and regime change" This comment elicited harsh criticisms on one hand and encomiums on the other hand. For example former governors of Kaduna and Jigawa states Alhaji Balarabe Musa and Sule Lamido criticized him heavily while pan-Yoruba socio-political organization, Afenifere, Ohanaeze Ndigbo, the pan Niger Delta Forum and former Aviation Minister, Femi Fani-Kayode said he was right (www.vanguardngr.com/2019/05/storm-over-obasanjo-stance-on-fulanisation-agenda/).

Accordingly, Eyoboka and Akinferon (2017) cited in Ele (2018) opine that National Christian Elders Forum which comprises of top government official has insisted

that the Federal Government was planning to “Islamise” Nigeria through Jihad. The forum maintains that Islamists have been interfering in the governance of Nigeria using “Takiyya (approved deception)” while Boko Haram and Fulani Herdsmen as violent Jihad were more aggressive in their objective of destroying democracy in Nigeria. He buttress that the aim is to remove democracy as an ideology and entrench Sharia ideology as a source of legislation in the country Eyoboka and Akiniferon cited in Ele, (2018). The declaration of Rivers State as Christian state and subsequently the alleged demolition of mosques by the governor of the state challenged the democracy and unity of the country. Like many other republics and military regimes, the fourth republic witnessed far reaching problems bordering, national integration and national development.

Conclusion

This paper sought to examine the effect of democracy on Nigerian national integration. From the foregoing, we understand the problem of Nigerian national integration does not start with the present democratic dispensation. It was clearly presented in the previous sections that problems of national integration started with the amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914 and of course the subsequent handover of power to the indigenous political leaders after the attainment of independence in 1960. The study reveals further that the adoption of the federal system of government which is meant to accommodate the multi-ethnic divides of the country has failed to ensure national integration in Nigeria.

Also, in spite of the several mechanisms adopted by government to ensure national integration through the establishment of various structures and new institutions of government, schemes as well as constitutional amendments and other extant laws, Nigerian national integration still remains unfinished business. Until present time, the quest for self-determination and secession by Indigenous People of Biafra is still noticeable, the cries for marginalization by one group or the other is still in existence, ethno-religious conflicts is on the rise as day passes by and the rise of mutual distrust among the already divided society is skyrocketing.

More so, the study has established that democracy that is supposed to guarantee national unity and integration among Nigerians has succeeded in undermining it.

Recommendations

In view of the above, the paper recommends thus:

1. True federalism should be incorporated and adopted in the Nigerian polity, so that all the segments of the country will have sense of belonging and fairness; in the sense that the units will take charge of its economic resources and activities and each should develop at its own pace in accordance with its peculiarities. In this sense cooperation will be at the front burner among the units pertaining issues concerning the country as a whole
2. The current constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria should as a matter of seriousness is reviewed to look into seriously in to national questions threatening further the continuous corporate existence of the country. Also, unlike the 1979 and 1999 constitutions which were merely the handiwork of the military, the reviewed constitution should be born out of consensus by the people' it should be made by the people and for the people
3. As against the current agitations from some quarters calling for bestowing state status on the Federal Capital Territory, its current status should be maintained and strengthened, in such a way that it will play its role as a centre of Nigerian unity in its true sense.
4. There is need to encourage both the state and local governments to generate their revenues internally like granting them relative control over natural resources found in their domain. This will make them less dependent on the federal government and look inward for fiscal sustainability as well as restoring social contract and improving service delivery in the sub-national government.
5. Nigerian government should ensure the fair distribution of power and resources among the diverse components of the federation in line with trust of the sociological theory of federalism, which tends to see diversities in a federal setting, is not mean weakness but strength due to concerted efforts of all for the good of the whole.
6. Rotational Presidency should be enshrined in to the constitution so that none of the sections of the country will feel alienated and marginalized. Further with rotational arrangement the disruptive clamour by the sections to clinch power at the centre will be taken out. Each section will simply wait for its turn with little or no rancor among the section.

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DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA TODAY AND THE QUEST FOR NATION-BUILDING: WHITHER NIGERIA?

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Abstract

Democracy is described as a political system where the general populace is permitted to engage, to varying degrees, in the day-to-day running of their own countries, whether through representative democratic elections or actual direct democratic actions, such as referenda. This article sets out a number of instances which should be kept in mind in any discussion of the relationship of Nigeria democratic governance and the quest for nation-building. Democracy aims at the exclusion of either violent action or use of force in championing supposed State policy and theoretically should render violence or use of force unnecessary, since all groups and individuals are expected to express their views and interests through a process of rational deliberation. Yet, this is obviously not always the case especially in today's Nigerian democracy. Since there is no meaningful participation of the masses in public policy or key decisions, one may likely ask 'is there any hope of building the nation (Nigeria) via these snobbish attitudes our leaders'? Nation-building entails concerted effort by political leaders to integrate citizens who are naturally diverse in terms of culture, language, religion, economy, and education to form one united and stable nation. The reversed is the case of Nigeria today, instead integrating the populace for nation-building; the leaders are disintegrating them the more. In this article, antithesis of democratic practices and its danger in building the nation as presented with subheading 'Nigerian democratic governance and quest for nation-building: an aberration were also discussed and some steps if considered would make things aright were suggested such as institutional reformation and restructuring and a new discourse of politics of inclusion should be important elements of our democratic governance which enhances nation-building.

Keywords: democracy, nation-building, and democratic governance

Introduction

Nigeria became a sovereign nation after achieving international political recognition from Britain in 1st October, 1960. In October 1, 1963, Nigeria attained a republican status which gave her political freedom to elect the first indigenous president in democratic arrangement. Since after then, the country's socio-economic and political landscape has been plagued by frequent coups and counter coups with a concomitant frightening propensity of abuse of the law. Millions of Nigeria citizens were made to live in fear since opposition in form of criticism was returned as rebellion. Until 29th May, 1999, Nigeria returned to democratic governance with the hope of assembling all intellectuals, trade unionists, students, workers, journalists and populace to work towards promoting democratic living and governance. Since then, Nigerian political leaders have tied their hands at democracy, they have tried to fashion out political culture directed to define leadership and forge unity among the people with multiple cultural backgrounds in order to achieve a new united and political stable nation. These concerted efforts should be referred to as Nation-building.

Presently, Nigeria has witnessed general instability in the economic and political sphere occasioned by an attempt to clamp down the national legislature by the executive which resulted to mass movement of politicians from one political party to another, thereby making the country to remain backward in the scheme of things, if compared to other international communities. In Nigeria today, dissenting politician, journalists, trade Unionists, workers and private individuals are swiftly arrested, at times, kidnapped, detained and in some cases incarcerated. All these become re-occurring phenomena in the Nigeria politics especially at the present dispensation when the country has gone through the harsh experience of constant mass destruction of human lives and property in middle-belt and north-east states. These actions appear to be violating fundamental human rights and flagrant violation of the Nigerian constitution. Despite all these incessant gruesome killing of innocent citizens, soaring state of unemployment, mind-boggling, corruption in high quarters and lack of priority on the choice of democratic values and constitutionality, Nigeria is still yearning for effective leadership that has the capacity and will to assemble all the required resources to building the nation. Indeed, a Machiavellian principle has become the order of Nigeria politics. The end justifies the means. This paper is therefore aimed at reviewing the democratic process, governance in Nigeria today, and searching

inherent factors that undermine nation-building with the hope of proffering solutions.

Meaning of Democracy

Democracy generally is the word used to represent the type of government that provide equal rights of participation to the citizens of a country to determine the structures and components of the government of their nation. Madu and Udezo (2010) refer to democracy as the commitment of the stakeholders to the ideals and values of the democratic process. This commitment anchors on the spirit of democracy as gleaned from Abraham Lincoln's statement at Gettysburg battle fields as captured by Odey (2001) in these words: "that the only justifying reason why so many Americans can lay down their lives without counting the cost was their abiding faith that they were fighting for democracy. He then defines democracy as the government of the people, by the people and for the people. This entails that democracy is the type of government that gives credence to individual's fundamental rights and rule of law.

Nation-Building

Nation-building is a multi-faceted complex process of building the socio-political and economic dynamics of political society in such a way as to facilitate the policy of continued independent sustenance, development and growth (Mezieobi, 1994). Anyways, from the socio-political view point, nation-building refers to an attempt by nation's leaders to move the nation steadily and permanently in the direction of self-reliance and development through dedication to excellence in leadership, discipline, orderliness, honesty, mutual respect to rules of law and tolerance in national affairs. It involves changing of attitudes of the citizens from tribalism and statism to nationalism, patriotism and globalism

Democratic Governance

As earlier stated, that democracy is the government of the people, by the people and for the people which implies that in democratic governance, the people has the final say in the State's policies and programmes. This is in line with content of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999), Chapter II which stipulated the "Fundamental objectives and Directive principles of State Policy" as specified in section 14 and 23, government's relationship with the people and

the National Ethnics respectively. Highlighting on government's relationship with the people, Section 14, Sub-section 1 and 2 (a) contained that the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be a state based on the principles of democracy and social justice. That sovereignty belongs to the people of Nigeria from whom government through this constitution derives its powers and authority". And section 23 spelling out the National Ethics say: "The National Ethics shall be discipline, integrity, dignity of labour, social justice, religious tolerance, self-reliance and patriotism".

Madu and Udezo (2010) maintained that indeed, these are noble and beautiful constitutional provisions which Nigeria leaders are singing in season and out of season. The idea and spirit of democratic governance supposed to be replicate of the view of Okere (2005), according to him, democracy has been translated in Igbo language as "Ochichi onye kwuo uche ya" which means a free speech regime. Though, this is one aspect of democratic process but freedom of speech is one of the major characteristics that make democratic governance possible. This might be the reason Aron in Gana (2015: 47), described democratic governance as one in which "the peaceful rivalry for the exercise of power exists constitutionally. This means that in democratic governance, who gets what, how and when are stipulated in the constitution which in most cases held to be supreme to any person, institutions, positions or organs of government. Therefore, every person, institution, other constitutions or laws and constituted authority derived their powers from the constitution and to be control by the same.

Explaining further, Bobbio in Mensah (2000: 87) stated that democratic governance entails first and foremost set of procedural rules for arriving at collective decisions in a way which accommodates and facilitates the fullest possible participation of interested parties. It is not only that this set of procedural rules provides ground for healthy participation of interested parties in the politicking of the nation but also provide platform in which political leaders are held accountable for their actions in public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives. Democratic governance allows the populace a significant voice in decision making through the right of franchise.

Antithesis of Democratic Practices

In a true democratic practice, Ikwumelu, Oyibe and Eluu (2014) maintained that leaders are just in power but not with power unlike what is obtainable in Nigeria where the political leaders seize the power from the people and are using it as an instrument for which hunting those who might have had some individual disagreement at one time or the other. As we may know that it is not the word democracy that guarantees the actual transformation expected by the people in a democratic practice, what is more important is the attitudes of those entrusted with the responsibility of manning the tools of democracy and how much they respect rules of law and other basic principles of democratic practices. In today's Nigeria democracy, there is gross disrespect to rules of law and constitutionality. The constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended strictly spell out the functions of all organs of government and of all the political positions stated therein but as we may observe, those in the corridor of power are clamping on the rights and functions of others officers. This is not a democratic practice that is organized on the principles of equality before the law. The situation of the present Nigeria so called democracy is what George Orwell captured in his book entitled "Animal Farm". According to him, "all animals are equal but some are more equal than the others"

Presently, some of the president's deviations from democratic and political norms slap everyone in the face. Attacks on federal judges for decisions that don't go his way or decision meant for the benefit of the public. For instance, the case of former senior special adviser to former president Goodluck Jonathan on internal security, Gen. Dasuki which both international and national courts have granted bail is still in the cell of Directorate of State Security till now. Also, attacks on news organizations for stories that portray him or his administration in a bad light. These amongst others bring about misstatement piled on misstatement which has made some parts of the country to clamour for secession and pointing accusing fingers on the president for running nepotism instead of democracy. The case of the present governor of Benue State will serve as an example where 1/3 of the members of the State House of Assembly convened with the aid of Nigeria police after court order served impeachment notice to the governor against constitutional prediction and the president merely said he knew nothing about it and that is all (Stateman, 2018).

There is no hope for true democracy, respect for rule of law and responsible governance in a country where politicians, high-ranking civil and military officials and judges get state lands as bounties and do not make public declaration of assets owned by them and their relatives. The president in his inaugural statement made it known Nigerians on 29th May, 2015, that his administration is set to fight corruption and in his bid to achieve that, he (the president) belong everybody and belong to nobody. With this declaration, the hope of Nigeria citizens were raised high with anticipation that the Messiah is right on the corner. They shower him with praise for the arrest of Olisa Metu, the former publicity secretary of People Democratic Party, and Gen Dasuki in connection to armed deal and Sen. Bukola Saraki, the senate president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria for failure to completely declare his asset by the Code of Conduct Bureau (Oyibe and Anukaenyi, 2021).

At time in the past, Jonna (2018) reported that the secretary of the government of the Federation 'Engr. Babachir David Lawal' was accused of using one hundred million naira (#100,000,000) to clear grasses in Internal Displaced Persons (IDP) camp and was neither arrested nor prosecuted for such bounty lies and fraud. Recently, the former Minister of Finance 'Mrs. Kemi Adesina' under PMB lead administration was accused of certificate forgery and the government is handling it with executive treatment and we are fighting corruption. Which way Nigeria? Though, there are other shifts, equally audacious and troubling, take a more subtle form. They unfold slowly until, perhaps too late, the change becomes blindingly apparent. So it is with the president's dealings with the media, and the effective disappearance of public accountability. Authoritarianism does not announce itself. It creeps up on you. Like his predecessors, Tokumbo (2018) reported that President Mohammadu Buhari (PMB) has also answered a few questions at joint news conferences with foreign leaders although he has had a smaller number of such events than his predecessors and, unlike them, has made a habit of directing questions to friendly conservative news outlets.

Rather than hodgepodge or decorative changes, Nigeria needs massive reforms in all spheres of governance. This is because; Nigeria is a strange country where custodians are themselves complainants. Those who head institutions, instead of reforming the same, complain and express helplessness about their malfunctioning, inefficiency and non-performance or under-performance. In

recent days, people have heard a lot about paralysis of our legislative, administrative and judicial systems, and that delivery to public is not possible without reforming the existing institutions. We all know what ails Nigeria yet everyone feels indifferent.

Haq (2018) maintains that in every society, administration and dispensation of justice should be the top most priority. A society without a sound, reliable and speedy judicial system like ours (Nigeria), which does not ensure effective dispensation of justice, can never progress or prosper. It is imperative that administration and dispensation of justice under various laws in Nigeria need serious attention. There is a consensus that the entire justice system is on the brink of collapse. There is an urgent need to revamp the justice system to ensure justice for all, rule of law, fairness and equity. As pointed out by the president of Igbo socio-cultural group (Ohaneze), Chief John Nnia Nwodo in recent speech as they visit National Assembly, the legislature has failed to perform its duty in this regard and that he is ready to interact with them to frame out strategies to achieve the goal of reformation of the entire justice system in particular and restructure the country in general (Nwodo, 2017)

In present discourse of what a weak Nigeria initiated by Nnia Nwodo and others, conspicuous by its absence is mentioning of the fact that we have failed to democratize our National apparatus. The existing system is inherently exploitative and anti-people. The ruling classes thrive on people's hard-earned money using custom officers, police force, taxation and judiciary to keep them under control and for their vested interest. Empowerment of the people, both politically and economically, is the real essence of a true democracy geared toward nation-building but this would be a deathblow to the ruling classes. Thus, they work hand-in-hand to safeguard their mutual interests. They hoodwink the masses by arguing that 'system' is important. They know that perpetuation of the existing system alone can help them to keep the masses subjugated.

Nigerian Democratic Governance and Quest for Nation-Building: Aberration

True democratic governance geared towards nation-building should be a system that supposed to allow the electorates significant proportion of participation in the State's decision making process. Keorapetse (2012) rightly observed that,

participatory democracy is a vital mechanism for controlling ruling classes. This argument is on the belief that, in a democracy all should govern, in the sense that all should be involved in law making, in deciding of public policy, in applying laws and in governmental administration. All should be personally involved in vital decision making, that is to say, in deciding laws and matters of public policy but in the Nigerian context, our situation is familiar with the slogan of 7up bottling company 'the Different is Clear'. The different is clear because instead of liberal democracy that is the predominant form of government preferred in the twenty-first century and it is largely characterized by snobbisms in most countries of African especially Nigeria. These select few have become celebrities and the people become spectators in the political theater of our dear country. There is no meaningful participation of the masses in public policy or key decisions, how then can we be clamouring for nation-building.

Nigerians have been denied universal adult suffrage as contained in the constitution, albeit with limitations, which could have been the only way in which people participate meaningfully in the political process for the purpose of building sustainable and stable nation. The limitation of common suffrage as practiced in Nigeria is worrying; our electoral processes have been characterized by irregularities and this denies the people the right to confer legitimacy or otherwise on the elected. The sitting president and the state governors somehow determine who succeeds them. It is an aberration to democratic practices and nation-building. This participation if given would have ensured that rulers act in the interest of the ruled and are accountable to the ruled or at least to the representatives of the ruled. Ikwumelu and Oyibe (2011) are of the view that a direct opposite of participatory democracy is classism. Classical and contemporary influential theorists propagated the view that real democracy, where the people govern, is always and everywhere impossible and that the people could never rule.

And Keorapetse (2012) pointed out that these scholars, including Plato, Robert Michels, Vilfredo Pareto, Max Weber, Gaetano Mosca and Joseph Alois Schumpeter among others, argue, even though in different ways, that government ought in principle, always and everywhere, to be controlled by elites of education, wealth and social status. Some of them argue that elites dominate because the masses lack education, resources and are lethargic, passive, unsystematic and

unimportant. Elitists believe that government is in practice confined to elites. But there is no time or place these scholars said that the ruling classes should distance themselves from the electorates who supposed to own the power they control. In the case of Nigeria, it is the handiwork of Jacob on Esor. The constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria vest executive powers on the president and did not empowers him to decide alone, consequently not authorizing dictatorship but, after elections, the masses are reduced to mere spectators as all decisions are made for them. Is there any hope for nation-building in this situation since nation-building as captured by Ukpong in Oyibe and Nnamani (2017) is a concerted effort by the political leaders to integrate citizens who are naturally diverse in terms of their culture, religion, language, economy, education, and politics so as to form a united and stable society.

Nigeria national assembly and states houses of assembly, which are supposed to be the barometers of public opinion, have been reduced to rubber stamps of executive decision and those of the ruling party. Nigeria parliaments do not have real powers to adequately exercise its oversight function. The incidence of 24th July 2018 that Nigeria Police held siege at senate president (Sen. Bukola Saraki) and his deputy's (Sen. Ike Ekweremadu) residences express no doubt that the Nigeria parliament doesn't have real powers to adequately exercises its oversight function. This is due to strict party discipline and binding ruling party caucus and numerically weak opposition in parliament. Laws are made by the executive and passed through parliament and not passed by parliament. The government only informs, as opposed to consulting, the people on key decisions.

In Nigeria, political parties lack the culture of disagreement(s) and working unanimously for agreed agenda after proper debate and winning majority vote. All parties have an authoritarian, single-person-dominant model that itself is a negation of democracy. It is a situation by which all other organs of government, Ministries, departments and Parastatals are accountable to the Chief Executive only. Instead of clear separation of Power, it is otherwise unification of power and functions of organs of government under the control of one man known as the Chief Executive. The interest of the Chief Executive determines who hold one political position and either who should be elected or not elected by political parties. There are no *bona fide* elections within parties and no process for accountability. This lack of democratic values within political parties is the root

cause of their failure to deliver. Sadly, despite criticism from all corners, parties are still not ready to introduce democracy within their ranks. In all established democracies, political parties regularly hold elections and meetings of workers, publish their audited accounts, file tax returns, and disclose details of expenses and names of donors. But these elements are totally missing in Nigeria political milieu. The commitment to do work at the grass root level and empowering the masses is completely alien to all our political parties.

Nigeria governments, civil and military alike have been totally insensitive towards the poor and at present it is officially admitted that over 80 million Nigerians are living below the poverty line (Oyibe and Eluu. 2015). Income inequalities in Nigeria have increased sharply during the last three years and the trend continues unabated despite tall claims of poverty reduction. The main factors that govern personal income distribution include: distribution of assets; functional income distribution; transfers from other households, government and rest of the world; and tax and expenditure structure of the government. The single most devastating factor for increased income and wealth inequalities remains the regressive tax system. Mbam (2019) reported that incident of tax on the poor for some years now has increased substantively (35 per cent) as in the case of Ebonyi State while the rich owning 90 percent of wealth of the nation and pay less than 1 percent of total tax collection. We are facing chronic economic disparities and dearth of essential services. The 'great divide' in today's Nigeria between the rich and the poor is assuming alarming proportions but there is no debate about it in any quarter.

Putting Things Aright

In true democratic governance, the *sine qua non* is accountability for all. Accountability must start from the judges who adjudge others. Judges must be above board. They should be men of integrity, blameless, and free from all internal and external pressures. Since justice should not only be done but seen to have been done, the prime duty of a judge is to demonstrate this through his judgments and not by verbal exchanges in courts or statements on various occasions.

Politicians need to act responsibly in all spheres whether in power or in opposition. Their role is pivotal for effective working of institutions of the State. Being role models, it is imperative for them to show others by their conduct, the

supremacy of rule of law. If they indulge in corruption and malpractices, the entire system becomes discredited.

Every democratic government should operate by the dictate of constitution and rules of law. Gana (2015) is of the view that a true democracy is characterized by respect to rules of law and good governance. Good governance focuses on the responsibilities of governments and governing bodies to meet the need of the masses. This is cannot be achieve when there is low regard to rules of law and constitutional provisions as the case of Nigeria.

Presently, almost all political parties are dominated and controlled either by a single person or a handful of individuals with workers showing complete loyalty to their "chief" rather than to the party's manifesto/programme. Obviously, in return, they expect personal favours from the "chief" when the party gets power. This culture of nepotism within parties is the biggest failure of democracy in Nigeria and not the imaginary "interferences" by establishment that may be in security and foreign affairs but not in internal affairs of political parties. Another failure of politicians is non-establishment of an independent accountability authority that is accepted and respected by all. The way forward is that political parties should be forced to file tax returns and make their accounts public after audit. This will help the process of filtration within the parties.

A true democratic set-up ensures rule of law and accountability of all, especially of rulers, public office holders and government officials. Absence of rule of law (as is the case in Nigeria) is absolute negation of democracy and nation-building. Favouritism, nepotism, despotism, repression, fascism, bigotry, totalitarianism, oppression, tyranny, intolerance, denial of human rights, persecution of minorities and denial of access to justice are all, antithesis of democracy. Elections *per se* cannot guarantee a democratic polity or rule of law. Since abuse of power can only be checked through a proactive and impartial judiciary, dispensation of justice is a *sine qua non* for democracy.

The ruling classes work hand-in-hand to safeguard their common interests and despite occasional in-fights and pulling each other's legs for grabbing more and more benefits and privileges, they immediately unite to "salvage the system." They hoodwink the masses by arguing that the "system" is more important compared to giving them their basic rights. They know that perpetuation of the existing system alone can help them to keep the masses in eternal subjugation. In

other words, historically all subjects were ruled by one king but today, each subject has to bow before many kings.

The existing power structures, whether related to executive, judiciary or legislation, belie good governance and democratic norms. No political party wants to dismantle these structures. On the contrary, politicians vociferously protect the interests of civil-military bureaucracy, landed classes and unscrupulous businessmen. This unholy alliance not only denies empowerment of masses but also exploits them in the name of “democracy” and/or “national interest.” The real challenge is thus dismantling of this unholy alliance.

Conclusion

The above discourse revealed that Nigeria needs massive reforms and restructuring in all spheres of governance, rather than patchwork or cosmetic changes. The starting point should be accountability of all organs of government. In a country where politicians, high-ranking civil and military officials and judges get state lands as bounties and do not make public declaration of assets owned by them and their relatives, there cannot be hope for true democracy, rule of law and responsible governance. And when a broad-based alliance of political workers, civil society, media and intelligent actors are formed to force the parliament to abdicate all laws of secrecy and enact a comprehensive legislation for right to information, as enshrined in the constitution, coupled with strict accountability by an independent body that we shall clamour for nation-building in Nigeria.

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NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME AND SUSTAINABLE HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM IN DELTA STATE (2010 - 2015)

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Abstract

The National health insurance scheme was established for all employees of government including informal sector employees in Nigeria. The NHIS like other social security measures is expected to help make healthcare accessible and affordable to the people of Delta State as well as improved funding and essential upgrading of facilities in the health sector if well managed and implemented. Against this backdrop the study focused on national health insurance scheme and sustainable health care delivery system in Delta State within the period under review. Data for the study were drawn from direct observation, media commentaries and authentic secondary sources. Data were analyzed through qualitative review of literature on the subject matter. Results indicated that inadequate funding among other factors posed a big challenge to the full implementation of the national health insurance scheme and sustainable health care delivery system in Delta State within the period under review. The study recommended among others that the NHIS should expand the participation of the public facilities, help decrease administrative costs, and set a framework for infrastructural development with a continuous supervision mechanism.

Keywords: National Health Insurance Scheme; Sustainable; Service Delivery; Delta State; Nigeria

Introduction

Healthy population and indeed work force are indispensable tools for rapid socio-economic and sustainable development all over the world. Despite this indisputable fact, in Nigeria the provision of quality, accessible and affordable healthcare remains a serious problem (WHO, 2007, Omonian, Bamidele, and Philips, 2009). This is because the health sector is perennially faced with gross shortage of personnel, inadequate and outdated medical equipment, poor funding and policies inconsistency. Evidence shows that, only 4-6 percent of both public and private Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2004 was committed to the sector (WHO, 2007). Among other factors that impede quality health care delivery in Nigeria include; inability of the consumer to pay for healthcare services and inequality in the distribution of healthcare facilities between urban and rural areas (Omoruan, Bamidele, and Philips, 2009). Sequel to the aforementioned, the country is continually ranked low in healthcare delivery by World Health Organizations. It is therefore, obvious that unless there is a quick intervention, Nigeria will get to 2025 without a change in her health status. This is where the idea of establishing a governmental body to address health care problems that will provide equitable access to healthcare delivery in Nigeria called the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 1999.

Before establishing NHIS in 1999, health systems in Delta State operated a Pay-As-You-Go scheme and payments were based on the nature of services rendered to patients. The health systems in Delta State were plagued by many problems among which was poor funding due to inadequate budgetary allocations. For instance shortage of budgetary allocation released to Delta State health sector, resulted into loss of skilled health professionals, low level of healthy life expectancy and high maternal and child mortality rate. Since the establishment of NHIS programmes in 1999 in Nigeria, there was low level of people's awareness, funding and contribution to the scheme in Delta State because it existed among the public sector workers in the formal sector which covered about 3% of the population (4.1 million) only (Akpovi, 2002, Sanusi & Awe, 2009).

Delta State in its effort to review the state's health policy to ensure access to the use of high quality health care services by Deltans was the first in the country to pass laws establishing SSHIS to implement a mandatory health insurance scheme

in 2015 with plans to capture informal sector as soon as possible. This was aimed at addressing the associated health problems.

The National health Insurance scheme was established for all employees of the Federal Public Service, Federal Capital Territory, States and the private sectors (including informal sector employees) in Nigeria. The major operator under the scheme is the Health maintenance Organization (HMO) which makes payments for services rendered to the enrollee to the health care provider. Being a contributory scheme, employees are to contribute minimum 10% of basic salary while the employers are to contribute 5% basic salary to enjoy health care benefits. This study therefore aims at examining the impact of National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) on healthcare delivery system in Delta State.

The Problem

The health services in Delta State are judged to be unsatisfactory and inadequate in meeting the needs and demand of the people as reflected by the low state of health of the population. The falling standard of the health care system are poor service delivery, poor funding, poor health indices, limited access to quality health care, inadequate participation of private sector among others. The usual pattern of health care financing in Delta State, even with all the political will and socio-economic stability may take decades and billions of naira to make the public health institution functional, viable and effective.

The introduction of the National Health Insurance Scheme in Nigeria most especially Delta State is hoped among other things to help reduce or totally eliminate the “misery” in the health sector and help in improving healthcare facilities. The NHIS like other social security measures is expected to help make healthcare accessible and affordable to the people of Delta State as well as improved funding and essential upgrading of facilities in the health sector if well managed and implemented. But over ten years on, not much is known about it, its’ mode of operations and benefits are not known to those who are even aware of the programme. It is against this backdrop that this study poses the following questions: What is the level of enrolment into NHIS in relation to funding and indicators of a sustainable health care delivery in Delta State? And, what are the major challenges of NHIS and a sustainable health care delivery in Delta State?

The general objective of the study is to examine the impact of National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) on health care delivery in Delta State. Specifically, the study sought to examine the level of enrolment into NHIS in relation to funding and indicators of a sustainable health care delivery in Delta State and identify the major challenges of NHIS and a sustainable health care delivery in Delta State.

Methodology

The study used qualitative descriptive approach, utilizing robust data from official documents and evidence from official documents and relevant agencies. Data collected from the mentioned sources were presented in tables and figures and descriptively analyzed.

Literature Review

The following related literature was reviewed in this study in order to have better understanding of the issues under our investigation;

National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS)

Insurance is an undertaking that involved the regular payment of a token in order to safeguard against loss, sickness or death. According to Burke (1976), an insurance contract is an agreement between two or more parties which is enforceable in law. Awosika (1998) said health insurance is a social security system that guarantees the provision of needed health services to the persons on the payment of token contributed at regular interval.

Health Insurance is a financial mechanism that spreads the cost of medical care over as large portion of the group risk as possible. It is a form of savings set aside to cover relatively predictable contingencies facing individuals or households (Kutzin, 1995). It is a means of removing all part of the economic barrier to health and medical care services. Its purpose is to equalize the distribution of the burden of Medicare among individuals and families (Sarokin, 1975). It also assures that providers will be paid for services rendered. It protects all or part of the citizens from inability to acquire health care because of financial barriers. The National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) is a social health insurance scheme (Utman, 1995) and it is the national pooling of contributors from income of eligible persons to provide standard healthcare services to them and their dependants (Edozien, 1997).

According to the National Health Insurance handbook, (1999) it is a social security system that guarantees the provisions of needed health services to person on the payments of token premium at regular interval. Akande (2000) said that the history of government participation in health care dates back to colonial era when the few existing health facilities were maintained for the use and care of the colonial masters and the few civil servants who were Nigerians. Health Care as at then was free partially for all the recipients, being wholly subsidized by the government. But as the level of education, awareness and of course population increased, the health demand increased and government had no choice than to restrict herself to the provision of the capital and human facilities for health on a “cash and carry” basis to the demanders of health care.

The National Health Insurance Scheme is a body corporate established under Act 35 of 1999 by the Federal Government of Nigeria to improve the health of all Nigerians at an affordable cost. The NHIS Act is the statutory authority for the scheme’s benefit programmes as well sets the general rules and guidelines for the operations of the scheme.

According to Achime and Oyaide (2010) since the National Health Insurance Scheme is income related, it is expected to help in the redistribution of income from people who can afford the payment to those who cannot afford the cost of quality health care services within the economy, which is “rich pay for the poor” the healthy pay for the sick”. The number of Nigerians who could not afford good health care is increasing. Health care must be accessible to all Nigerians.

Benefit Packages under NHIS

Health Insurance is basically, a social security system that guarantees the provision of needed health services to persons on the payment of token contributions at regular intervals, this is in tandem with the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of ensuring healthy lives and promote well- being for all at all ages. The following among others are the benefits Nigerians stand to get from the NHIS packages

- i. Outpatient care (including necessary consumables): Treatment that does not require an overnight stay in the hospital or medical facility, including necessary drugs, injection, drip etc.

- ii. Prescribed drugs, pharmaceutical care and Diagnostic tests as contained in the NHIS Essential drugs list and Diagnostic Test Lists.
- iii. Diagnostic tests as contained in the NHIS diagnostic test list.
- iv. Antenatal care.
- v. Maternity care for up to four (4) live births for every insured contributor/couple in the formal sector program. Additional care is also available if any stillbirth occurs.

Considering these benefits accruing to individuals who are part of the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), the programme works when an employer registers himself and his employees with the scheme. Thereafter, the employer affiliates himself with NHIS approved Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) that will thereafter provide the employee/contributors with list of NHIS accelerated and approved health care providers (public and private) to choose from. The employee registers him/herself and dependants with such provider of his/her choice. There is extra dependant form also to be completed (optional) for those who have more than the stipulated number of wives or children and for those who want to add their parents or relatives, and this is done at an additional fee different from the 5% contribution of the employee (NHIS Act, 2009). There is a place for alternative provider for those whose families are outside their state of posting. So there are the opportunities of choosing say a provider (primary) in the state where you work and if your family is in say Abeokuta, you can choose a provider (alternative) for them in Abeokuta (Achime and Oyaide 2010).

Upon registration, the employee/contributor and his/her dependants are issued with NHIS certified identity card with a Personal Identification Number (PIN). In the event of falling ill, the employee/contributor and or his/her dependants present the identity card to his/her chosen primary health care provider for treatment. The enrollee will be able to access care after a waiting period of thirty (30) days, this will enable the completion of all administration processes (NHIS Act, 2009).

Enrollee/contributors has the right and privileges to change his/her choice of primary provider after a minimum of six (6) months, if he/she is not satisfied with the services provided (NHIS Act, 2009). The Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) makes payments for services rendered to the enrollee to the health care

provider. An enrolment may however be asked to make a token payment called co-payment at the point of service (where applicable), usually at the pharmacy. This co-payment of 10% is only on total cost of drugs presented and it's a mechanism to check abuse of the system (NHIS Act, 2009).

In his opinion, Akande (2000) stated that the benefits in National Health Insurance Scheme could be accessed to the contributions of 15% of basic salary and earnings related where the employee pays 10% while the employee contributes 5% basic salary to enjoy health care benefits. However, the contributions made by and for an insured person entitle him or herself a spouse and four (4) biological children who must be below age of (18) eighteen to health care benefits as contained in NHIS benefits package. More dependants or a child above the age of eighteen could be covered on the payment of additional contributions by the principal beneficiary.

Cases that require specialized attention are referred following the laid down guidelines from primary to secondary and tertiary levels. Referral can be vertical or lateral. A patient may be referred from a primary to a secondary/ tertiary service facility or from a secondary to a tertiary service facility due to need for specialized investigations, for medical/ surgical reasons or other services diagnostic, physiotherapy etc. approval by the HMOs is necessary, except in emergencies and notification of such should be served within 48hrs. Referrals are made to the nearest specialist as contained in the list of NHIS accredited facilities in the area (NHIS Act, 2009).

Health Care Financing in Nigeria

A wide range of systems is used for financing personal health care, whereas public health services are normally financed by government and provided through government mandated system. Access to personal health care also depends on various mechanisms with varying degrees of financial involvement in government, social and private insurance scheme e.g. (NHIS), foreign donors, non-governmental organizations and individuals.

Akpovi (2002) asserted that the pattern of the public and private financing of health care in Nigeria is politically inadequate and economically inefficient to meet the goal of national policy on primary health care. Although the private sub sector of health care delivery is active and substantial in Nigeria but such private

spending had little or no impact on the low cost services for health care within the country. The underlying reality in Nigeria's health care problem is the decreasing availability of public funds of the federal, state and local government. Spending is highly dependent on federal assistance; the down turn in the world's oil market after 1984 seriously reviewed the resources available for public spending on health sector. Health care managers are often faced with various options in generating financial resources for effective management of health sector. The problem accompanying the options and choices for funding health sector is also likely to have implications for different approaches, however, the appropriate methods of financing of the health sector is complicated since the mechanism are numerous, their operations are often complex and their effects multiple.

It is obvious that government alone cannot afford the cost of providing the required resources without some assistance. It became clear that the major problem the health sector faces is one of pervasive under funding and insufficiency of financial resources to provide pertinent health care. This problem of resources efficiency is exasperated by confuting pressures which health care managers have to contend with. On the other hand, financial difficulties arising from the budget deficit and debt problem of government indicate the need for reduced expenditure on the health sector.

Achime and Oyaide (2010) opined that the present economic down turn in the country has increased the constraint of the Federal Government in funding Primary Health Care Services. Consequently, local governments and communities have been urged to increase their efforts in exploring other sources of funding and to make efficient use of the meager available funds. Although, the World Health Organization (WHO) (2000) recommends that at least 5% of a nation's budget be set aside for health, this has not been practicable in Nigeria.

With the NHIS set up as the health insurance with the enrollees willing to test new financing option and demand health insurance, that is, they become registered member of NHIS. Not everyone will fall sick, but a certain proportion may fall ill during the time (note their premium is paid for) and how to access and get health care at the health care provider level.

It is worth noting here that the positive experience with the NHIS in terms of immediate access to care and benefits for their health will create trust for the scheme and will convince people in other sector to join the scheme, while existing enrollees prolong their membership especially in CBHI. The provision of healthcare is a concurrent responsibility of the three tiers of government in Nigeria. The mixed economy practiced in the country also gives room for private sector participation in medical care provision.

NHIS is therefore a mixed bag of two broad categories of stakeholders-government and the private sector. A breakdown of these stakeholders include government at all levels, employers (in the public or private sector organization, self-employed and Rural Community Health Insurance Programme, health maintenance organizations, board of trustees, health providers (including primary, secondary or tertiary healthcare providers), international organizations (including donors and collaborating partners), commercial banks, NGOs, community leaders and the media (Executive Secretary NHIS, 2009). Government under the scheme provides not only standards and guidelines but ensure the enforcement of the same for the smooth and effective running of the programme. Apart from funding by government and donors or partnering organizations, employees under the scheme contribute 5 percent of their basic salary while the employer 10 percent of their basic salary to NHIS (Executive Secretary, NHIS, 2009).

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework for this study is Development theory propounded by Higgins (1977). In line with developmental strategies of the state through rich sustainable Health plan to ensure stable Healthcare for the teaming population, Development is associated to any efforts of the government and other well organized bodies or institutions in order to increase the standard of human welfare, while anything that undermines Health and welfare is anti-development. And this will damage people's relationships, productivity, determination of the equality of life, destruction of traditional cultural values, increase inequalities, lead to poverty, unemployment and hunger/starvation (Higgins 1977:117-8). Seers (1979) sees development as very holistic improvement in all endeavour through available sectors so that the effects will undoubtedly be noticed in all aspects of human life; political, economic, social, cultural, international, etc just like Gundre

(1967) in his capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America. Political, healthcare sustainability and economic development seeks system stability and system integration. (Okoli 2003:33).

The theory posits the use of policies to strengthen the healthcare delivery of a nation by allowing for competitiveness to ensure higher returns through productivity. All category in our population must be economically mobilized and empowered to make needful input to the national development. It is the right of people to enjoy good standard of living through sound healthcare provision so laws of the state should champion that course for national development. It also shows that is the responsibility of states to run a Health system that ensures welfare of its people to world standard.

Findings and Discussion


Level of Enrolment into NHIS in relation to funding and Indicators of a Sustainable Health care Delivery in Delta State.

The sustainability and viability of a country's economic and social growth depend largely on vibrant healthcare sector of the nation, hence National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). The Delta State vision 2020 has a chapter on Human Development of which education and healthcare are key components. The vision of the health sector, as articulated in the plan, is high quality, accessible and affordable health care delivery for all Deltans, while the mission is to provide standard and adequate facilities, infrastructure and human resources to achieve the highest quality of healthcare that is globally competitive. While Nigeria's National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) has been made optional for its citizens, statistics have shown that 12 years after the establishment of the scheme, the impact of NHIS is still placed at 25%.

Table 1: Enrolment for NHIS in Delta State, 2010 – 2015

S/N	Year	Male	Female	Total
1	2010/2011	121,429	69,559	190,988
2	2011/2012	128,040	79,873	207,913
3	2012/2013	133,286	93,374	226,660
4	2013/2014	131,930	100,461	232,391
5	2014/2015	126,771	94,278	321,049
	GRAND TOTAL	641,456	537,545	1,179,001

Source: Adapted from the Delta State Development Performance Assessment Report, 2010-2015

Figure 1: Enrolment for NHIS in Delta State, 2010-2015

Source: Delta State Development Performance Assessment Report, 2010-2015

Figure 1 reveals the Delta State slow growth enrolment into National Health Insurance Scheme between 2010 and early 2015. The assessment revealed that contribution to the health insurance scheme was unpopular and facing resistance from civil servants in Delta state.

Consequently, there was no pre-payment arrangement being implemented. The Professional Associations however worked with the State Ministry of Health SMOH to mount a campaign to educate the general public about the merits of the fund pooling arrangement that allows sharing of financial risks due to health expenditure.

In 2015, Delta state being the first state in the country to have passed laws establishing SSHIS to implement a mandatory health insurance scheme, garnering over 321,049 registered enrollees within few months of new administration, a result that has shown that right health insurance models can achieve results. The scheme commenced services in 63 secondary healthcare facilities for pregnant women and children under-five years with the transition of free maternal and child health programme into the state before the end of December, 2015 through partnership, especially in healthcare service disadvantaged areas, adding that as at mid-year, it had a total 26,905 pregnant women and 44,445 children under five years who have been registered and were receiving treatment budgeted and paid for by the government.

About 100 Primary Healthcare Centres (PHC) spread across the state have been considered appropriate to commence provision of service under the scheme in August 2017 and a quality of service improvement programmes has been initiated to achieve 100 PHCs through partnerships, especially in healthcare disadvantaged areas.

The public sector workers in the formal sector group have signed up to be included in the scheme with the commencement of deduction of 1.75 percent of their consolidated salary, while the government will contribute an equivalent 1.75 % on their behalf, and so far, over 49,000 public sector workers have been enrolled in the scheme.


The next plan is to capture the informal sector that is the okada riders, market women and so on. The aim is to have a large number, because it has to be a pool, and health insurance coverage works better with numbers. The premium of N7,000 was adopted after consideration and review of the actual analysis report with focus on the affordability of the average family to ensure no one is left behind.

In order to have a well expanded health insurance coverage, the Delta stage government under Senator Dr. Ifeanyi Okowa first determined key household demography and health seeking behavior of Deltans to guide her planning. They determined the current household spending on health, insurance coverage needs willingness to pay for health insurance by Deltans.

Table 2: Budget allocation to the health sector, 2010-2015

Year	Capital Budget Estimate (N)	Health Budget	%
2010	22,933,820,000	1,573,548,266	6.86
2011	21,777,974,393	1,518,886,147	6.97
2012	22,823,392,518	1,693,982,032	7.42
2013	22,814,420,196	1,249,661,263	5.48
2014	26,143,990,000	2,354,815,566	7.86
2015	32,971,432,793	3,756,232,761	11.39

Source: *Delta State Development Performance Assessment Report, 2010-2015*

Figure 2: Budget allocation to the Health Sector, 2010-2015

Source: *Delta State Development Performance Assessment Report, 2010-2015*

They also estimated the proportion of Delta State residents in the lowest socio-economic quintiles and availability and capacity of health delivery facilities in Delta State to deliver proposed health insurance services.

The current Delta State administration of Gov. Okowa, established a law that 0.55% of the consolidated revenue of the state goes direct into health insurance, such that it won't only exist at the mercy of subsequent governors. In order to reduce administrative costs, the State deployed competent staff from the civil service who are already on payroll of the government and trained to work in the commission as against engaging health workers that becomes expensive to manage.

Table 3: Health Indicators for Delta State, Nigeria, 2010 - 2015

Year	Birth rate	Death rate	Infant mortality Rate	Maternal Mortality Rate	HIV Prevalence	TB Prevalence
2010	22,023	1497	48	456	254 (3.4)	28
2011	22986	1497	68	430	299 (2.9)	30
2012	19,289	1368	37	410	132 (2.5)	34
2013	25,057	1409	102	290	201 (2.6)	59
2014	27,149	1560	54.5	270	228 (2.9)	69
2015	30,162	1002	14	130	100 (2.0)	12
Total	146,666	8333	323.5	1910	1364	232

Source: *Delta State Development Performance Assessment Report, 2010-2015*

Birth rate

In the analysis of the data above, it shows that the proportion of births attended by skilled birth attendants were 22,023 in 2010 representing 15%, 22986 in 2011, representing 64%, 19,289 in 2012 representing 13%, 25,057 in 2013 representing 17%, 27149 in 2014 representing 19 % and, 30,162 in 2015 representing 21% respectively. In 2015 there was an increase in birth rates which was attributed to improved antenatal care coverage of four or more clinic visits under NHIS. There was also deployment of midwives to improve the quality of healthcare in the state.

Death rate

In 2010 and 2011, the death rate was 1497 which represents 18%. The rate reduced to 1368 in 2012 and increased to 1368 in 2012. The death rate increased to 1409 in 2013. Again, in 2014 the death rate was 1560 and extremely declined to 1002 in 2015 which stand for about 12% of death rate. It was observed that between 2010-2014, the estimated figures of death rate with all the indices on the high side are unfavourable. This might be attributed to low funding, poor infrastructure with consequent adverse effect on health status of the state. The figure in 2015 showed

the state of provision of infrastructural facilities, increased funding and high enrolment into NHIS with improved health gains as indicated in table 3 above.

Infant Mortality Rate

Infant mortality rate which increased from 48/1,000 live births in 2010 to 68/1,000 live births in 2011, reduced to 37/1,000 live births in 2012. Infant mortality rates stood at 102/1000 live births in 2013, 54.4/1,000 live births in 2014 and 14/1,000 live births in 2015. The table 3 shows that reduction in the mortality rate in 2015 was achieved as a result of the proportion of births that were attended to by skilled birth attendants under NHIS programme. There were routine immunization and special campaigns for measles and polio immunization. Before 2010, all these services were provided under a cost recovery at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels. But by 2015, the Delta State Government launched free Under-5 Healthcare Scheme under NHIS, which provided diagnostic and treatment services to children under age five.

Maternal Mortality Rate

Maternal mortality rate has progressively declined in the years under review (2010-2015), falling from 456/100,000 live births in 2010 to 430/100,000 live births in 2011. The maternal mortality rate was 410/100,000 in 2012 and 290/100,000 live births in 2013. In 2014 the rate further reduced to 270/100,000 live births. In 2015, 130/100,000 live births was achieved through the Delta State government's effort to equitable access to quality health care services. In a bid to promote safe motherhood and reduce maternal deaths, family planning, antenatal delivery, postnatal and emergency Obstetrics services were delivered under the State Health Insurance Scheme. The Nurses were trained on Live Saving Skills (LSS) and Doctors on Elongated Life Saving Skills (ELSS). There was improved preventive, diagnostic and treatment service utilization.

HIV Prevalence

As seen in Table 3, for each of the years shown the HIV prevalence was 3.4 percent in 2010, declining to 2.9 percent in 2011. The prevalence was 2.5 percent in 2012 and slightly increased to 2.6 percent in 2013. Again, in 2014 the HIV zero-prevalence rate was 2.9 percent declining to 2.0 percent in 2015. It was observed that in 2015 there was a significant decrease in the number of people with HIV. This is attributed to the scaling up of Anti-Retroviral Services (ART) which

targeted eliminating mother to child transmission of HIV by 2015 under National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). This was achieved with the support of the Institute of Human Virology (IHVN) undertaking HIV counselling and testing, and building the capacity of health workers under the scheme.

Tuberculosis Rate

There was steady increase in sputum smear positive rates of 28/100,000 population in 2010, 30/100,000 population in 2011 and 34/100,000 in 2012 and 59/100,000, 69/100,000 in 2013 and 2014 respectively. In 2015, there was reduction in the prevalence of deaths from TB infections 12/100,000 by more than 50 percent compared to the figure of 2010. The state empowered people with TB and communities through partnership, advocacy, communication and social mobilization and fostering community participation in TB care and prevention and health promotion through the state National Health Insurance scheme.

Major Challenges of the NHIS and a Sustainable Health Care Delivery in Delta State

There is no doubt that the health insurance scheme in Nigeria since its inception, has to a large extent positively affected the lives of its enrollees among which include reduction in the rising cost of health care among the participants, the restoration of confidence in primary and secondary levels of health care, etc. Besides, the Delta State Development Performance Assessment Report, the major challenges militating against the timely achievement of Health insurance outcomes in Delta State are as follows:

Poor Remuneration of Doctors and Health Professionals: In Delta State, Doctors and other health professionals are severely underpaid. Nonpayment of salaries and other benefits lead to nonchalant attitudes of health workers to the patients. Routine strikes disrupt the delivery of health services and lower the overall quality of healthcare. During the period of strike patients resorts to traditional medicine or quacks and roadside drug vendors because they are unable to get an appointment with a professional doctor.

Inadequate community involvement and participation: NHIS Delta State has really done a lot in the areas of awareness and orientation. They have used various channels in efforts to improve penetration, they have also carried out advocacy visits and provided supports to individuals, there is however an existing channels

that have not been harnessed properly, this is more grass root oriented and strong community participation which has health service ownership and sustainability uncertain. The community needs to know that their health insurance program is not just one of those government hand-out programs.

Problem of distribution and provision of medical facilities: Over 90% of the disease burdens are in the rural areas, with a corresponding less than 10 per cent of the facilities (Delta State Health Development Plan, 2010). Moreover, many of the health human resources are based in the urban areas and are not ready to move to the rural area to work. This is due to the dearth of infrastructures such as schools for the children, potable water, and electricity, among others.

Treatment coverage: There is big gap in the services that are covered under NHIS. NHIS cannot handle major illness like big surgeries, treatment of HIV, cancer etc. to a large extent, there is a high level of dissatisfaction among the enrollees because with a major illness, NHIS cannot handle it. At the end of the day, patients will end up in treating only ailments like malaria and typhoid.

Non-availability of quality drugs: This is one of the major challenges and limitation in the effectiveness of NHIS in Delta State. Drugs at health facilities were generally regarded as an essential aspect of quality service delivery. Access to drugs motivates people to seek health care and to enroll and remain in the NHIS. Lack of drug makes health insurance less attractive.

Non- reimbursement of health providers claims: The health providers complained that delays in claiming reimbursement negatively affected their cash flow and supplies and this led to low stock levels in the hospitals (Agbola, 2000). These delays made providers refuse to offer services to some insured clients. Other challenges affecting NHIS and sustainable health care delivery in Delta State were the stigmatization of people living with HIV & AIDS which prevents them from disclosing their zero-status and accessing needed drugs and services (Awosika, 1998).

Conclusion

Nigerians desire and deserve easy access to qualitative health care, however, this desire has not been met by Nigerian government, consequently, the health situation of the people of this country has remained unstable due to the onslaught of infectious diseases and poverty. Having delved extensively into the research,

we make bold to conclude that the implementation of the recommendations of this study will improve the National Health Insurance Scheme effectiveness in Delta state which will provide quality services to the clients.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations are made:

- i. Law establishing the NHIS should be made compulsory, and mandatory in order to ensure access to basic healthcare services to all residents of Delta State at an affordable cost.
- ii. There is the need to digitalize and create systems that make bureaucracy minimal and give technology solution that makes the process seamless e.g. Premium can be paid with a POS, ATM and Online.
- iii. The scheme should expand the participation of the public facilities, help decrease administrative costs, and set a framework for infrastructural development with a continuous supervision mechanism.
- iv. The Office of the Special Adviser to the Governor of Delta State on Project Monitoring should provide and mandate a focal person for monitoring health insurance scheme, its implementation using elaborated M & E result framework. There should also be periodic assessment of achievement and progress towards MDG and reporting of cooperation of all stakeholders.

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INSURGENCY AND THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPS) IN THE NORTH EAST NIGERIA (2009-2018)

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Abstract

The study critically evaluated the Management of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) orchestrated by insurgency in North East Nigeria. One of the major problems facing Nigeria is how to manage the rising number of IDPs especially in the North Eastern part of the country. Irrespective of the effort of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) which was established to saddle with the responsibilities of managing the IDPs yet the IDPs face grave human rights violations and abuse including lack of food, shelter, water and sanitation, limited health facilities, death, injuries, sexual abuse etc. Three research questions that transcend to three hypotheses were formulated to act as a guide in realizing the objectives of the study. Data for the research were sourced from secondary materials and were analyzed descriptively. The study was anchored on theory of structural functionalism. The findings revealed that irrespective of the rights contained in the Nigerian Constitution, IDPs are invariably and tactically denied access to these rights. The study recommended among others; the Nigerian government through NEMA should ensure that it enhances its data tracking mechanisms for displaced persons in the Northeast to ensure the availability of dependable statistics of displaced persons both in camps and in host communities; that the institutions of war against corruption must be strengthened, such that those found wanting in diverting and embezzling the funds meant for the welfare of the IDPs in the Northeast will be prosecuted and punished accordingly.

Keywords: Insurgency; IDPs; NEMA; Insecurity; Management; Boko-Haram; Constitution; Corruption.

Introduction

The issue of internal displacement has taken centre stage of insurgency and insecurity discourse especially in sub-Saharan Africa, where hordes of insurgents have sacked communities from their ancestral homes and ensured that their return is impossible. Internal displacement describes situations in which individuals and groups are compelled to leave and remain away from their homes, but remain within the borders of their own countries. This usually occurs as a result of insurgency as entrenched in the North East Nigeria under the episode of Boko-Haram (Bukar, 2016). The scale of internal displacement and the inevitable problem and nature of the response by the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMAs) have become far more momentous in contemporary times.

The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) was established by Act 12 as revised by Act 50 of 1999 as the Nigerian government's response to disasters, particularly internal displacement of people. According to the Act that established it, its objective is to coordinate resources in Nigeria to ensure efficient and effective disaster prevention, preparation, mitigation, and response. In carrying out its duties, NEMA has partnered with other governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps were built in various sections of the country, and catastrophe victims were given relief supplies. For example, in 2006, NEMA evacuated around 1700 Nigerians fleeing community conflicts in Mambilla Plateau and surrounding areas to seek safety in Cameroun (NEMA Report, 2006). In 2011, more than 500 Nigerians were safely evacuated from troubled Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, as well as the West African country of Ivory Coast (NEMA Report, 2012).

Statistics from International Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) (2013, 2015) showed that the population of internally displaced persons in Nigeria increased from 1,353,982 in 2013 to about 2,152,000 in 2015. This represents an increase of over one million from 2013 to 2015. The total number of internally displaced persons across Nigeria as at 2017 was 1,700,000 people (www.internal.displacement.org/countries, 28/4/2019). About 279,000 displacements were due to violence perpetrated by Boko Haram insurgents and military operations against them. Between January and June, 2018, a total of 417,000 people were displaced in Nigeria due to conflicts and violence (IDMC,

2019). The obvious effect of these massive displacements was accommodation deficits for the teeming number of displaced persons. NEMA and government appeared to have been taken unawares and therefore unprepared in making adequate provisions for accommodation of very large number of displaced persons. Host communities were equally over-stretched as there existed few camps for the accommodation of these IDPs. Odunmorayo (2015) further observed inadequate and at times unavailable health services in the camps due to high number of IDPs.

Most apparently, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) instantaneously become reliant on others for their most basic needs such as shelter, food and water. At the same time, their susceptibility may be amplified by barriers to accessing health care, education, employment, economic activities, and electoral politics in their areas of displacement. Moreover, the longer displacement continues, the greater is the risk that traditional family and social structures break down, leaving Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) dependent on outside aid and vulnerable to economic and sexual exploitation. Such dependency, in turn, reduces the chances of durable solutions and sustainable reintegration into society once political and security conditions have changed to enable such solutions to take place (Ogundamisi, 2016).

These Internally Displaced Persons face grave human rights violations and abuse including lack of food, shelter, water and sanitation, limited health facilities, death, injuries, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), arbitrary detention, disappearances, forced displacement, and forced recruitment. The psychological needs of these displaced persons are particularly significant and remain largely unmet given the magnitude of the problem. Loss and fear among the displaced are aggravated by a sense of loss of dignity as many feel ashamed of their living conditions.

1.1 Objective of the Study

As regards to the justification for the critical assessment of the Management of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) occasioned by insurgency in North East Nigeria, the objectives of this paper are to: find out how rapid increase in insurgency affected management of internally displaced persons in the North East Nigeria, find out how corruption impeded the management of internally displaced persons

in the North East Nigeria and identify how National Policy on IDPs strengthen the effective management of IDPs in the North East Nigeria.

The Concept of Insurgency and Internally Displaced Person

In recent times, the concept, insurgency has attracted lots of interpretations, some of which are closely related and some which have completely distinct interpretation from scholars, analysts and security experts all over the world because of its regular occurrences and sophistication adopted by those that championed its cause as a mean to register their grievances either against government policies or marginalization, as well as in pursuit of selfish interests or of religious ideologies or beliefs (Mevayerore, 2019).

Abdu and Shehu (2019) see insurgency as a rebellion against a constituted authority either in the pursuit of political goal or for selfish interest. Abolurin (2011) cited in Abdu and Shehu (2019:10) described insurgency as a revolution, revolt, rebellion, riot and mutiny. By implication, those carryout rebellious acts are insurgent groups involved in insurgency. Most people have also used the term 'terrorism' to describe the term 'insurgency'. But this description is not usually correct about insurgency. Though it can only be regard as such only when it has gone extreme with the use arms and other forms of sophistication. In this respect, Curtas (2006) and Liolio (2014) cited in (Amalu, 2015:36) argued that insurgency is not terrorism, subversion, guerrilla war, conventional war, revolution, coup d'état, although some insurgent groups have adopted some of these methods in the achievement of their goals.

Hassan (2014) argued that insurgency can be seen as political struggle and necessarily not a military struggle, therefore, not amenable to a purely military solution without resorting to a level of brutality unacceptable to the contemporary global environment. Galula (1964) define insurgency as "a protracted struggle conducted methodologically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives which often times or extreme cases lead to overthrow of existing order". The US Department of Defense, (2007) cited in Ukpong-Umo (2016) defined insurgency as an organised movement which its aim is to overthrow a constituted authority or government through the use of subversion or armed conflict.

Nature of Internally Displaced Persons in Nigeria

The rise in the numbers of internally displaced persons in Nigeria has become an issue of national concerns. Many Nigerians have been displaced as a result of natural disaster, ethno- religious conflicts, communal clash and the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East and some part of Northern West has increased the number of IDPS (Funmi, 2014). The insurgency perpetrated by the Boko Haram on residents on daily basis in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States in particular has increased the number of displaced citizens with some Nigerians reportedly taking refuge in the neighboring countries of Cameroon, Niger Republic and Chad (Funmi, 2014). The number of, internally displaced persons (IDPS) in the country has been increasingly in leaps and bound each passing day since the beginning of the insurgency in the North-East Nigeria. The officially registered number of conflict and disaster induced IDPS stands at 868,235 in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States (Chibuzor, 2015).

According to the 2014 report of the IDMC and the Norwegian Refugee Centre, out of the 33 million internally displaced persons all over the world, Nigeria accounts for 3.3 million or a whopping 10 percent of the total population of IDPS in the world. In April, 2014, a statement by the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCFMIDS) claimed that Borno state was in the lead with Nasarawa following after it. The figures from the commission also indicated that Nigeria had IDPS in 24 states of the Federation (Adeola, 2014). Internally displaced people (IDPS) the vast majority of whom are women and children face a range of threat to their physical safety and restrictions on their freedom of movement. Many are traumatized by the violence that prompted them to flee and are afraid to return. Those whose homes have been damaged or destroyed by conflict and flooding have nowhere to go back to. Most internally displaced families live and share resources with host communities (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014).

Challenges faced by Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

In a study conducted by Kabiru (2015) on the nature and management of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Northern Nigeria from 2012-2015, the study findings revealed the followings challenges of IDPs in Nigeria;

- **Lack of adequate and safe shelter:** - Access to adequate shelter is the most immediate need IDPs face in the initial stages of displacement. In the middle belt and parts of the north-east recurrent ethnic and inter-communal clashes frequently cause displacement as a result of the destruction of homes, schools, and markets (IDMC, 2014).
- **Basic Needs Unmet:-** IDPs are often unable to exercise their basic rights to food and essential household items such as sleeping, mats, mosquito nets, jerry can, soap and cooking utensils. They usually lose access to their sources of revenue when they flee. Assistance for those living in camps, when provided, is inadequate.
- **Poor Health and Hygiene:** - IDPs often have only minimal access to health services and their lack of access is of particular concern given that the overwhelming majorities are women and children. Most health facilities in areas of the north east affected by conflict were closed as of mid-2014 as a result of insecurity and the displacement of staff (IDMC, 2014).
- **No access to Education:** - With many IDPs sheltering in schools and humanitarian assistance often limited to life saving intervention, displaced children are generally unable to pursue their education. Boko Haram attacks against schools since 2012 and state government closure of facilities in the worst affected areas, such as Borno.

Legal and Institutional Framework for IDPs

The protection of IDPs' rights demands the same measures as are necessary to protect the rights of all citizens, regardless of whether or not they are displaced. However, a central means of implementing the right to liberty and security of person is the passage of legislation setting out protections against capricious and precarious situations affecting a vulnerable group such as IDPs. Presently, Nigeria has no legislation that deals explicitly with IDPs and there is no specific institution equipped to handle matters relating to IDPs. Overwhelmed by the enormous displacement caused by Boko Haram and the lack of any legal and institutional framework for tackling such situations and in order to provide a provisional solution to the menace, the government of Nigeria was left with choice than to attempt a momentary remedy (Eni & Synda, 2016). The government set up a

committee to draft a National Policy on IDPs to assist in the registration and issuance of identity cards, prevention or reduction in instances of internal displacement and allocation of responsibilities to agencies and organs of government, non-governmental and civil society organisations. The National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons was prepared and presented to the government in 2011, but it is yet to be adopted till today (Bukar, 2016). This policy is based on the United Nations Guiding principles on Internal Displacement of 19982 and the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Ekpa & Dahlan, 2016).

Corruption in the Management of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

There are several forms of corruption in the IDPs settings which extend beyond cash bribes and other forms of financial corruption to include the fraudulent diversion or theft of resources, the denial or granting of access to resources to serve political ends, extortion of affected populations, nepotism in recruitment practices in aid agencies as well as sexual exploitation of those (predominantly women) seeking access to aid. The exact nature of corruption encountered will further depend on the form of aid being provided, whether this is shelter, food, healthcare, sanitation, longer-term infrastructure development or all-encompassing support, such as in refugee camps. It is critical to recognize that some groups of people are more vulnerable than others to various forms of corruption in these settings. Studies of gender and corruption have shown how women and girls experience corruption differently and, as primary service users, may be more adversely affected by the problem (Transparency International, 2016a).

A more recent study has also taken a gender perspective on corruption encountered during forced and irregular migration (GIZ, 2017). It highlights the vulnerability of women and girls at different stages of the migration process and the intersection between sexual violence and forms of corruption in these IDP Camps.

On the other hand, corrupt office holders in government, and in IDPs management agencies alike, have been accused on several occasions diverting funds and relief materials meant for IDPs for their personal use and for their relatives or friends. A situation that reduces the efficiency of the agencies concerned in managing IDPs (Eweka and Olusegun, 2016).

Challenges of Managing Internally Displaced Persons in Nigeria

Managing internally displaced persons has become a major challenge to most countries. The situation is not different in Nigeria. The institution that has some dealings with displaced persons in Nigeria is the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) which provides direct material assistance to displaced persons. NEMA was established to perform the function of organizing, providing and coordinating emergency relief to victims of national disasters throughout the federation and matters incidental thereto.

Inferring from its statutes NEMA has little to do with prevention, protection and return or resettlement of IDPs. NEMA responds to the occurrence of disasters in the country by sending relief materials and supplies to affected communities and facilitates the ability of the displaced to survive the immediate problems of displacement and dispossession. Unfortunately, these efforts are not sustained and the victims are soon left on their own (Adebowale, 2013). In Nigeria, there are several challenges associated with managing IDPs. The government does not respond to the plight of this category of persons because it assumes that the relief materials given are adequate to meet their needs, even though these materials do not get to the target end users. These items are sometime diverted by the people who are expected to distribute them, and sold for profit (Mohammed, 2013).

Gap in the Literature

So many scholars have written extensively on the subject matter, but the authors in the literature under review could not state the legal punitive actions to be taken peradventure any individual violate the laws guiding the IDPs. This is true because Nigeria has no legislation that deals explicitly with IDPs and there is no specific institution equipped to handle matters relating to IDPs. The missing link is that the available data did not show how NEMA should enhance its data tracking mechanisms for displaced persons in the Northeast to ensure the availability of dependable statistics of displaced persons both in camps and in host communities.

Theoretical Framework

The study is anchored on Structural Functional approach as expounded by Sociologists such as, Herbert Spencer, Talcott Parsons, Emile Durkheim, Robert

Merton and others (Mbah, 2006:307). This approach sees society as a complex system whose parts work together to promote solidarity and stability. Functionalism addresses society as a whole in terms of the functions of its constituent elements. A common analogy popularized by Herbert Spencer presents these parts of society as “organs” that work towards the proper functioning of the “body” as a whole (Turner, 1985, Urry, 2010). The core advocates of the theory are Almond and Coleman (1960) and Almond and Powell (1996). The structural functional theory revolves around the two concepts of structure and functions. According to Durkheim, society should be analyzed and described in terms of functions (Coser, 1977). While structure refers to the arrangements within the system which perform the functions and/or roles; function denotes the consequences involving the objective as well as the process of the patterns of actions and roles. As a branch of the system theory, structural functionalism addresses the issue of what political structures performs which functions in the political system (society).

Tenets of the theory

- It sees the society as a single inter-related system with each element performing a precise function.
- If a society is a system as a whole, it has parts that are interconnected.
- The entire social structure has wide aims and principles, which are mainly observed by the members of the society to maintain equilibrium.

Application of the theory to the study

The emphasis of the Structural Functionalist approach on the inter-relatedness of several parts of society makes us aware of the fact that a change in one part of society, whether intended or unintended, affects other parts of society. NEMA as a federal government agency is like other structures of government viz; ministries, agencies and departments. It is charged with the responsibility of handling humanitarian issues as they arise in the country. It ensures that in emergency situations leading to humanitarian crisis, including displacements of citizens, NEMA would be able to perform its assigned function to restore equilibrium to the Nigerian society.

Thus in the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast Nigeria, NEMA was expected to properly handle the ensuing humanitarian situation to

ensure the sustenance of the displaced persons and their eventual rehabilitation. Merton (1957) made it clear that there is a social dysfunction referred to as any social pattern that may disrupt the operation of society. The dysfunction of the political and economic structures of the country, giving rise to corruption, gross inequality, poverty etc, adversely affected the performance of NEMA just as it affected other structures that make up the Nigerian society. This explains why in spite of NEMA's intervention, coupled with local and international interventions in the humanitarian crisis that arose from Boko Haram insurgency, NEMA could not effectively handle the situation. The inability of NEMA to keep effective records of the progressive rise in the number of IDPs, led to acute accommodation problems in the IDP camps. Its lack of proper coordination of interventions of local and international aid agencies contributed to the scarcity of food items and poor health conditions of the IDPs in the camps.

Furthermore, improper utilization of relief materials meant for IDPs from different aid agencies also accounted for the poor health conditions of people in the IDP camps. These are results of malfunctioning of the other structures in the country which had affected the entire Nigerian society. Thus, if other structures like the Federal Ministry of Budget and Planning which has the mandate to serve as clearing house for all international aid agencies did not effectively perform its oversight functions on these agencies, it has serious negative effect on the performance of NEMA.

Thus, the dysfunction of one structure affects the proper functioning of other structures, since according to the Structuralism approach, the proper functioning or dysfunctioning of any part(s) affects the whole and would give rise to the creation of other structures or functions to handle the disequilibrium resulting from the dysfunction. NEMA officials had explained that NEMA's inability to effectively handle the humanitarian crisis in the Northeast Nigeria mainly bordered on irregular and under releases of budgetary provisions, paucity of fund, and the preferences of local and international aid agencies to operate through their branches and local affiliates in Nigeria (Daiti, 2016). This scenario is not peculiar to NEMA. Other government agencies had complained of under releases of budgetary provisions or under implementation of approved budgets. Paucity of fund is a common denominator in Nigeria and in fact, in other underdeveloped countries of the third world.

Hypotheses

The following hypotheses were formulated to guide the study.

1. Rapid increase in insurgency affected the management of internally displaced persons in the North East Nigeria, 2009-2018.
2. Corruption impeded the management of internally displaced persons in the North East Nigeria.
3. Legal and institutional framework can enhance effective management of the internally displaced persons in the North East Nigeria.

Discussion and findings**Hypotheses One: Rapid increase in insurgency affected the management of internally displaced persons in the North East Nigeria.**

The number of IDPs has been on the increase especially in the Northeast Nigeria. The major cause of the displacements was the Boko Haram insurgency, which increased in magnitude as the years passed by and climaxed in 2014, and early 2015, when the insurgents occupied vast territories in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states. The number of mortalities and displacements continued to rise that NEMA was unable to handle the arising humanitarian crisis. A clarion call was made to the international community and philanthropic agencies to assist in the humanitarian crisis. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) (2014) had reported that, as at the end of 2013, there was an estimated 1,538,982 IDPs in Nigeria. Two years later in 2015, IDMC estimated that with the rate of annual increase in IDP population, about 2,152,000 IDPs were in Nigeria. This represented an annual increase rate of about 500,000 IDPs. This figure, according to IDMC (2015) report, was based on an assessment conducted from November to December 2015 by the International Organization for Migration Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) teams in 207 local government areas covering 13 states of Northern Nigeria. The displacement assessment was conducted with key informants from local governments, wards and IDP sites (both in official camps and camp-like settings), as well as people in host communities. It was the report that revealed that out of the total figure of IDPs in Nigeria, 12.6 percent were displaced due to communal clashes, 2.4 percent by natural disasters and 85 percent because of insurgency attacks.

International Organization for Migration (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) (2014), reported that as at May 2014, there were about 650,000 IDPs in the

Northeast, while in December of the same year, the number rose to 868,355 IDPs in the region (Inter Agency Report, 2014). The program of IOM had the objective to support the government of Nigeria through NEMA in establishing a comprehensive system to collect and disseminate data on IDPs by strengthening the capacity of NEMA and other partners in the field to undertake IDP assessment in a unified and systematized manner. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) (2014) reported that there had been steady rise in internally displaced persons from Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states, and was able to tabulate the estimated number of IDPs by year as they progressed from 2009 to 2014.


Table 1: Progressive Increase in Number of IDPs in Northeast Nigeria; 2009 - 2014

Year	No of IDPs	Increase by Year
2009- 2010	100,000	-
2010 – 2011	130,000	30,000
2011 – 2012	200,000	70,000
2012 – 2013	290,000	90,000
May 2013 – March 2014	250,000	(40,000) decrease
May 2014 – June 2014	436,608	186,608
August 2014 – December 2014	600,000	163,392,

Source: UNOCHA Report, 2014

Even though the above figures varied with the compilations of IDMC/IOM, the fact remains that these international organizations have some mechanisms on ground to keep track of IDP population in parts of the country. Although, NEMA had fragments of figures here and there on IDP population; such records do not constitute effective record keeping on the population and needs of the IDPs in the Northeast Nigeria. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) (2014) had reported that conflict and insecurity in the Northeast region had driven massive displacement with an estimated 1 million people reported to have fled their home communities in 2014 alone. The on-going conflicts and insecurity prevent the international aid agencies from keeping accurate track of the displaced population as some of the displaced persons eventually found their way into safer communities where security situation did not allow for proper profiling. Majority of such displaced persons remained in host communities, as some of them did not even have the idea that NEMA had established camps for IDPs. ACLED (2014)

graphically presented both the cumulative fatalities and the number of conflict incidents attributed to Boko Haram from 2009 to 2014 as follows:



The figures above show that fatalities attributed to Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast rose from less than 1000 in July 2009 to more than 14000 in 2014 (which was the climax of the insurgency activities). In addition, the number of conflict incidents attributed to Boko Haram rose from less than 5 incidents in July 2009 to over 60 incidents in October 2014. This progressive rise in the number of incidents and the resultant progressive rise in the number of fatalities over the period also led to similar progressive rise in the number of displaced persons in the Northeast Nigeria. This scenario tallies with IOM (2015) Report that IDPs' number rose by about 1 million from 2013 to 2015. The IDMC, IOM and NEMA (2017) Reports also tabulated the statistics of the rising number of IDPs in the Northeast Nigeria from 2009 to 2016 as follows:

Table 2: Rising Number of IDPs in the Northeast Nigeria from 2009 to 2016

Year	No. of IDP	
2009	100,000	
2010	130,000	
2011	200,000	
2012	290,000	
2013	389,281	
2014	868,335	
2015	1,846,999	
2016	1,913,213	

Source: Compiled from IDMC (2014), IOM/NEMA (2017) figures

The table and figure above confirm that there had been progressive increase in the number of displaced persons in the Northeast Nigeria between 2009 and 2016. The number of IDPs rose from a figure of 100,000 in 2009 to a whopping figure of 868,335 in 2014 and 1,846,999 and 1,913,213 in 2015 and 2016 respectively. This cumulative rise in the number of IDPs, no doubt, posed serious challenge to both the Nigeria government, NEMA and the intervening local and International Humanitarian Agencies. The Humanitarian Needs Overview (2014) Report showed that the situation in the Northeast had deteriorated and continued to worsen with the growing number of victims.

Hypothesis two: Corruption impeded the management of internally displaced persons in the North East Nigeria, 2009 - 2018.

The fund donated by the nongovernmental organization and individuals towards alleviating the plight of the troubled people has been enormous. Odufowokan (2016:7) reported that Aliko Dangote and other individuals donated 6.5 million Naira; the World Bank donated the sum of 800 million US dollars, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) donated 248 million US dollars for the rebuilding of the Northeast, out of which 24 million US dollars has been released. United States donated 200 million dollars; Saudi Arabia donated 750 million Naira, and the Australian government donated 9 million Naira respectively.

The support is not only limited to the above. Japanese government assisted Nigeria with 4.5 million US dollars, an equivalent to the sum of 1.4 billion Naira

for the purpose of responding to the needs of the IDPs in the Northeast zone (Vanguard Newspaper, 2016). In the same manner, the United Nations fund released 13 million US dollars for the upkeep of the IDPs in the Northeast (Enejeta, 2016). The Senate approved the sum of the 10 billion Naira for the resettlement of IDPs in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States, which was also accompanied by the United States assistance with the sum of 8.7 billion Naira to support the IDPs in the zone (Premium Time, 2015). Also, the media, particularly the Daily Trust have contributed financially to supporting the plights of the IDPs in the Northeast Nigeria. Daily Trust raised 230 million Naira for the funding of the welfare of the IDPs in the region (Daily Trust, 2016).

These supports coming to the Nigerian government or the state governments where the IDPs are, and sometimes, to the IDPs directly are fragmented humanitarian response because there is no financial or resource pool meant to respond to the problems of the IDPs in Nigeria. Despite the fragmented assistance coming to Nigeria as a result of the IDPs of the Boko Haram insurgency, it appears much has not been recorded in terms of improving the condition of the IDPs or resettling them. The reason for this situation is the preponderance of corruption in the process of management of financial and other related resources meant for IDPs in the Northeast Nigeria. The situations in the various camps accommodating the IDPs in the region are still facing enormous challenges of basic needs of food, shelter and clothing; water, sanitation, and hygiene as well as the safety and security challenges of their lives and families. The enrolment of IDPs children in schools has not improved because of the challenges associated with the financing of their schooling. The same challenge is also applicable to the deplorable health condition of the IDPs, which include among others their vulnerability to cholera, contagious diseases and sexually transmitted diseases due to absence of health governance (Lancelot, 2013; NEMA, 2015).

Table 3: USAID-Nigeria Co-funding Requirements for IDPs

Sector	Total 2015 Requirements (HAC)	Funding required for assistance conflict-affected population (180 day plans)	Funding available (HAC)	Funding Gap (2015)	
				USD	% Unfunded
Nutrition	6,100,000	2,275,924	7,504,495	-1,404,495	123%
Health	4,000,000	4,126,098	2,179,440	1,820,560	46%
WASH	3,900,000	4,959,515	2,353,600	1,546,400	40%
Child Protection	3,810,000	3,644,743	1,844,077	1,965,923	52%
Education	7,500,000	3,901,942	886,291	6,613,709	88%
Sector Coordination	1,200,000	209,857	-	-	100%
Total	26,510,000	19,118,079	14,767,903	11,742,097	44%

Source: UNICEF: Nigeria Humanitarian Situation Report, Situation in Numbers (2015)

The deplorable conditions of the IDPs in the Northeast are attributed to the alleged diversion of donor funds (Odufowokan, 2016). It is in this context that the National Assembly, particularly the House of Representatives decided to probe the diversion of donor funds for the rehabilitation of the victims of Boko Haram in the Northeast Nigeria. This is because the IDPs are disenchanted with the manner of how the responses are managed and particularly, the unrealistic information about their situations. They would rather wish the donors – the foreign governments; agencies and individuals, should render direct assistance to them instead of going through the Nigerian government to reach them.

It can be deduced from the above analysis that corruption has been a bane in the management of the IDPs in the Northeastern Nigeria. This no doubt supports the hypothesis that says corruption impeded the management of internally displaced persons in the North East Nigeria.

Hypothesis three: Legal and institutional framework can enhance effective management of the internally displaced persons in the North East Nigeria, 2009-2018

Arguably, internally displaced persons have been under the protection of their national governments since they do not cross their national borders. IDPs are entitled to fundamental human rights which consist right to human dignity, rights to life and other inalienable rights. Their fundamental human rights need to be preserved and protected by the national government. However, the degree to which these rights can be protected is contingent to the legal framework for the protection of IDPs and the mechanisms to ensure compliance with the established laws (Hassan & Collins, 2017).

The constitution has been used as the basis upon which various organs of government operate. It empowers people to legally claim protection against any potential or real danger (Chemerinsky, 2016). Basically, a constitution is the existing national law where internally displaced people can legitimately proclaim their rights to sufficient and decent protection against any threat to their lives. The constitution obligates the national government to safeguard the citizens of the country. Consequently, the Constitution can serve as the national legal framework for the protection of the internally displaced persons. Unfortunately, Nigerian constitution does not specifically laid down any provision for the protection of the internally displaced population. This can be partly related to the rigidity of the amendment procedures of the Nigerian Constitution (Seidman & Seidman, 2017). The national responsibility needs to be effective for the protection of the internally displaced persons. In so far as the IDPs remain within the national borders of their country, the primary responsibility for their protection lie with their national authority. At the same time, the national government needs to safeguard its citizens from any displacement in the first place. This principle is in lines with the Guiding Principle on Internally Displacement and the African Union (Kampala) Convention on IDPs (Adeola, & Viljoen, 2017).

However, previous studies reveal massive violation of IDPs rights despite the existing provision of the fundamental human rights contained in the Nigerian Constitution. The IDPs protection in Nigeria has been suffering by legal problem which virtually deny IDPs adequate protection (Shedrack & Nuarrual, 2016). According to Abegunde (2017), the Nigerian response to the IDPs' predicament is

largely inadequate and fragmented because of the lack of legal framework on internal displacement.

Lack of proper laws and policies about IDPs protection in Nigeria has placed overburden responsibilities on NEMA. This is because it is the only domestic agency with the ability to quickly respond to urgent situations by virtue of its roles or functions. Although NEMA has certain unit devoted for the IDPs related issues. As a result of that the agency has been facing the problem of scarce resources to involve in all the emergency situations and this has hampered its ability to provide adequate protection to the IDPs in Nigeria (Ekpa & Dahlan, 2016).

Drawing inference from the above analysis, it is obvious that Nigeria lack legal and institutional framework to manage the ever increasing IDPs in the Northeast orchestrated by the nefarious activities of Boko-haram insurgency. There is no gain saying the fact that legal and institutional framework remains a panacea to addressing the challenges facing the management of the IDPs Camps. It is through an existing law that can guide the overall management of the Camps and give it a focus and direction, also, to reposition the administrative structure of the Camps for effective and prudent management of the financial and material resources available for the IDPs in the Northeast. This goes further to accept the hypothesis that says legal and institutional framework can enhance effective management of the internally displaced persons in the North East Nigeria.

Findings

Based on the outcome of our study, the following findings were made:

- The findings of the study revealed that inspite of the rights contained in the Nigerian Constitution, IDPs are invariably and tactically denied access to these rights or are not enjoying the rights available to the general citizens.
- The study also found that the situations in the various camps accommodating the IDPs in the region are still facing enormous challenges of basic needs of food, shelter and clothing; water, sanitation, and hygiene as well as the safety and security of their lives and families.
- The findings of the study further revealed a preponderance of corruption in the process of management of financial and other related resources meant for IDPs in the Northeast Nigeria.

Conclusion

The effects of the Boko Haram insurgency are great and defy explanations. It is not in doubt that the Nigerian government in its efforts to tackle the challenges faced by the IDPs in the Northeast as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency has received support from foreign governments, agencies and individuals, both national and international.

Though NEMA has recorded some measure of achievements in managing the plights of the IDPs in the affected areas, the agency has not been able to perform these tasks optimally due to the protracted nature of the insurgency and limited funding of its operations. The agency is also incapacitated by legal, coordinating, logistics, and operational inhibitions.

However, the humanitarian supports have not addressed the enormous challenges the IDPs are facing which, among others, include inadequate food, shelter, sanitation, water, healthcare facility. There are still the challenges of insecurity, inadequate protection and educational needs. One major issue bedevilling the progress of curbing the situation is primarily corruption associated with the distribution and management of the humanitarian funding to the Nigerian government, and above all, the government's inability to implement the Kampala convention on the IDPs through the legal, logistical and resources pool framework account for the poor humanitarian condition of the IDPs in the Northeast Nigeria.

The problem of internal displacement has not been directly addressed by any global legal framework. However, the Guiding Principles clearly state that the states have the primary responsibility to protect IDPs. However, there is absent of effective domestic response from the Nigerian government to protect and assist Nigerian IDPs. Therefore, IDPs suffer because of the lack of commitment by the Nigerian government to protect and assist them. Likewise, they suffer from the absence of specific international legal and institutional frameworks for their protection when their states fail to do so.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of this study, the researcher recommends that:

- The Nigerian government through NEMA should ensure that it enhances its data tracking mechanisms for displaced persons in the Northeast to

ensure the availability of dependable statistics of displaced persons both in camps and in host communities.

- The institutions of war against corruption must be strengthened, such that those found wanting in diverting and embezzling the funds meant for the welfare of the IDPs in the Northeast will be prosecuted and punished accordingly.
- The Nigerian government should domesticate the long-waiting draft national policy for the protection of IDPs. This policy should be in line with the African Union (Kampala) Convention on the protection of IDPs in Africa.
- The Federal Government of Nigeria, in collaboration with the state governments should build permanent camps for the registered IDPs with schools and health clinics in order to facilitate healthy life and produce skillful human being among the internally displaced persons for the betterment of their life and the general society.

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REVENUE GENERATION AND EXPENDITURE IN NASARAWA STATE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (2011 - 2017)

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Abstract

The study examined an assessment of the relationship between revenue generation and expenditure in Nasarawa State local governments (2011-2017). The study is premised on the background that the responsibilities and revenue streams translate to expectations on the local governments to make capital and current expenditures. The research was anchored on Institutional theory while descriptive method of analysis was used in the study. The study adopted the purposive sampling technique in selecting two (2) local Government areas for the study. This theory used was intended to capturing the main thrust of the issue under our consideration, the findings of the study revealed unending conflict and contestation between the state government and the local governments over revenue. The study recommended among others things that there should be a call on the President to end the conflict and contestation between the state government and the local governments over revenue points and the outright usurpation of the revenue points by the state governments through issuance of an executive order.

Keywords: Revenue Generation; Expenditure; Allocation; Local Government; Nasarawa State;

Introduction

With about 200 million Nigerians competing for the available public services, expectations of effective public sector service delivery are high and ever increasing on the political leaders. This population increase and the urgent need for effective public service delivery have resonated the role of local government in enhanced public service delivery and the critical role of finance in meeting the set objectives of public sector organizations where the federal, state and local governments are key actors (Nnaeto, 2017). This critical role of finance means that it is a vital means of sustaining any body politic and of enabling them to perform their most essential functions or better still, the life elixir of any organization (Idahosa & Nchuchuwe, 2005).

However, a mention of finance in a study on the local government, usually call attention to revenue generation with little thought on the expenditure. But in actuality, it is the expenditure that is reputed as the veritable tool for economic growth and development. This is so, because irrespective of the amount generated, what translates into service delivery or infrastructural development is the expenditure and to a large extent, it is upon the expenditure that questions are asked, problems are identified and solutions are sought (Efobi & Osabuohien, 2012).

In Nigeria, Local governments' revenues come from the federal government, state government and internally generated sources (Edogbanya & Ja'afaru, 2011). From the federal government, the Nigerian local governments are entitled to a statutory allocation of 20% of the revenues accruing to the federation within the month. From the state government, local governments are legally entitled to 10% of their respective states' internally generated revenues. This is in addition to their share of the value added tax (VAT) and grants and loans.

According to Ogunna (1996), the constitution allows the local government access to loans for capital projects however with the approval of the state. This category of revenues to the local governments in Nigeria is collectively called the externally sourced revenue to the local governments. It implies that there is another category of revenue sources to the local governments and this revenue source is called the internally generated revenue (IGR).

The internally generated revenue (IGR) is the revenue generated from capital receipts and taxes, which includes local rates, market taxes and levies excluding any market where state finance is involved, bicycle, truck, canoe, wheelbarrow and cart fees, other than a mechanical propelled truck permits and fines charged by customary courts, local government business investments, tenement rate, fees from schools, shops and kiosks rates, on and off liquor license fees, slaughter slab fees, marriage, birth and death registration fees (Onah, 1995).

Other sources of IGR include naming of street registration fee excluding any street in the state capital, right of occupancy fees on lands in the rural areas excluding those collectables by the federal and state governments, cattle tax payable by cattle farmers only, merriment and road closure levy, religious places establishment permit fees, signboard and advertisement permit fees, radio and television license fees etc (Onah, 1995).

But more concisely, Atakpa, Ocheni, and Nwankwo, (2012) refer to the IGRs as the revenues generated through community tax and rates; property (tenement) rates; general/development rates; licenses, fees and charges like marriage registration fees, car/truck licenses; interest on revenues such as deposits, investments, profits from the sale of stocks, shares, etc; departmental recurrent revenues from survey fees, repayment of personal advances, nursery and day-care centers' fees, rents on local government quarters, etc.

These revenue sources to the local governments seem enormous but they have corresponding, if not higher expenditure responsibilities accorded to them by the same law that gave them those revenue generating outlets. For instance, the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended significantly outlined the responsibilities of the local governments to include the provision and maintenance of primary, adult and vocational education; the development of agriculture and natural resources other than the exploitation of minerals, the provision and maintenance of health services and such other functions as may be conferred on them by the House of Assembly of a State. These responsibilities are geared towards enhancing the wellbeing of the people of the various local government areas of Nigeria as a shared responsibility it has with the first and second tiers of government in Nigeria.

According to Akpofure (2014), the local governments embark on capital expenditure when financing projects like construction of mini bridges within the area including culverts; purchase of official vehicles, buses and machines for the council; engagement into market development and building of abattoir; construction of class room and building of mini stadium; building of amusement parks, secretariats and staff quarter; building of health centers and veterinary; and purchases of office equipment like computers, typewriters, air conditioners, refrigerators .etc.

But to a discerning mind, the flamboyant lifestyle of the local government chief executive officers (the chairmen) and the amount of money they receive statutorily stand in sharp contrast to the developmental realities of most local governments in Nigeria. The 13 local governments in Nasarawa state, and more specifically, Nassarawa local government council in Nassarawa South Senatorial district, Keana local government council in Nassarawa Central Senatorial district, and Nassarawa Eggon local government in Nassarawa Central Senatorial district, are part and parcel of the local governments in Nigeria and are also affected by these problems hence this study examines the revenue and expenditure of Nasarawa state local government with the aim of identifying the challenges and finding solutions so that Nasarawa state local governments can leave up to their developmental (expenditure) expectations. The following research questions will guide the study;

1. What are the sources of Revenue generation to Nasarawa state local Government in Nigeria?
2. What are the Challenges to Revenue generation in Nasarawa local Government?
3. Howcan Revenue generation in Nasarawa local Government be improved in order to enhance expenditure to the local Government.

Objectives of the Study

In the light of the rationale for the critical assessment of the relationship between revenue generation and expenditure in Nasarawa State local governments, the objectives of this paper to; examine the sources of revenue generation to Nasarawa State local governments and how it can improve on the expenditure in carrying out the constitution role and responsibility of local Government in Nigeria.

Conceptual Clarifications

For better understanding of the issue of revenue and expenditure under our investigation, it will be very necessary to clarify some of these concepts in this study;

Nigerian Local Government Legal Mandates

The Nigerian local government administration is legally recognized and empowered to enhance socio-economic development of Nigeria. This mandate is what has kept the local government alive in Nigeria amidst advocates for its dissolution on the ground of not living up to its expectation. These expectations are what Ezeani (2006) was referring to when he wrote that local governments in Nigeria are created to make appropriate services and development activities responsive to local wishes and initiatives. Hence the devolution or delegation of powers to local representative bodies to sensitize and mobilize the various communities in their areas of authority in order to get involved in the development of their areas so that in general the overall development of the country will be easily achieved.

It is also in recognition of this legal mandate of and expectation on the Nigeria local government that Ikelegbe (1976) viewed the local government as that unit of government that facilitates democratic self- governance at the local level. This feat can be achieved according to him, through local representatives of the people who will mobilize the people and manage their affairs through involvement and encouragement of the people; planning and provision of services and development activities based on the needs of the people as identified by the people.

The legal mandates of the Nigerian local governments are clearly stated in fourth schedule of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended in 2011) which had already asserted the establishment of the local government in section 7 (1). According to the fourth schedule, local government councils are mandated to consider and make recommendations to a State commission on economic planning or any similar body on (i) the economic development of the State, particularly in so far as the areas of authority of the council and of the State are affected, and (ii) proposals made by the said commission or body. The fourth schedule went further to mandate the Nigerian local government to actively

participate in (a) the provision and maintenance of primary, adult and vocational education; (b) the development of agriculture and natural resources, other than the exploitation of materials (c) the provision and maintenance of health services; and (d) such other functions as may be conferred on a local government council by the House of Assembly of the State.

These legal mandates of the Nigerian local government can be said to have its historical root in the native authority system of the colonial era with necessary modifications. The most fundamental of these modifications is its entrenchment into the Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, but before then, the local government system has gone through many reforms, with the 1976 Reform as the most important of them all, perhaps, not only because of its accomplishments, but its objectives, one of which, according to Ibrahim (2012), is the institutionalization of popular participation in the local political process. In his exact words, the 1976 Local Government Reforms has been described as a catalyst for sustainable and meaningful local governance, hence a radical departure from local government administration of convenience to a local government system of content. This point by Ibrahim (2012) may have spurred the assertion by Athanasius (2017) that it was in 1976 that Nigerian local government system got its legal mandates, even though the extent of compliance is highly debatable.

Nigerian Local government Revenue Generation, Legal Provisions and Challenges

Given the general acknowledgement that local government in Nigeria, has the mandate to cater for the people at the grass root and also that no meaningful economic planning and development can be made without finance, a critical review of literature on revenue generation by the Nigerian local governments as well as the legal provisions and challenges around it becomes imminent especially as Nwosu & Okafor (2013) remarked that the processes of financial management is central to better fiscal outcomes that has eluded the contemporary Nigerian local government.

These finances are popularly called local government finance whose fair understanding yields to the assertion that each of the three tiers of government in Nigeria has its assigned financial arrangement. The local governments are entitled to 20% of the total amount in the federation account within a month. They are also

entitled to 10% of the internally generated revenue of the state government, plus a share of the value added tax (VAT). These revenues are in addition to the revenues from the traditional internal sources of revenue generation at the disposal of the Nigerian local government councils. These other traditional sources to the local governments accrue to them through the constitutional empowerment they have to regulate certain activities in their jurisdiction including powers to exert taxes. All these revenue sources herald local government revenue generation (Nwosu & Okafor 2013).

These revenue streams to the local government have been categorized differently by different authors. The example of Ogunna and the Central Bank of Nigeria are clear instances. Yet, authors such as Ezeani (2004), Alo, (2012) and Agba, Ocheni & Nnamani (2014) categorized the local government revenue streams into internally generated revenue and externally generated revenue. According to Alo, (2012), the internally generated revenue are the revenues generated within the local government area of administration comprising local tax or community tax, poll tax, or tenement rates, user fees and loans.

On the other hand, the externally generated revenues, according to Ezeani (2004), are the revenues accruing to the local government councils from outside the local government area of administration which include 20% of Federal Government Statutory Allocation; 10% of internally generated revenue of the State Government, Value Added Tax (VAT); Loans and Advances; Special capital grants, and Financial Aid and Assistance from individual and organization.

All these revenue sources have legal backings to ensure that local governments perform the numerous functions assigned to them in Section 7, Schedule 4, of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria as amended in 2011, which also mandated the government of every state to make provisions for the financing of local government councils in the state. Key provisions of this section are: (a) the National Assembly shall make provisions for statutory allocation of public revenue to local government councils in the Federation; and (b) the House of Assembly of a state shall make provisions for statutory allocation of public revenue to local government councils within the state (Obi, 2001).

Also, section 162 states that (c) any amount standing to the credit of the Federation Account shall be distributed among the Federal and State Governments and the local government councils in each state on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly. (d) The amount standing to the credit of local government councils in the Federation Account shall also be allocated to the states for the benefit of their local government councils on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly. (e) Each state shall pay to local government councils in its area of jurisdiction such proportion of its total revenue on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly (Agba, Ocheni & Nnamani, 2014).

Unfortunately, despite these avalanches of revenue streams at the disposal of the local governments in Nigeria, the various local governments still have cause to complain of challenges. These complaints have warranted a review of extant literature on the challenges of revenue generation by the Nigerian local government councils. Ayodele & Anyabe (2012), for instance, asserted that local governments in Nigeria have not been doing well due to lack of financial autonomy, undue meddlesomeness of state governments in local affairs, corruption among local government officials, lack of qualified staff to manage the local governments; misplaced loyalty of worker to their benefactors instead of the government, and lack of transparency and accountability. These problems according to Edogbanya, & Ja'afaru (2013) are cog in the wheel of progress in the smooth running of local government administration.

Local Government Expenditure in Nigeria and the Financial Memoranda

Local governments in Nigeria have legal mandates on expenditure. This mandate is in tandem with their legal mandates to engender the socio-economic development of the people of the area they govern. This was why Mohammed & Sagir (2018) saw local government expenditure as the expenses which the Local Government incurs for the maintenance of the government and for initiating and attracting developmental projects to the people such as provision of access roads, water supply, rural electrification and primary health care among others. The relevance of local governments' expenditure is hinged on the argument that it is the instrument of government policy used in distributing resources productively, effectively and efficiently. Hence, the expenditure pattern exhibited at any level of government plays a vital role in accelerating the socio-economic performance of

the society. This pattern involves the manner of fund allocation between capital and recurrent expenditure of the Local Government.

According to Bello, (2004), while the recurrent expenditure is meant for servicing sustenance and maintenance of the existing human and material resources of the Local Government, the capital expenditure deals with the acquisition of new assets. But Hassan (2001) gave more details when he asserted that the recurrent expenditure is the day to day financial commitment of the government that caters for transient cost like personnel cost, which consist of personnel emoluments of those employed by the government (basic salaries, rent and transport allowance, leave Bonus etc) and overhead costs used for day to day expenses of general nature, which include general repairs and maintenance activities, the capital expenditure are capital items incurred for the long-term used of the government in order to attain its set goals e.g. purchase of motor vehicles, furniture and equipment, heavy plants and generators etc (Agu, 2007).

According to Muhammed & Sagir (2018), the treasurer is empowered by the Model Financial Memoranda (2009) to ensure that the Local Governments are guided by the financial memoranda in their expenditures. The essence is to have effective control over local government expenditure. According to Ocheni, Atakpa & Nwankwo (2013), the Financial Memoranda provided that the annual recurrent expenditure estimates of local governments shall be prepared under heading 2001-2013 for the Office of the Chairman, Secretary to the Local Government, the Local Government Council, Personnel Management, Finance, Education, Medical and Health Services, Agriculture, Natural Resources and Social Development, Works, Housing, Land and Survey, traditional offices, miscellaneous, contribution to Local Government Loans Fund, and transfer to reserve fund respectively (Ocheni et al, 2013).

Local government in the Nigeria fiscal federalism

According to Ekpo & Ndebbio (1998), apart from providing and maintaining basic infrastructures, local governments do complement the economic activities of both the state and the federal government in enhancing the wellbeing of the people. This noble assignment, the local governments are able to accomplish with the help of the local government fiscal operations which indeed, play very vital role in macro-management of the Nigerian economy. The authors based their argument on the assumption that given the size of the country, at the local level, certain

goods and services are best provided through public means and issues of efficiency, resource allocation and distribution become relevant at the third level of government. In the same vein, certain taxes, including levies and rates are better collected by local governments.

The need for certain taxes to be collected by the local government is in keeping with Musgrave's assertion that not every expenditure made at the local level are centrally financed and directed. This is because local governments that act as central expenditure agents do not reflect expenditure decentralization in a meaningful sense, just as centrally collected but shared taxes do not imply proper revenue centralization (Musgrave, 1973).

However, apart from the financial relationship that exists between local governments and the other levels of government, there exist specific duties and responsibilities solely meant for local governments. However, conflicts do occur among the tiers of government especially between the local and state governments (Ekpo & Ndebbio, 1998). These conflicts and battles may have prompted Abdulhamid & Chima (2015) admit that despite the fact that local government system in Nigeria has witnessed many reforms aimed at accelerating development and enabling the local population to participate and hold those in power accountable for their governance roles, yet a true third tier has never taken off in the governance structure of Nigeria, despite the widespread endorsement of local government as a potent system to mobilize people for local participation in governance.

Theoretical Framework

The study is anchored on institutional theory. Guy (2000) sees institution as a formal or informal, structural, societal or political phenomenal that transcends the individual level that is based on more or less common values has a certain degree of stability and influences behaviour. The theory focuses on the deeper and more resilient aspects of social structure. It considers the processes by which the structures, including schemes, rules, norms, and routines become established as an authoritative guidelines for social behaviour. A good and strong institution is one that regulates the behaviour of members of the institution and society (Izueke, 2014). Sociological institutionalist explanations must establish not only that dominant norms and schemas exist, but also that they are in fact internally coherent enough to inspire

straightforward policy prescriptions; understating internal contradictions risks prematurely minimizing the influence of domestic politics, whose debates often revolve around normative concerns that sociological institutionalist explanations posit to be settled and whose influence may be most likely where tensions among dominant norms or schemas are unresolved (Finnemore 1996; Buttel 2000: 119; Campbell 1998). Institutional approaches would also benefit from a cross-fertilization of research methods. Sociological institutionalist research that undertakes an in-depth analysis of primary source documents, demonstrating and tracing the constitutive influence of global civil society organizations on state-level conceptualizations of policy goals and means, would shore up the claims for which statistically well-founded analyses of superficial secondary data have been only spottily convincing. Institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience (Amanta & Kelly, 2009).

Local Government as an institution has its norms, values, traditions and structures written down as rules and regulations. They are meant to constrain behaviours of people in the institution, and also model their preferences in both generation of revenue to run local government and the manner the revenue is spent. In other words, these rules and regulations regulate the behaviour of the executive Chairman and other local government administrative officers that manage the revenue generated for the day-to-day activities of the local governments in Nasarawa State.

Methodology

This study adopted descriptive method for the purpose of investigating the issue of Revenue generation and expenditure in Nasarawa local Government (2011-2017). This involved a more detailed facts finding endeavor through the use of relevant textbooks, journals, magazines, newspapers, internet, official gazette and some unpublished materials. These materials were used to compliment the primary data obtained by observing the performance of Nasarawa local Government in its arrangement in revenue generation and expenditure. These data were used to analyze the work and to gain insight into the topic under investigation. The study also adopted purposive sampling technique to select two (2) local Government areas as sample local Government to be studied to represent the entire local Government system in Nasarawa state. The local Government areas are Nasarawa Eggon local Government in Nasarawa central senatorial

district, Keana local Government council in Nasarawa central and Nasarawa local Government in Nasarawa South senatorial district.

Sources of Revenue to Nasarawa State Local Government

Local governments in Nasarawa state have many sources of revenue. Nasarawa local government, for instance, have statutory allocations, value added tax (TAX), excess crude, Sure-P, state allocation, and independent revenue as their sources of revenue generation. These sources they share with the Keana local government council (see table i-iv) below. However, Nasarawa Eggon local government official sources of revenue differ a little from the other two local government councils as they documented investment, internal revenue, federal allocation, state allocation and Value Added Tax. The Excess crude and Sure-P sources that were documented by both Nasarawa and keana local government councils are missing in the budget of Nasarawa Eggon local government of Nasarawa state.

Table i: Consolidated Financial Statement of Nasarawa Eggon LGA of Nasarawa State, 2011-2012

A	RECURRENT REVENUE	APPROVED 2011	ACTUAL 2011	ESTIMATE 2012
	Opening Balance as at 1st January	2,878,880	100,000	502,100
	Investment	1,254,040	100,000	500,006
	Internal Revenue	13,376,900	2,148,150	3,000,000
	Federal Allocation	1,000,000,000	248,069,334	562,019,280
	State Allocation	67,518,396	-	10,000,000
	Value Added Tax	102,000,000	-	93,787,992
	TOTAL REVENUE	1,296,926,241	250,417,484	669,809,372
B	RECURRENT EXPENDITURE			
	Personnel Cost	595,119,886	190,995,302	360,000,000
	Over Head Cost	347,830,574	51,776,306	60,000,000
	Capital Expenditure	290,675,781	7,143,776	249,809,372
	Total Budget Size	1,296,926,241	249,915,384	669,809,372

Source: Nasarawa Eggon Local Government Council Approved Budget (2012)

Attachment ii: Consolidated Budget Summary of Keana LGA of Nasarawa State, Nigeria

Table ii: Consolidated Budget Summary of Keana LGA of Nasarawa State, Nigeria

S/N	Items	Budget 2014#	Budget 2015 #	Budget 2016 #	Budget 2017 #	Total 4 year Budget #
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1.	Opening Balance	-	-	-	-	
2	Receipts					
3	Statutory Allocations	576,273,875	900,414,875	918,423,173	936,791,636	3,331,903,559
4	Value Added Tax	120,000,000	30,000,000	30,600,000	31,212,000	211,812,000
5	Excess Crude	42,000,000	20,000,000	20,400,000	20,808,000	103,208,000
6	Sure-P	4,500,000	18,000,000	18,360,000	18,727,200	59,587,200
7	State Allocation	-	5,000,000	5,100,000	5,202,000	15,302,000
8	Independent Revenue	3,060,000	16,634,000	16,966,680	17,306,014	53,966,694
9	Total Current Year Receipts	745,833,875	990,048,875	1,009,849,853	1,030,046,850	3,775,779,453
10	Total Projected Funds Available	745,833,875	990,048,875	1,009,849,853	1,030,046,850	3,775,779,453
11	Expenditure					
12	A: Recurrent Debt					
13	Social Contribution	59,000,000	325,000,000	331,500,000	338,130,000	1,053,630,000
14	Total Recurrent Debt	59,000,000	325,000,000	331,500,000	338,130,000	1,053,630,000
15	B: Recurrent Non Debt					
16	Personnel Cost	442,972,375	465,882,375	475,200,000	484,704,023	1,868,758,773
17	Overhead Cost	81,761,500	61,816,500	63,052,830	64,313,887	270,944,717
18	Total Recurrent Non-Debt	524,733,875	527,698,875	538,252,830	549,017,910	2,139,703,490
19	Total Recurrent Expenditure	583,733,875	852,698,875	869,752,830	887,147,910	3,193,333,490
20	C: Capital Expenditure Based on Sectors					
21	Capital Expenditure	162,100,000	137,350,000	140,097,000	142,898,940	582,445,940

22	Total Capital Expenditure	162,100,000	137,350,000	140,097,000	142,898,940	582,445,940
23	Total Expenditure (Budget Size)	745,833,875	990,048,875	1,009,849,830	1,030,046,850	3,775,779,430
24	Budget Surplus / Deficit					
25	Closing Balance					

Source: Keana Local Government Council Approved Budget (2015).

Attachment iii: Consolidated Budget Summary of Nasarawa LGA of Nasarawa State,

Table iii: Consolidated Budget Summary of Nasarawa LGA of Nasarawa State, Nigeria

S/N	Items	Budget 2012 #	Budget 2013 #	Budget 2014 #	Budget 2015 #	Budget 2016 #	Total 5 year Budget #
1.	Opening Balance	-	-	-	-		
2	Receipts						
3	Statutory Allocations	-	262,305,117	995,301,484	1,015,207,514	1,0135,511,664	12,408,325,779
4	Value Added Tax	8,000,000	9,000,000	10,000,000	10,200,000	10,404,000	47,604,000
5	Excess Crude	-	-	25,000,000	25,500,000	26,010,000	76,510,000
6	Sure-P	-	-	45,000,000	45,900,000	46,818,000	137,718,000
7	State Allocation	30,000,000	40,000,000	36,300,000	37,026,000	37,766,520	181,092,520
8	Independent Revenue	43,403,923	322,205,117	6,260,000	1,140,218,714	1,163,023,088	2,675,110,842
9	Total Receipts	81,403,923	633,510,234	1,117,861,484	2,274,052,227	2,319,533,272	15,526,361,141
10	Total Projected Funds Available	81,403,923	633,510,234	1,117,861,484	2,274,052,227	2,319,533,272	15,526,361,141
11	Expenditure						
12	A: Recurrent Debt						
13	Social Contribution	247,464,600	313,000,000	324, 000,000	330, 480,000	337,089,600	1,552,034,800
14	Total Recurrent Debt	247,464,600	313,000,000	324, 000,000	330, 480,000	337,089,600	1,552,034,800
15	B: Recurrent Non Debt						
16	Personnel Cost	365,900,970	508,197,236	430,126,484	438,729,014	447,503,594	2,190,457,298
17	Overhead Cost	87,818,089	195,053,541	155,335,000	158,441,700	161,610,534	758,258,864
18	Total Recurrent Non-Debt	453,719,059	703,250,777	585,461,484	597,170,714	609,114,128	2,948,716,162
19	Total Recurrent Expenditure	701,183,659	1,016,250,777	909,461,484	927,650,714	946,203,728	4,500,750,962
20	C: Capital Expenditure Based on Sectors						

21	Capital Expenditure	22,011,000	202,080,000	208,400,000	212,568,000	216,819,360	861,878,360
22	Total Capital Expenditure	22,011,000	202,080,000	208,400,000	212,568,000	216,819,360	861,878,360
23	Total Expenditure	723,194,659	1,218,330,777	1,117,861,484	1,140,218,714	1,163,023,088	5,362,629,322
24	Closing Bal						

Source: Nasarawa Local Government Council Approved Budget (2014).

Attachment vi: Revenue Sources of Nasarawa Eggon LGA Nasarawa State, 2011-2012

Table vi. Revenue Sources of Nasarawa Eggon LGA Nasarawa State, 2011-2012

Items	Approved 2011	Actual 2011	Estimate 2012
Investment	1,254,040	100,000	500,006
Internal Revenue	13,376,900	2,148,150	3,000,000
Federal Allocation	1,000,000,000	248,069,334	562,019,280
State Allocation	67,518,396	-	10,000,000
Value Added Tax	102,000,000	-	93,787,992

Source: Nasarawa Eggon Local Government Council Approved Budget (2012).

A detailed narrative of the sources of revenue generation to Nasarawa Eggon for instance, revealed about one hundred and thirty-two (132) revenue sources to the local governments in Nasarawa state. These sources are categorized under different headings. Under taxes, they have community tax or poll tax, arrears of community tax or poll tax, development tax or levy, Cattle tax water applicable, arrears of cattle tax, other special services electricity, water and ground rate, and arrears of other special services tax. Under rates, they have tenement rate, Arrears of tenement rate, Room or flat rate, Federal government grant, and State government in lieu of tenement rate (Nasarawa Eggon Approved Budget, 2012).

Major Challenges of Revenue Generation in Nasarawa State Local Government

Many authors have written to acknowledge the challenges of revenue generation in the Nigerian local government. While Adeyemo (2005) observed that the usurpation of local government functions and revenue sources by state governments seriously erode the autonomy of the local governments. Eteng & Agbor (2018) asserted that the local governments in Nigeria have standard outfits from which it collects revenue to boost its finances. However, since the emergence of democratic rule, from 1999, we have seen the sudden withdrawal of those revenue points from the control of local governments to the state. For example, haulage that used to be a veritable revenue points for local governments has been

swindled by the state government. Again major markets that were hitherto an exclusive preserve of local government now have the state meddling into how revenue is got from such markets. Revenue from tenement rate has also been taken over by the state government (Eteng & Agbo, 2018).

In the same vein, we found that the local government councils of Nasarawa state have as one of the major challenges of revenue generation, conflict and contestation between the state governments and the local government councils over revenue points. To a large extent, the state government usurps the revenue points of the local government councils of Nasarawa state and this explains their level of dependence on the state government for the administration of social services.

Improving Nasarawa State Local Government Revenue to Enhance Expenditure

Usually, the essence of research is to proffer feasible measures of upturning the identified challenges or remedying maladies as identified. In this study, having identified the major challenges of revenue generations in Nasarawa State Local Governments, we therefore outline and discuss some explorable options that can help to improve revenue generation in Nasarawa state local governments for enhanced expenditure. There is no gain saying the fact that reviewing the revenue sources of the local governments as contained in the current budget of Nasarawa Eggon local government that are obsolete with too little funds attached to them to something worthwhile, even if it means rescheduling these revenue sources/tax jurisdictions between the state government and local government councils.

Putting an end to the conflict and contestation between the state government and the local governments over revenue points and in some cases, the outright usurpation of the revenue points by the state governments through executive order from the presidency backed up by judicial pronouncements and legislative enactments.

Conclusion

The federal system of government in operation in today's Nigeria implies a political and administrative relationship between the Federal, State and Local governments. The establishment of the third tier of government to exist closer to the people at the rural and grassroots is to deliver sustainable public revenue management in lieu of the authority, functions and responsibilities.

These responsibilities beget revenue generation expenditure expectations. This is because finance is a prerequisite for the fulfillment of any organizational objectives, and the local government is not an exception. As Oguonu (2004) noted, the success and the effectiveness of local government depend largely on the financial resources available to the individual local governments and the way these finances are utilized by the local government administrators in the course of the administration. This is why in Nasarawa State, the assessment of the revenue sources, expenditure components, relationship between the revenue generation and expenditure, revenue generation challenges and prospects suffice, hence the perennial complaint of inadequate fund by the local government and the interference of the state in their revenue points as well as the complain of not living up to its responsibilities and expectation by the people can find a point of convergence and understanding of the reason for these complaints established. This makes this study unique and the findings quintessential.

That Nasarawa state local government councils have several revenue sources but the major ones are Statutory Allocations from the federation account, share of the Value Added Tax, 10% of State's internally generated revenue, and Independent Revenues from taxes, rates, local license and fines, fees, interest payment and dividends, and earnings from commercial undertakings.

That Nasarawa State Local Governments have various challenges in generating revenue including conflict and contestation between the state government and the local governments over revenue; too many obsolete revenue points with too little funds attached to them; non-compliance to the constitutional mandate on the State government to release 10% of its internally generated revenue to the local government councils of the state; state government interference in the councils' statutory allocations.

That the Nasarawa State Local Government council can improve the revenue generations by calling on the federal government to end the conflict and contestation between the state government and the local governments over revenue; reviewing the revenue sources of the local governments that are outdated and obsolete with too little funds attached to them to something worthwhile; and possible arrangements for suing governors who refuse to comply with the

constitutional mandate of releasing 10% of the state's IGR to the local government councils with the backing of the president and attorney general of the federation.

Recommendations

- i. Calling on the president to end the conflict and contestation between the state government and the local governments over revenue points and the outright usurpation of the revenue points by the state governments through issuance of an executive order, backed up by judicial pronouncements and legislative enactments.
- ii. Reviewing the obsolete revenue sources of the local governments that are with too little funds attached to them to something worthwhile.
- iii. Decentralizing revenue collection centers according to the wards in the council to avoid spending much to collect less revenue.
- iv. Suing governors who refuse to comply with the constitutional mandate of releasing 10% of the states' IGR to the local government councils with the backing of the president and attorney general of the federation.
- v. Improving the inept revenue collection enforcement by calling on the internal auditors of local Government to live up to their responsibility.
- vi. Establishment of up-to-date data bank by the councils for all their revenue points and their payment records and urgent automation of payment method.

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THE AFRICAN UNION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN COTE D'IVOIRE (2002 - 2011)

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Abstract

The study evaluated how African Union conflict resolution mechanisms were applied to resolving the Cote d'Ivoire crisis 2002-2011. The conflict originated with history; It is not a recent issue, yet it is a recurrent issue globally. The objective of this study examined the conflict resolution mechanism of A.U. in the Cote d'Ivoire crisis 2002-2011. This study made use of secondary data and had the following major findings: African Union made use of mediation and conciliation mechanisms in the conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire between 2002-2011. Divisions among African Union member states impeded the efforts of African union conflict resolution in Cote d' Ivoire. Insufficient Funding impeded the efforts of the African Union in resolving the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire. Recommendations were made, such as institutional improvement, reduction of divisions. African Union member states should intensify their commitment to good governance.

Keywords: Conflict resolution, African Union and mediation.

Introduction

The conflict originated with history; it is not a recent issue, yet it is a recurrent issue globally. The number of conflicts in Africa shows the need to resolve these conflicts before development can take place. Conflict resolution and peace building are issues that have become very topical in debates and discussions on Africa. This is not only because many conflicts characterize Africa but because, in most cases, the conflicts have a negative impact on Africa's socio-economic and political development. As opined by Okoye (2010:206), conflict resolution means satisfying the knotty issues that gave rise to a given conflict, including ignored wishes, demands, and denied aspirations of a given person, group or entity who, out of frustration, may take up arms. Ajayi and Buhari (2014) posit that conflict resolution provides an opportunity to interact with parties concerned, with the hope of reducing the scope, intensify and effects of conflicts.

The deployment of a peacekeeping force from South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique to Burundi in May 2003 was the African Union's first military intervention in a member state to oversee the fulfilment of different accords. Before the operation was handed over to the U.N. on January 1, 2008, A.U. troops were stationed in Sudan to maintain peace in the Darfur conflict. According to Agu and Okeke (2013:281), The Peace and Security Council has been engaged in respect to the crises in Darfur, Comoros, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, and other countries since its inaugural meeting in 2004. The African Union has passed resolutions establishing African Union peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Darfur and sanctions against those who undermine peace and security and travel bans and asset freezes against the leaders of the Comoros revolt.

Thus, conflict resolution has become essential in solving the problem of conflicts in the continent. The Cote d'Ivoire crisis is a typical African crisis, which usually involves former colonial power, problems of citizenship, power struggle and intra-elite squabbles, the impact of neo-colonial linkages and the dynamics of globalization. It is a combination of all these factors, which led to the collapse of social and political harmony in Cote d'Ivoire. Cote d'Ivoire has been split into two-part since a failed coup in 2002, which developed into a full-scale rebellion against the government. Rebels held the North and west, while government forces control the rest of the country. The latest peace accords, the Ouagadougou Peace

Agreement (OPA) of March 2007, paved the way towards reunifying the war-torn country. The election was finally held in October 2010. Violence escalated again following the presidential run-off election held in November 2010 when President Laurent Gbagbo refused to cede power to Allassane Quattara, the internationally recognized winner of the presidential election.

The political stalemates degenerated into violence, leading to the decline of state security, threatened stability, and gross human rights violations. African Union responded to the situation with efforts to resolve the crisis. Given the above scenario, the study seeks to investigate the following research problems:

1. What are the causes of conflicts in Cote d' Ivoire 2002-2011?
2. What conflict resolution mechanism did African Union apply in resolving conflict in Cote d'Ivoire?
3. Which factors constituted impediments to the efforts of the African Union in resolving the conflicts in Cote d'Ivoire?

The Concept of Conflict

Conflict is endemic in human society. However, violent conflict is not inevitable, and so it is an anomaly. According to Nnadozie (2011), conflict is defined as pursuing incompatible goals or interests by different groups or individuals. This definition, by implication, asserts the intrinsic and inevitable nature of conflicts in human life. That is to say, all humans or groups of humans have goals and interest which may be different from the goals and interests of other groups. While, Bayoya (2006) stated that conflict is often seen as a threat to peace, by itself, it does not necessarily represent a threat to peace, but it is the violence linked to the conflict that makes it a threat to peace.

Similarly, David (2007) argues that conflict emerges from the incompatibility of goals and a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power, and resources. The opponents aim to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals. Mitcheal (2001) shared this view and stated that conflicts are likely to occur in so far as objectives are incompatible, groups are strong and determined, actions are feasible, success is possible, and inter-group comparison leads to competition, anxiety, and fear being dominated. Conflict is, therefore, about the concrete interests that adversaries pursue and, at the same time, about interpreting what is at stake.

Also, Abuddalahi (2002) conceived that conflict could be both beneficial and detrimental. Conflict is viewed as a result of the change, particularly in socio-political structures and institutions, human relationships, and the distribution of social resources. If not appropriately managed, conflicts can lead to slowed communication, a decline in group cohesiveness, and subordination of goals to the priority of fighting among members, perhaps bringing a system to a halt. However, when conflict turns dysfunctional, it becomes destructive and provokes war, resulting in depopulation, devastation, and defoliation. This consequently impedes the process of socio-economic growth and development. By implication, conflict can be competitive, destructive and creative.

Additionally, Ochogwu (2009) noted that conflict could bring about positive changes in society. Its violent form retards development and promotes poverty and anarchy. Also, Coser (1956) Conflict is defined as a struggle for ideas and demands for status, power and scarce resources in which opponents seek to neutralize, injure or eliminate their opponents.

The Concept of Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution is often misinterpreted. According to Aja (2007:32), conflict resolution comprises agenda-setting to assist parties in conflict or dispute to establish a common ground, given certain guiding principles or conditionality for peaceful co-existence. It establishes a range of principles, rules and regulations, and aspirations that help dispute parties operate within international law and diplomacy tenets. As an agenda-setting process, conflict resolution should be seen as a set of peace and security guidelines and legal procedures for achieving relative order and stability. More so, conflict resolution can be both formal and informal. According to Swanstrom and Weissman (2005:25), it can either aim at resolving or terminating conflicts in an open and predictable process following legal principles or focus on efforts to increase cooperation among the parties to a conflict and deepen their relationship by addressing the condition that led to the dispute, fostering a positive attitude and allaying distrust through reconciliation, initiatives and building or strengthening the institutions and process through which parties interact. Okon (2002) opined that conflict resolution is an intervention essentially aimed at facilitating or changing the course (i.e. the scope, intensity and effect) of conflict.

Background to/Causes of Cote D'ivoire Conflicts

Cote d'Ivoire was formerly colonized by France. Houphouet – Boigny became the first prime minister of Cote d'Ivoire in 1959. The following year, he was elected its first president. Under his one-party rule, Cote d'Ivoire enjoyed relative prosperity, "the Ivorian miracle" (Cocodia,2008). Even though it coercively suppressed political opposition parties, his regime was marked by stability, but a transition to multiparty politics occurred late in his tenure in the mid-1980s. It calls for democratization, episodic social unrest, and political unrest and tensions emerged, spurred by long term cocoa price and production decline, growing national debt, austerity measures and decreasing access to new tree cropping. While resources scarcities underlay these tensions, social competition increasingly began to be expressed in ethnic, regional, and religious identities.

However, Houphouet-Boigny's death in 1993 generated rivalries over political power, leadership succession rights and citizenship. Henri Konan Bedie used these divisions to rally political support, using a xenophobic, nationalist ideology known as "Favourite". It defined southerners as authentic Ivoririans, in opposition to circumstantial ones, i.e. northerners and immigrants. The Favourite also excluded many others from national, straining inter-ethnic relations (Doyie 2002; Torulagha, 2003). It helped to increase volatile national politics encompassing electoral competition and labour unrest; conflict over land rights; and periodic mass protests, violence over economic issues (Nicolas 2011).

Bedie was ousted in a 1999 military coup which brought General Robert Guei in power. However, Gbagbo defeated him in the 2002 election, from which Qattara was excluded from that presidential election on ethnopolitical grounds. N'Diaye, Theron and Perdigao (2014) opined that following the failed coup of 2002 and the outbreak of civil war, a ceasefire agreement separated the government-controlled south from the rebel-held North. Dividing the country in two, the zone of confidence provided a concrete symbol for the discrepancy between northern and southern narratives of Ivoirian society. A series of internationally supported peace accords, the most recent signed in 2007, laid out a roadmap for disarmament, national reunification, election, leading to a return to democratic governance after years of political crisis. However, all have remained only partially implemented (Nicolas 2011:5). The recent election was the product of this agreement. The presidential election was scheduled for November 2008 and was postponed.

Finally, it was held in October 2010. It was against these historical events that the 2010 presidential election was held.

Cote d'Ivoire immediate political crisis is rooted in its November 28, 2010, presidential run-off election. The run-off election was held between the incumbent President, Laurent Gbagbo, and the former prime minister Alassane Darama Quattara. According to Zounmenou and Abdul (2011), the two candidates garnered the most votes, 38.5 % and 32%, respectively, in a generally peaceful but long-delayed first-round presidential poll held on October 31, 2010. Langer (2010) stated that the electoral commission declared Quattara, the winner of the November 28, 2010 run-off presidential election with 54% of the votes against Gbagbo's 46%. The African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, and the United Nations all endorsed the election results.

On the other hand, Gbagbo has challenged the results, alleging election fraud and vote manipulation in the northern opposition bastion. According to Bellamy and Williams (2011), the Ivorian Constitutional Council then annulled over 660 000 votes in seven areas favourable to Ouattara and declared Gbagbo, the election winner. The country's violent war erupted as a result of the political crisis, which resulted in, among other things, the loss of life.

Theoretical Framework

The theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution serves as the theoretical underpinning for this research (ADR). Brinham (1986), Fischer (2006), Forester (1999), and Walzer (2006) are all proponents of this idea. "A variety of approaches that allow the parties to meet face to face to reach a mutually acceptable resolution of the issues in a dispute or potentially controversial situation...all are voluntary processes that involve some form of consensus building, joint problem solving, or negotiation," according to the definition of alternative dispute resolution (Bingham, 1986,). Litigation, administrative proceedings, and arbitration are not included in this description. Negotiation and mediation are the two most often used alternative ways to dispute resolution. While distinguishing between democracy and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), Fischer (2006) stated that ADR is concerned with solving problems within current political regimes by resolving the tension between trading to meet competing interests versus the exploration and definition of general public good. According to Walzer (2006), ADR as a theory is generally concerned with solving problems within current

political regimes and complements democratic efforts to create a better regime, one that either emphasizes the public good and the triumph of the best argument or creates conditions in which disempowered groups can more productively and equally participate in defining problems. According to the preceding, ADR theory focuses on the tension between trading interests among contending parties to harmonize them and investigate and characterize a broader public good or interest to address power imbalances in any society. In essence, ADR uses the core concepts of conflict resolution, such as dialogue, negotiation, compromise, and agreement, to resolve conflicts.

Application of the Theory to the Study

This work is about African Union and Conflict resolution in the Cote d'Ivoire crisis 2002-2011. It is necessary to consider Alternative Dispute Resolution theory in explaining the African Union in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire. The ultimate objectives of the African Union in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire were to achieve political stability and unity, which has eluded Cote d'Ivoire. African Union deployed a series of mediation missions for discussions with the rival presidents to resolve the crisis in a non-violent way.

The essence of the existence of the theory is the use of peaceful methods in settling disputes and resolving conflicts situations using negotiation, compromise and agreement. Also, to find ways that satisfy the parties. Conflicts are an integral part of human interaction; one must learn how to manage them and deal with them to prevent escalation and destruction and develop innovation and creative ideas to resolve them. The ADR aims to reach an acceptable agreement to all parties, to which they remain committed and which they indeed implement.

It involves mediation; in mediation, a neutral third party helps the parties agree about resolving the case. Even in the Cote d'Ivoire crisis, the African Union sent representatives as the third party to help the parties agree about resolving the conflict.

Conflict Resolution Mechanisms That African Union Applied In Cote D'ivoire Crisis.

Within the framework of the African Union, the Peace and Security Council was established with a mandate of conflict resolution, among other things. According

to Ali (2006), the Peace Security Council has embarked on conflict resolution in Cote D'Ivoire. Immediately after the 2002 crisis broke out in Cote d'Ivoire, A.U. sent a representative Thabo Mbeki, the President of South Africa, to promote dialogue between the rebels and the government. The efforts made by ECOWAS and A.U. leaders were not rewarded with durable success (Ali 2006:105).

Consequent to the escalation of the conflict, despite the A.U. mediation, France proposed a peace meeting at Linas-Marcossis in January 2003. The result of the negotiations among the warring parties was Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. However, according to Okereke (2007), in November 2004, a renewed outbreak of hostilities arose due to the failure of the power-sharing set up under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. As the political stalemate in the country deepened, in its response, the A.U. dispatched President Thabo Mbeki to Abidjan to revive the Ivorian peace process (Okereke, 2007:90). During his first visit to Cote d'Ivoire in October 2004 after the A.U. mandate, President Mbeki discussed with President Gbagbo and other contending parties in the conflict how to resolve the crisis. Officials of the U.N., International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), European Union and ECOWAS were also in attendance. Martins (2005:26) noted that the parties in the conflict agreed that political reforms should be fast-forwarded, weapons should start being handed in, among other things.

Additionally, in December 2004, president Mbeki's mediation efforts were not successful. Even his visit to Cote d'Ivoire to attend a cabinet meeting was boycotted by the rebel and rejected calls to start handing in their weapons to United Nations peacekeepers. On April 6 2005, the African Union mediator effort resulted in the Pretoria Agreement. The rebels and pro-government should start laying down their weapons from May 14 2005, but this never happened (Ali 2006).

Also, in June 2005, a follow-up agreement provided a framework for disarmament, elections and adoption of legislation required under the Linas-Marcoussis Accord. President Gbagbo accepted a suggestion from President Thabo Mbeki to allow his rivals to take part in the election (Martins 2005:23). In line with the peace deal signed in June 2005, president Gbagbo used special constitutional powers to pass a series of laws dealing with nationality, citizenship rights and the composition of the independent electoral commission. Mbeki stated that the law adopted by president Gbagbo conforms to the provision of the peace plan. As a result, the

rebels rejected the mediatory role of President Thabo Mbeki, accusing him of lacking objectivity regarding the crisis.

However, the conflict in the late part of December 2010 led to A.U. mediation in the Cote d'Ivoire crisis again. Abatan and Spies (2016) and Ochai (2011) noted that on December 5, 2010, African Union had made efforts through the formal South Africa President Thabo Mbeki to restore peace in the country, but talks had ended in a deadlock. Mbeki submitted a preliminary report to the A.U. chairman, arguing that only a negotiated settlement would prevent civil war. Martins (2011:75) observed that from the beginning, it was clear that such a straightforward, simple solution would not be enough to disrupt the stalemate between Côte d'Ivoire's two sides, which had military forces and had a background of open ethnic conflict.

On December 9, 2010, the A.U. Commission (AUC) and Peace and Security Council (PSC) decision on Cote D'Ivoire recognized Qattara as the President elects and called on Gbagbo to abide by the result and surrender power without delay. A.U. also suspended the country's participation in all A.U. activities until such a time as the democratically elected President effectively assumes State power (AU PSC 2010).

Following the failure of Mbeki's mission, Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga was appointed by the African Union chairman to monitor and assist negotiate an end to the crisis Nicolas (, 2011). On December 17, 2010, Raila Odinga called for African states to remove Gbagbo from office by force. Odinga was among the first negotiators to suggest a military option. Similarly, a high-level committee undertook the meditative efforts of the African Union to end the crisis. In early March 2011, the A.U. high-level panels presented their report to PSC at the meeting and, among other things, recommended were that it reaffirmed that Qattara won the election and that Gbagbo should step down. (PSC; AHG, CCL XV, 2011). Efforts to implement the high-level committee report recommendation of the committee proved difficult. Nicolas (2011) noted that Gbagbo's camp had strongly rejected the panel's recommendation result. Also (Tim and Loucoumane 2011, as cited in Nicolas, 2011, p.5), on March 22, 2011, Brito, a former Cape Verde foreign affairs minister, was appointed to implement the panel's recommendation Qattara rejected him because he was not a former head of state. He had alleged personal and political ties to Gbagbo.

In the end, the capture of Laurent Gbagbo in a bunker in the presidential palace in Abidjan on April 7, 2011, by force loyal to Alassane Qattara backed by United Nations peacekeepers and French Special Forces brought an end to the problem of having two presidents in one country (Obi, 2011: 16).

Problems That Militated Against African Union Conflict Resolution In Cote D'Ivoire.

The crisis in Cote d'Ivoire showed the divisions that existed among African Union members. Consequently, the organization's failure to present a united front in resolving the issue in Cote d'Ivoire is a result. The A.U.'s efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Cote d'Ivoire issue were repeatedly impeded by disagreements among member states, undermining the A.U.'s credibility as the primary political mediator. According to Bekoe (2011), These divisions were reflected within the A.U. mediation team, notably when South Africa sided with Gbagbo and claimed that South Africa had stationed a naval warship off from the Qattara camp on the coast to prevent an ECOWAS intervention. It later emerged that South African Naval presence was part of a joint military exercise between Cote d'Ivoire and South Africa. South African position regarding the Cote d'Ivoire crisis was ambiguous.

Furthermore, other indications of discord among A.U. member states had included Gambia's recognition of the legality of Gbagbo's election and its opposition to a possible ECOWAS military intervention. Also, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni's called for an investigation of the poll process and rejected the validity of international recognition of Quattara and rejection of Gbagbo's claimed to win. Moreso, Martins (2011) noted that the Angolan government were supportive of Gbagbo at first when they sent an emissary to witness Gbagbo's swearing ceremony and later when it stated that a revision of the electoral process and new election were needed, with President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos arguing that Gbagbo was the constitutional President of Cote d'Ivoire. He should remain until the next election since the electoral results of November 28, 2010, were announced past the deadline by those who did not possess the competence to do so. However, Angolans' confusing stance on Cote d'Ivoire changed when its government rallied behind the A.U. but also defended that Cote d'Ivoire should create a national unity government based on dialogue Gbagbo was constitutionally elected. Also, (Apuuli 2012:35) supported that the division among

African Union members hampered the A.U. capacity to bring a peaceful resolution to the conflict. He opined that this immense political disorganization within A.U. provided Gbagbo with time and a straightforward solution: Remain in power without paying heed to the foreign charter.

Ghana supported Gbagbo's case that the 2010 elections were fundamentally flawed. This discord within the A.U. members states, according to Reosebell (2011), resulted in the A.U.s failure to achieve very much, even though Cote d'Ivoire has been the dominant issue in many deliberations that the African Union have held since after the disputed election of November 2010. From the above, we discovered that what was wrong with the African diplomacy in Cote d'Ivoire was that the A.U. has been more divided than ECOWAS, which explains why the Ivorian protagonists, especially Qattara, has treated the organization's envoy with ignominy.

However, from the above, we have seen that although both the ECOWAS and African Union presented a unified front in the Ivorian crisis, some individual African Union members took divergent positions. Thus, with these varied positions, A.U. could not realize an effective intervention in the crisis.

Another impediment that militated against the success of the African Union in conflict resolution was finance.

Table 1.1 Summary of A.U. Approved Budget of the African Union 2004-2007

Year	A.U. Approved Budget (in US\$ '000s)					
	Approved Budget	Assessed Budget to the Member States	Budget requested from External Partners	Income receipt		Total Annual Income
				Income received from Member States	Income received from External Partners	
2004	43,000	40,422	2,578	25,632	10,560	36,192
2005	158,384	60,228	88,995	48,822	25,542	74,364
2006	136,004	69,389	66,615	73,890	15,003	88,893
2007	132,988	96,449	36,539	63,773	10,101	73,874
TOTAL 2004-7	470,376					273,323

Source: Audit of the Africa union high-level panel Report 2004-2007. Retrieved on October 20, 2012, from www.pambazuka.org/actionalarts/.../Audit-REPORT.Doc

Table 1.2 Summary of the Peace Fund

Year	Off-Budget Peace Fund (in US\$ '000s)					
	Contributions from the Member States	Donors' Contributions	Total income received	Member States' Contributions as a percentage of income received	Actual Expenditure	Expenditure as a Percentage of Income
2004	1,794	107,652	109,446	1.6	80,541	73.6
2005	2,737	122,892	125,629	2.2	104,796	83.4
2006	2,786	179,622	182,408	1.5	169,888	93.1
2007	2,940	142,350	145,290	2.0	109,082	75.1

Source: Audit of the Africa union high-level panel 2004-2007. . Retrieved on October 20, 2012, from www.pambazuka.org/actionalarts/.../Audit-REPORT.Doc

Table 1.1 indicates the evolution of the African Union Budget from 2004 to 2007. The resources generated through internal sources, from assessed contributions, are hardly sufficient to cover the administrative cost, thus leaving little or no surplus for the financing of programmes and projects of the A.U. A.U. has managed to mobilize external resources to meet part of its budgetary requirements. Also, African Union, to play the role of conflict resolution and peacekeeping, must have adequate resources. We found that from table 1.2 African Union has had financial challenges since its inception. Also, Okumu (2009) supported that A.U. has operated with a budget deficit since its inception.

Also, from the high levelled audit of the African Union from table 1.2, we observed that an average of 1.9% of the total resources channelled through the peace and security fund came from African member states. External partners provided the rest. It implies that some African Union member states had not shown much commitment in paying their dues. Bakara (2011) noted that given the A.U. capacity weakness in finance and logistics, A.U. involvement in Cote d'Ivoire dogged on while the conflict intensified. Eventually, regional and sub-regional mediator's efforts failed, and the conflict had to be resolved through war. This shows how financial challenges undermined the A.U.'s ability to take effective action and ultimately led to United Nations (U.N.) intervention calls.

Additionally, Magliveras (2011:14) noted that at the end of June 2009, the sum of contributions in arrears had reached USD 127 million, of which USD 41 million concerned 2008 and the rest concerned 2009. Around 66.36% of the total Union budget comes from only five countries; 26 members were in arrears; 16 Members have no arrears but have not paid their assessment for the year 2011, and two members cleared their arrears and paid only part of the assessment for 2011. This has meant that, at the end of June 2011, the total budgetary contributions paid were USD 43.8 million, which amounted to 35.7% of the total contributions. At the end of June 2009, the sum of contributions in arrears had reached USD 127 million, of which USD 41 million concerned 2008 and the rest concerned 2009.

Furthermore, according to the African Union High-level Panel report (2012), the Union depends heavily on partners to fund its programmes. Thus, the division among African Union member states and Funding impeded A.U. to resolve the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire.

Conclusion and Recommendation

The conflict in Cote d'Ivoire reflects the failure of governance from the perspective of conflict resolution theorists. African Union needs to note the importance of avoiding inter-sub regional rivalries to the extent that they impede collective goals and interests. The findings reveal that although African Union demonstrates a willingness to tackle the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire, A.U. faced severe challenges in seeking to mediate in the Ivorian crisis apart from the conflict's intractability, warranting national interest, institutional weakness and resource deficits. A.U. held several meetings, examinations, considerations throughout the entire crisis, but A.U. was unable to change the course of events in Cote d'Ivoire. Consequently, we recommend as follows. Funding is an issue that A.U. needs to watch closely because Funding by the member states creates ownership. A.U. should mobilize additional resources through an innovative partnership with civil society and the private sector.

Political will, a spirit of trust and cooperation are needed on the part of regional political leaders to overcome the friction that led to mutual accusations and suspicion regarding the harbouring and provision of support to opposition groups. African Union should establish a mediation unit; The A.U.'s current approach to mediation has been ad hoc, ill-prepared, and based on top-down bargains. To ameliorate this problem, the A.U. should establish a mediation unit within the commission. Such a unit could coordinate mediation support to A.U. officials and envoys and mediation capacity-building activities of the Peace and Security Council.

In order to obtain respect, the AU Peace and Security Council need also have political and military power. While it is challenging to expect compromise in every other disagreement, the A.U. must use discretion and logic in its conflict resolution method. Above all, African Union member states must strengthen their commitment to good governance, human rights protection, political accountability, and openness across the continent.

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